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Fall 1991

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Book Reviews

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

ANDREW FENTON COOPER, RICHARD A. HIGGOTT, and KIM RICHARD NOSSAL take issue with the common view that the Gulf conflict provides an example of successful American leadership in international politics. They argue that if leadership is examined from the perspective of the follower instead of the leader, the American role in the Gulf war emerges in a different light.

JEROME SLATER argues that Israeli security would be enhanced rather than threatened by the creation of a Palestinian state, so long as there are appropriate safeguards against Palestinian irredentism or the use of the West Bank as a base for an attack on Israel by major Arab States.

JANICE GROSS STEIN explores strategies of reassurance that can contribute to the prevention of the use of force among adversaries. She assesses their strengths and weaknesses and identifies the conditions under which strategies of reassurance can complement or supplement the threats that underlie deterrence.

THOMAS R. OLIVER looks at the national debate over health care reform of a decade ago and congressional policy decisions on the issue. He analyzes why Congress rejected proposals to stimulate broad competition in the financing and delivery of health care services and instead enacted a more narrow system to regulate hospital costs for the Medicare program.

C. LAWRENCE EVANS analyzes patterns of participation in U.S. Senate committees. Drawing on interviews with senators and Senate staff members, he concludes that influencing committee decisions tends to be selective, often including just three or four senators.

RICHARD PIOUS reviews four recent books dealing with what happens to the vast powers of the presidency, especially its national security prerogatives, when a no-hands president occupies the Oval Office.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict

ANDREW FENTON COOPER
RICHARD A. HIGGOTT
KIM RICHARD NOSSAL

The renewalist side of the long-running debate over whether the United States is in decline in world politics was given a particular fillip by the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990–1991.[1] From the very outset, the conflict tended to create a mood of optimism in the United States,[2] confirming for many the correctness

[1] Exemplars of the declinist side of the debate are usually said to include David Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), esp. chap. 8; and Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), esp. chap. 10. Renewalists take their name from Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Winter 1988–89): 76–96; also Henry Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). For examples of more journalistic contributions to the debate, see Steven Schlossstein, *The End of the American Century* (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1989); and William Pfaff, *Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).

[2] Martin Walker, correspondent for *The Guardian* in the United States, was moved to remark caustically on "the giddiness of Washington as it thrills to its new self-image as the one and only superpower." "The U.S. and the Persian Gulf Crisis," *World Policy Journal* 7 (Fall 1990): 792.

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of such renewalists as Samuel P. Huntington, Henry Nau, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.[3] In a contribution to *The Economist*'s annual new year forecast, Nye, for example, extended his basic theme to the Gulf crisis. "[A]s the action over Iraq has shown," he concluded his essay (which appeared in Canada under the title "Still Top Dog"), "where America leads, others follow—this year, next year and for the following generation."[4]

To be sure, this stirring sennet and the nationalist sentiments that undergird it accurately reflected common discourse—official and unofficial—about the role of the United States in the Gulf conflict. As President George Bush put it in his State of the Union message on 29 January 1991, "For two centuries we've done the hard work of freedom, and tonight we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity. . . ."[5] Martin Anderson, of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University exulted in an end-of-war interview that "the Persian Gulf war has shown, clearly and unequivocably, that we're the number one military power. . . . The United States has achieved moral, economic and military supremacy—probably for the first time in history. It's the first time since World War II that the leadership of the United States is undisputed."[6] In the same vein, Charles Krauthammer argued that the Gulf conflict revealed the essential unipolarity of the post-cold war world: "The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies."[7] Moreover, the ubiquitous use by the English-language media of the adjectival phrase "U.S.-led" to describe the opposition ranged against Iraq reinforced the idea of an American leadership role.

There can be little doubt that the United States took the lead in the Gulf conflict. The Bush administration gathered a broadly-based coalition of thirty-five others states from six continents and all points of the compass to commit units to sanction Iraq.[8] It mustered critical support on the United Nations Security

[3] Excerpts from Nye, *Bound to Lead* were published, inter alia in "The Misleading Metaphor of Decline," *The Atlantic* 265 (March 1990): 86–94; "The Changing Nature of World Power," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Summer 1990): 177–92; and "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy* 80 (Fall 1990): 153–71.

[4] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Still Top Dog," *The Economist/The Globe and Mail Report on Business: The World in 1991*, January 1991, 48.

[5] *New York Times*, 30 January 1991.

[6] *Toronto Star*, 3 March 1991.

[7] Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (America and the World 1991): 23.

[8] An exact count of the coalition is difficult to come by. At the onset of war, the English-language media commonly used the figure twenty-eight or twenty-nine; advertisements taken out by the Kuwaiti government thanking the United States and its partners for their part in liberation list thirty-two members of the coalition. These numbers, however, overlook the contributions of some states. The count of thirty-six we adopt includes all those governments that had units in the Gulf at the outbreak of war—Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

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Council for a series of punitive UN-sponsored actions against Baghdad, including eventually Resolution 678, authorizing members to use "all necessary means" to secure an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Indeed, such was the rallying power of American diplomacy that thirteen foreign ministers attended the Security Countil meeting for the vote on 678 on 29 November 1990. On the military front, the United States rapidly deployed impressive military might to the Gulf region. And most importantly, it demonstrated unwavering resolve to commit both blood and treasure to the fight for what the president in his State of the Union message called "a big idea, a new world order."

Nor can there be any doubt that few other states would have been inclined to do what the United States did; and surely no other state could have done it. As Secretary of State James A. Baker III argued before Congress, "We remain the one nation that has the necessary political, military and economic instruments at our disposal to catalyze a successful response by the international community."[9] Bush was to repeat the same theme in the State of the Union message: "Among the nations of the world only the United States of America has had both the moral standing and the means to back it up."

In short, it is not surprising that the dominant interpretation of American policy after 2 August 1990 is that it constituted leadership behavior: as Nye put it so simply, the United States led, and everyone else followed. It is indeed a tempting conclusion. But to put it this way is misleading, for it assumes that leadership can be deduced by looking at the leader's behavior alone; it assumes that one need not bother examining too closely what the followers are actually doing, what is motivating them, what is driving their behavior. As long as others are following, the assumption seems to be, the United States must therefore be leading.

A Follower's Perspective on Leadership

Such an interpretation of the American role in the Gulf is very much in keeping with how the international relations literature looks at leadership. An examination of different strands of the scholarly literature reveals that the focus is almost exclusively on the leader or the hegemon. Smaller states or the hegemon's followers do not occupy a position of prominence in these analyses.

For those who see hegemony in fundamentally negative terms—as a system of domination—discussions of leaders and followers are largely irrelevant. In this view, there is no leader providing leadership, only a hegemonic power subordinating all others before it; there is, consequently, little need for a careful examination of followers. Indeed, it does not even make much sense to talk of followers of the hegemon; they are not follower states as much as they are simply subordinate

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That number would rise to thirty-seven if the several hundred Afghani *mujahadeen* who travelled to the Gulf privately are included.

[9] Quoted in Walker, "U.S. and Persian Gulf Crisis," 791.

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or secondary states subject to the hegemon's ability to ensure that its own interests prevail. In less crude versions, hegemony is seen in largely structural terms: the ability of the leading state to mold the socioeconomic or ideological environment in a way conducive to its interests and reinforcing its dominance. For example, G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan seek to go beyond purely coercive explanations of hegemony by examining the degree to which hegemonic power is sustained by the socialization patterns of elites in secondary states, and the degree to which these elites come to share the larger "vision" of the hegemon.[10] Likewise, Robert W. Cox stresses the interactive nature of the process: "[Hegemony] means dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leader state or states and leading social classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful."[11]

However, in much of the international relations literature, hegemony is used in a more positive way,[12] one that embraces the terminology of leadership. And, typically, the analysis tends to focus on the leader alone. The sources of the leader's hegemonic power are explored; the generally positive leadership role the hegemon plays providing what are commonly called "international public goods," such as order, stability, and security is asserted; and the traits and abilities needed to sustain that hegemonic power are enumerated. With but few exceptions,[13] it is widely assumed in the literature that followers are not a sufficient or even a necessary condition of leadership. Rather, secondary or "supporting"[14] states figure in this kind of analysis largely to show the free rider principle in operation (to show how secondary states consume international public goods being provided by the hegemon); or to ascertain that such states do not possess attributes of power quite like the hegemon and, therefore, can be safely ruled out as "contenders" or "challengers" to the leading state.[15]

[10] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44 (Summer 1990): 283–315.

[11] Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 7; also "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," *Millenium: A Journal of International Studies* 12 (Summer 1983): 162–75.

[12] For a good discussion of what he calls the ironies of hegemony's second coming, see Richard Leaver, "Restructuring in the Global Economy: From Pax Americana to Pax Nipponica?" *Alternatives* 14 (October 1989), esp. 439ff.

[13] For example, Robert O. Keohane has argued that we should be as interested in "why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemon" as we are in how the hegemon imposes its power on the international system. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), esp. 39.

[14] David A. Lake has suggested the category of "system supporters," but his analysis is cast almost exclusively in collective-goods terms and focuses narrowly on economic policy. "International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983): 517–43.

[15] For example, Nye, *Bound to Lead*, chaps. 4–5; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*

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Even those students of international politics who recognize that there is a difference in styles of behavior by the leading state—between "leadership" and "dominance"[16]—tend not to concern themselves with how those differences work themselves out on followers. For example, the difference is central to Charles P. Kindleberger's analysis of American leadership—and the lack of it—in the global economy.[17] Likewise, Duncan Snidal reminds us of the distinction that is drawn between models of "coercive leadership" and "benevolent leadership" in hegemonic stability theory, a distinction echoed by John Conybeare's notion of the United States as a "predatory hegemon."[18] For his part, Oran R. Young has attempted to differentiate between "structural," "entrepreneurial," and "intellectual" leadership in regime formation.[19] However, these analyses tend to focus on the behavior of the leader alone; they only rarely touch on the followers.

It can be argued that such a leader-centered approach seriously distorts how we understand the nature of leadership in international politics. Focusing on the traits, interests, and capabilities of leaders and would-be challengers may tell us a great deal about which states are bound to be the most powerful in the international system at a particular historical conjuncture. But that approach tells us little about leadership, because it tells us little about the dynamics of followership—in other words, what drives followers to follow.

If, by contrast, assertions about American leadership in the Gulf conflict are examined using different assumptions about what constitutes leadership, rather different conclusions about America's role emerge, all of Washington's taking-the-lead behavior notwithstanding. Instead of asking whether the United States is bound to lead, we ask whether others are bound to follow.

In this, we adopt the approach used by Richard Stubbs in his recent studies of international leadership in Southeast Asia.[20] Stubbs argues that we will get a more

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(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29–38; George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 12–18; Charles P. Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides" in *Economic Order: Essays on Financial Crisis and International Public Goods* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 185–95. For an excellent critique of these assumptions, see Isabelle Grunberg, "Exploring the 'Myth' of Hegemonic Stability," *International Organization* 44 (Autumn 1990): 431–77.

[16] Often the leadership component of this leadership/dominance dichotomy tends to be only inchoately defined. For example, Modelski, *Long Cycles*, 14, notes that "Leadership cannot be viewed solely or primarily as a display of power or a manifestation of superiority. . . ." But his description of what leadership entails ("it must be seen more essentially as the accomplishment of essential services that give impetus and example to the global polity. . . .") is incompletely worked out.

[17] Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership," for example.

[18] Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39 (Autumn 1985): 579–614; John Conybeare, cited in Gilpin, *Political Economy*, 345.

[19] Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: The Emergence of Institutions in International Society" (Paper presented to International Studies Association, Washington, DC, 10–14 April 1990).

[20] Richard Stubbs, "From Hegemony to Competitive Leadership: The Case of Southeast Asia" (Paper delivered to the International Studies Association, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 20–23 March 1991); and

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nuanced picture when we use the set of lenses provided by the social psychology literature on leadership.[21] One of the central themes of this literature is that "leadership" as a political phenomenon must be distinguished from "dominance," "headship," or "naked power."[22] In other words, leadership should be seen as something more than simply the domination of a group by its strongest member (in the way that an alpha male dominates a baboon troop), or even "compliance induction"—the use by the powerful of force, coercion, or manipulation to ensure that their interests prevail over the interests of the weak.[23] Leadership, this literature argues, must be seen first and foremost as a relationship between a leader and those who follow the leader; moreover, it is argued that this relationship cannot be fully understood by focusing on the leader alone; one gains insights into leadership by focusing on both the leader *and* the followers and on the dynamics of "followership,"[24] or what James MacGregor Burns called the "rich and pulsating stream of leadership-followership forces flowing through the whole social process."[25]

The implication here is not that leader-follower relationships are free from the element of power, however. As Kenneth F. Janda has argued, "all leader-follower relationships are power-wielder-power-recipient relationships, *but not all power relationships involve leadership.*"[26] The key is to distinguish between acts of leadership and acts of power. And just as we would want to distinguish leadership from dominance, so too would we want to distinguish a desire to follow a leader (followership) from merely deferring to the powerful for reasons of pragmatism (or acquiescence).[27]

"Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia," *International Journal* 46 (Summer 1991).

[21] The most comprehensive and exhaustive survey of this literature is to be found in *Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research*, rev. and exp. by Bernard M. Bass, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1981); also C.A. Gibb, ed., *Leadership: Selected Readings* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1969). The best application of this literature in a purely political context is James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

[22] C.A. Gibb, "The Principles and Traits of Leadership" in Gibb, ed., *Leadership*, 213; also Bass, ed., *Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*, 14–15; Burns, *Leadership*, esp. 433–39.

[23] Here we follow the analysis of power in Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan, 1974).

[24] There is a strand within this literature that suggests that one can and should look at the issue of leadership *primarily* from the perspective of the followers. As F.H. Sanford argued in 1940, "There is some justification for regarding the follower as the most crucial factor in any leadership event and for arguing that research directed at the follower will eventually yield a handsome payoff. Not only is it the follower who accepts or rejects leadership, but it is the follower who *perceives* both the leader and the situation and who reacts in terms of what he perceives. And what he perceives may be, to an important degree, a function of his own motivations, frames of reference, and 'readinesses.'" Quoted in E.P. Hollander, "Emergent Leadership and Social Influence" in Gibb, ed., *Leadership*, 296.

[25] Burns, *Leadership*, 437.

[26] Kenneth F. Janda, "Towards the Explication of the Concept of Leadership in Terms of the Concept of Power" in Glenn D. Paige, ed., *Political Leadership: Readings for an Emerging Field* (New York: Free Press, 1972), 58–59. (Emphasis added.)

[27] Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Hegemonic Power," 286n, remind us of the useful distinction drawn

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The key to distinguishing between the two, it can be argued, is motive. Without the elements of motive and context, the mere observable act of going along tells one little about either leadership or followership. To be sure, it is tempting (particularly for the powerful) to assume that if everyone around is going along, they must therefore be leading and everyone else must be following. But it is axiomatic that acts that may superficially appear to be the same at the overt level reveal themselves to be markedly different when one adds the less than tangible elements of intent and context.

So too with acts of leadership and followership: appearances can be misleading. Those who look as though they are following may well be engaged in an act of followership, to be discussed in more detail below. Then again, those putative followers may not be so much following a leader as finding themselves in step with a leader because of complementary interests. And finally, those who look as though they are following may also be engaged in an elaborate deception, purposely misleading those who are inclined to think (perhaps wishfully) that they are leading. In this latter case, those following may have little regard for the leader but be fearful of the consequences of a confrontation or defection; they are merely deferring to superior power with the intention of defecting as soon as is practical.[28] It can thus be argued that before we can draw conclusions about leadership and followership, we must inquire into the motivations of those following a leader. The motivations will enable us to distinguish between followers and those who are simply bending to the will of the more powerful.

What, then, motivates followership? There is in the literature little agreement on how best to characterize followers other than to recognize their complexity. Some have argued that one can understand the relationship between follower and leader simply in terms of reciprocity: leadership and followership involve a transactional social exchange in which they give and receive benefits. The followers benefit by having a leader who organizes and achieves mutually desired goals and objectives. For their part, leaders benefit by having followers who grant them status, prestige, and, on occasion, material benefit.[29]

Others maintain that leadership should be seen as more than an exchange, a transactional manipulation of benefits. Burns, for example, argues that leadership is best understood as transformational: in "transforming leadership," the leader is able, by using the teaching role of leadership, to transform the interests, priorities, and expectations of would-be followers, and convince them to join in the pur-

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by Michael Mann between "*pragmatic* acceptance, where the individual complies because he perceives no realistic alternative, and *normative* acceptance, where the individual internalizes the moral expectations of the ruling class and views his own inferior position as legitimate."

[28] Cooper and McGaugh note that "The human may act as though he admires the person in command and professes a desire to follow, though in reality he may be working out a compromise. Being pushed around now in order to gain a favorably anticipated position later is common practice among humans." J.B. Cooper and J.L. McGaugh, "Leadership" in Gibb, ed., *Leadership*, 245.

[29] See *Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*, 254.

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suit of "higher" moral goals articulated by the leader.[30] Others still focus on the importance of legitimacy for our understanding of leadership and followership: Janda, for example, argues that leadership is "a group member's perception that another group has the right to prescribe behavior patterns for the former regarding his activity as a member of a particular group."[31]

Both Burns and Janda focus on what appear to be the critical elements that distinguish followership from submission or acquiescence: the degree to which the follower regards the leader and the leader's "vision" (the goals that the leader seeks for the collective or the group) as worthy of active and concrete support; and following from that the degree to which the follower willingly trusts the leader—in other words, accords the leader the right to make decisions on behalf of the group to achieve those goals.

Both elements are equally important. Followers need to be convinced that the leader's goals are good and worthy in themselves. They must be convinced that the goals being embraced by the leader embody some notion of a "greater good,"[32] rather than just happening to be in the obvious parochial interests of the leader, and thus worth the subordination of one's own parochial preferences and expectations. It is as critical that followers see the leader as legitimately placed to make decisions on their behalf. True followership involves an understanding that leadership necessarily means making political choices for the group; followers appreciate that decisions made on behalf of the collective in pursuit of worthy goals may nonetheless conflict with the interests of a particular member. But followership implies granting leaders the legitimacy, as Janda puts it, to "prescribe behavior patterns" for group members, even when that prescription involves having some followers alter their preferences.

In this formulation, the element of power is not necessarily absent. The leader of such followers may have preponderant power resources and may therefore have the capability, if the leader wishes to use it, to engage in the exercise of power and domination over the smaller members and to secure their deference and acquiescence by manipulating material benefits or using threats of harm or deprivation. But followership implies that such bullying will quite simply be unnecessary given the expectations of the followers. The leader may have to consult, to explain, to persuade, even on occasion to cajole. But because followership involves followers intertwining their own interests with those of a leader in whom they place confidence and trust, these followers are likely not simply to defer and acquiesce to the leader, but to willingly follow that leader.

We are still, however, left with an obvious question: does it matter whether following in international politics occurs because of the followership that is the necessary concomitant of leadership, or because of the submission associated with dom-

[30] Burns, *Leadership*, esp. 425–26.

[31] Janda, "Concept of Leadership," 62.

[32] To formulate it in this fashion, however, is not to imply that the leader is thereby supplying a "public good," as that term is understood in policy analysis.

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inance or headship? Surely, behavior is what counts: as long as other states are going along, does it matter why they follow? We argue that it does matter for both the leader and the follower. Just as authority is usually deemed preferable to coercion, so too is followership inspired by leadership preferable to subordination secured by dominance. For the follower, the calculus is a simple one: submission to the dominance of a greater power is in all respects less palatable than the consensual dynamic of followership and will surely drive the dominated to seek ways of defecting at the first pragmatic opportunity. For the putative leader, the chief calculations are cost and predictability: followership gained through leadership is, simply put, less costly than submission extracted through dominance. More importantly, it yields more stable and predictable support. These are not insignificant concerns for a great power, which must be concerned about the costs of maintaining its greatness. It is axiomatic that a great power able to generate a wide followership will have to expend less energy and fewer resources to secure outcomes that are basically in its own interests than one that must maintain its dominance by more costly means.

Leading and Following: The Case of the Gulf Conflict

If we need followership in order to have leadership, then before we can accept rosy assessments of the implications of the Gulf conflict for the nature of American leadership, we should examine followership in the Gulf crisis more closely. On the one hand, there was a great deal of going along with the United States—from the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion, to the launching of the air war by the coalition on 17 January, and into the short ground war in late February 1991. Thirty-five states formally joined the United States in a coalition between August 1990 and January 1991, initially to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and to impose a blockade. Support on the Security Council and in the General Assembly for a tough anti-Iraq position was consistently overwhelming. When force was eventually used, aircraft from six states opened the air war. On the other hand, if one examines more closely the motivations and policies of those states that initially appeared to be following the United States in the Gulf conflict, it is less clear that there was as much followership as at first might appear to be the case.

First, it is problematic to include as followers of the United States every state that was in one way or another on side during the conflict simply because they were on side. For example, the Soviet leadership appeared to be in considerable sympathy with the general approach taken by the Bush administration and backed American policies and initiatives in a positive and cooperative way during the conflict—even after force was used. But it makes little sense to think of the Soviet Union as a follower simply because Moscow supported American statecraft in the Gulf. Not only does the USSR not conceive of itself in such terms, but other priorities were looming large for the leadership in Moscow that helped shape the Soviet response. Was Soviet support for the American initiative driven by a desire

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to keep foreign investment flowing into the USSR? Reportedly, Secretary of State James Baker arranged a $4 billion Saudi loan offer to the Soviets before the UN vote on Resolution 678. Or was Soviet support designed to induce the West to be more tolerant of developments in domestic Soviet politics, in particular the central government's handling of the more feisty republics? Even though most accounts stress that the Soviet leadership seemed genuinely sympathetic to the approach favored by the United States,[33] there seemed to be a limit to the USSR's willingness to go along, as Moscow's peacemaking efforts at the end of the war clearly indicated.

Likewise, China may have deferred to Washington on its general approach to the invasion and on Resolution 678, but one cannot call this followership. All indications are that Beijing's acquiescence was not at all driven by a belief in the inherent rightness of Bush's vision of a new world order or the American position on Kuwait. Rather, it would appear that the anticipation of a straightforward quid pro quo drove Chinese policy: deference on the Gulf conflict in return for an unambiguous side payment—a warming in the Sino-American relationship that had been so soured by the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989. For its part, the Bush administration did not even bother to put too fine a point on it. The very day after Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister, abstained on Resolution 678, he was welcomed for the first high-level Chinese visit to Washington since Tiananmen.

We should also exclude Syria as a follower of the United States, even though it was formally part of the international coalition. One could adduce numerous reasons why the government in Damascus would welcome the lead taken by Washington in August 1990, join the coalition, and then commit some 19,000 combat troops to the enterprise. It stretches credulity, however, to believe that among these reasons was President Hafez al-Assad's belief in either the rightness of American leadership in global politics or the normative correctness of Bush's vision of a "new world order, in which diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security, freedom and the rule of law."[34] It is likelier that the Syrian government calculated that it would gain a great deal if it were to put aside its more traditional antipathies to the United States for the moment and join the coalition. Ann Mosely Lesch, for example, argues that Syria was hoping its support would give Damascus a larger regional role. Other objectives included being dropped from the United States terrorist blacklist, more aid from Saudia Arabia, and even the possibility of a return of the Golan Heights from Israel.[35]

Other members of the coalition all have more legitimate claims to followership than Syria, but the implications for American leadership of the Gulf policies of

[33] Thomas L. Friedman, "The Iraq Resolution: A U.S.-Soviet Collaboration," *New York Times*, 2 December 1990.

[34] *New York Times*, 30 January 1991.

[35] Ann Mosely Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians," *Middle East Journal* 45 (Winter 1991).

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these states are no more clear. For example, the circumstances in which the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait's government-in-exile) joined the United States should be examined carefully. For followership offered in extremis is like consent offered under duress; one should be cautious of the implications one draws from it. Given the degree to which their vital survival interests were directly threatened (Kuwait's had already been extinguished) by Saddam Hussein's desire to expand Iraq's power in the Gulf, it is little wonder that the Gulf states were so willing to go along with whatever approach the United States desired, particularly since it was as potent as Operation Desert Shield and its successor, Desert Storm. Moreover, the manifestly illiberal, nondemocratic, and sexist nature of the political formations of the Gulf states suggests that the broader normative vision about the universal aspirations of humankind articulated by President Bush is hardly shared by those in the Gulf. A common quip, voiced frequently in western countries, was that this was a war to make the world safe for feudalism. Perhaps more importantly, there was a marked ambivalence in these states, widely shared by both governors and governed alike, about the desirability of an American military presence in the region and a preference, particularly in Saudi Arabia, to keep American troops "over the horizon."[36]

Egypt's vital security interests were not as direly threatened as those of the Gulf states, but like Syria, the government in Cairo had a great deal to gain geopolitically by acceding to the American initiative once Bush had foreclosed the inter-Arab solution being worked out in the early days of the crisis. There can be little doubt that Egypt's regional standing was greatly enhanced by its broker's role at the meetings of the Arab League held immediately after the invasion. At the same time, however, the government of President Hosni Mubarak had a great deal to lose by not being on board—and heartily so—from the outset. Would the United States have been as willing to continue its traditional exceedingly generous military aid package? Would it have forgiven so much of Egypt's debt? Such largely rhetorical questions do not deny followership (for Egypt has consistently been one of the most ardent followers of the United States in the region), but they do demonstrate how easily the analysis of this phenomenon can be muddied.

When examining the motivations of the various members of the coalition in an attempt to interpret followership, a further difficulty is encountered: how does one interpret followership given that the face of the Gulf conflict was changed so dramatically by the United States after it began? Most members of the coalition joined in August agreeing to a course of action and a set of objectives that kept on shifting as the crisis wore on. For many, what had begun as a relatively minor and painless contribution to a multilateral effort to impose sanctions to coerce Iraq into withdrawing from Kuwait and to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi

[36] Judith Miller, "Not So Much as a 'Thanks' for Western Forces in the Gulf," *New York Times*, 30 December 1990.

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Arabia was transformed at least five times by war's end, always at American instigation or by unilateral American decision.[37]

The first transformation occurred in late October, when the Bush administration decided that troop strength was to be redoubled and, more importantly, moved to an offensive posture. A second occurred on 29 November, when Resolution 678, effectively providing multilateral legitimacy for the use of force after 15 January 1991, came to a vote in the Security Council. A third shift came on 17 January 1991, with the opening of the air war against military and infrastructural targets inside Iraq. Yet another came on 23 February with the rejection by the United States of a Soviet proposal for a negotiated settlement and the opening of the ground offensive. The final shift came two days later – at the very end of the war – when it was decided to destroy the bulk of Iraq's military rather than allow it to withdraw from Kuwait.

These shifts in the nature of the conflict present the analyst with a problem in determining motivation about followership. On the one hand, political leaders from the coalition persistently claimed over the course of these seven months that they remained committed to the coalition and its shifting purposes. It might seem reasonable to take them at their word. On the other hand, we know that freedom of maneuver for coalition partners fell dramatically the moment they signed on in August 1990. Being on board meant in a very real sense being lashed to the mast: the costs of resisting or opposing the decisions being taken in Washington (much less defecting from the coalition altogether) were so high they became virtually impossible to countenance. Moreover, the behavior of Saddam Hussein himself increased the costs of defection considerably. He held foreigners as hostages and human shields for four months; launched Scud missile attacks on Israel in response to the coalition air raids; paraded obviously beaten-up coalition pilots on television; released oil into the Gulf; looted Kuwait City before the final retreat. All proved to be invaluable contributions to coalition unity.

Given this, the problem for the analyst is how to interpret the behavior of the allies, friends, and coalition partners of the United States over the course of the conflict. While we can readily call support for the multilateral moves organized by Washington in August 1990 "followership," it becomes more problematic after that. Can we be sure that the initial followership had not been transformed by January into Michael Mann's "pragmatic acceptance" and by February into outright submission? No definitive answers to such questions can be offered here, but the problem itself does warn us against easy assumptions that "following" is always followership.

Our skepticism about how to interpret the behavior of other states must be deepened by a further observation: with but one exception, the followers' enthusiasm

[37] The best account of these shifts is in Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pt. 2. See also Thomas L. Friedman and Patrick E. Tyler, "The Path to War: Bush's Crucial Decisions," *New York Times*, 3 March 1991.

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for this enterprise was hardly overwhelming. To be sure, many governments demonstrated genuine enthusiasm at the spirit of international cooperation that initially met the Iraqi invasion and readily agreed to follow the American lead in building support for multilateral sanctions by sending forces to the Gulf. But this enthusiasm was limited. Of the thirty-six members of the coalition deploying forces in the Gulf, nine states contributed only naval vessels; a further seven states contributed only medical units; Canada and Italy contributed naval vessels and aircraft. The contributions were thus appropriate for a naval blockade or tending someone else's wounded, but not for an offensive operation against Iraqi forces. Indeed, only seven states deployed ground troops actually engaged in combat.

Nor was the initial enthusiasm sustained for long. With the lone exception of Britain, no other state that joined the anti-Iraq coalition showed much zest for the increasingly military nature of the enterprise as it was being worked out by Washington over the final months of the crisis. Instead, a divergence occurred. On the one hand, the coalition's politicians continued to give strong support to the enterprise in their rhetoric. But rarely was the rhetoric matched by concrete action. On the contrary, there were numerous indications of a certain official nervousness and reluctance among many of the friends and allies of the United States, particularly as it became increasingly clear that the Bush administration's inclination was to use force if a full and unconditional withdrawal were not achieved.

Among the traditional friends and allies of the United States, Japan and Germany provide the clearest examples of this lack of zeal. Their reluctance to contribute military forces or some equivalent alternative to the multinational force was frequently criticized by many Americans as more allied free-riding. The excoriation of these states by Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) during the debate on war authorization is indicative. He claimed Germany and Japan

> have hardly spoken eloquently with their pocketbooks. They have only opted to hold our coats while we take on Hussein. Mr. President, I think this is a shame and a disgrace that Germany and Japan, two countries which will benefit far more than will the United States, two countries whose need for the oil of the Middle East far exceeds our need, will stand by and cynically watch American men and women shed their blood in the sands of the Arabian desert and refuse to help to finance in their treasury [sic] the costs of this effort. I think, Mr. President, I have difficulty finding the words to express my feelings that other nations would stand by. It's a monstrous disgrace and the American people will remember it.[38]

However, a more careful examination of German and Japanese attitudes toward the conflict might suggest a more complex conclusion. First, there was a general unwillingness in both countries to buy the argument put forward by the Bush administration that it was necessary to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait by force. Indeed, there seemed to be a resentment in both countries that their eco-

[38] *New York Times*, 13 January 1991. For a discussion of the oil needs of these states, see Richard Leaver, "The Fourth Oil Shock: Not So Shocking," *Current Affairs Bulletin* 67 (1990).

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nomic fortunes were at the mercy of what appeared to many to be collusion between the United States and Iraq in June and July 1990 to manipulate the price of oil.

It was widely believed that April Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, gave Saddam Hussein a green light to take action against Kuwait in their meeting on 25 July, a transcript of which was published in the *New York Times* on 25 September. Although Glaspie denied that this was her intent—claiming that no one thought Hussein would be "that stupid"—her interview was in fact in line with the signals sent to Iraq earlier in 1990 by her superior, John H. Kelly, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Moreover, Glaspie's alleged comment in September 1990 to the effect that no one thought Hussein would take *all* of Kuwait did little to dispel the suspicion that Bush's administration was implicated in an effort to spark a crisis in the Gulf that would in turn prompt a market-driven rise in the price of oil.[39]

In Germany and Japan, a certain parochialism prevailed: in Germany, the "narrow provincialism" that came with the preoccupation with reunification[40] and in Japan, the widespread view that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was simply not an event that deeply affected Japanese interests.[41] Moreover, entrenched in each nation's collective memory are the experiences of the first half of the twentieth century, which culminated in defeat and American occupation. One result was the imposition by the occupation authorities of constitutional provisions barring the use of force. The American occupiers were also successful in causing a nonmilitary ethic to be just as deeply embedded in the political culture of both states. Many Germans, for example, having had just war rhetoric rebound on them in the past, proved highly skeptical of the kind of justifications for the use of force against Iraq that surfaced during the conflict. Likewise, in Japan, there is a deep commitment to nonmilitary solutions to international affairs, and the Gulf crisis with its obvious military demands on all allies caused not only a kind of policy paralysis in Tokyo, but a governmental crisis.[42] In short, Americans may be con-

[39] Michael Emery, "How the U.S. Avoided the Peace," *Village Voice*, 5 March 1991. Clearly the meeting between Glaspie and Saddam Hussein on 25 July could be interpreted in markedly different ways. While some see evidence of conspiracy, other see it as a straight-forward case of misperception and failed deterrence. See Janice Gross Stein, "The Challenge of the Persian Gulf Crisis," *Peace and Security* 5 (Winter 1990–91): 2–5; or Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," *Survival* 33 (January/February 1991): esp. 26–28.

[40] Daniel Vernet, "Germans' Narrow Provincialism Inadequate for Wider Stage," *Le Monde* in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 20 January 1991.

[41] The Japanese expression "fire on the opposite shore"—used to describe distant events that do not directly touch Japan—was commonly employed to characterize the Vietnam war. See, for example, Thomas R.H. Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). It is noteworthy that the expression was used in the context of the Gulf conflict: "Japan Counts the Costs of Gulf Action—or Inaction," *New York Times*, 27 January 1991; and "'Fire on the Other Side': Why the Japanese Don't Think This Is Their War," *Newsweek*, 21 January 1991.

[42] For an example of this tendency, see the editorial, "Restrict Japan's Gulf Role," *Japan Economic Journal*, 26 January 1991.

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vinced that the failure of Germany and Japan to contribute to the Gulf war was free ridership; it can be as persuasively argued that their reluctance was due to a failure of U.S. leadership, a failure to secure followership from these states. Put bluntly, the United States failed to provide a sufficiently convincing argument that the big idea was also a good idea.

Both Italy and France engaged in an air combat role against Iraq, and French forces participated in the short ground war. But neither government was keen on the military solution being embraced by the Bush administration. Although the French government committed troops early (mainly because of French anger at the violation by Iraqi forces of the French ambassador's residence in Kuwait), as the 15 January deadline approached, the government of François Mitterrand adopted the role of a maverick. It embraced a kind of neo-Gaullist *indépendentisme*, breaking solidarity with both the European Community and the United States. Paris endorsed the proposal that would have linked an Iraqi withdrawal to a conference on the Palestinian question and pursued a unilateral diplomatic solution until the very last minute. When it appeared that the use of force was probable, Paris sought to limit its military role and promised, for example, to target only Iraqi installations in Kuwait proper. It is equally telling that in both France and Italy major resignations followed the outbreak of war: French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement and Italian naval chief in the Gulf, Vice-Admiral Mario Buracchia, resigned over their views on the use of force against Iraq. Moreover, the fact that both Italy and France rallied round the United States after war had broken out suggests bandwagoning rather than followership. They recognized that participation in the fighting was a necessary condition for participation in the peace with its lucrative reconstruction contracts and a reshaping of access to supplies of Gulf oil.

Such reluctance was not limited to the larger powers. Despite the lead of the United States in building up its military forces in preparation for the use of force, no smaller member of the coalition followed the American lead and significantly augmented their initial commitments. The Canadian government, for example, initially contributed two naval vessels and a supply ship and shortly afterwards sent a squadron of CF-18 Hornets; but it was not until the very end of the war that Ottawa finally approved offensive combat missions for this equipment. The Australian government also sent three naval vessels, but, his personal zeal for pleasing the United States notwithstanding, Prime Minister Bob Hawke left in no doubt that no further contributions would be sent, regardless of what happened. The Belgians dispatched three ships, but as war approached refused to sell ammunition to the British army. Some of the Muslim and Arab governments, such as Pakistan and Morocco, faced such strong domestic opposition that they tried to make their contingents as invisible as possible as it became clearer that the United States was prepared to use force.

This sense of reluctance of those in the U.S.-led coalition to follow the leader can be more clearly highlighted by contrasting their behavior with one member of the coalition that can be considered a true follower of the United States in this

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case. Britain established itself early as a paragon of followership, for its approach to the Gulf conflict reflected most closely the criteria of followership discussed above. To be sure, Britain had a great deal to gain geopolitically from eager support for the Americans: in one stroke, the "special relationship" that earlier in 1990 seemed to be threatened by the prospect of a new Washington-Bonn/Berlin axis was restored to its traditional prominence. But the British reaction went well beyond such calculations. The government, the political elite, and the bulk of the population exhibited a clear belief in the rightness of the leader's goals and in the legitimacy of the leader to select the means to achieve them. Both prime ministers, Margaret Thatcher and John Major, were by turns firm and genuine promoters and supporters of American leadership in the crisis. Indeed, Thatcher's role at the outset of the crisis proved to be crucial. She happened to be visiting Colorado at the time of the invasion and talked to Bush for two hours in Aspen before American policy had coalesced. She urged a leadership role on the United States, suggesting that the only way to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia was for both their countries to send combat troops to the region.[43]

British deference to the American lead was reflected not only in London's support for the various shifts in Bush's policy line but in its robust opposition to compromises being pushed by others, such as France or the Soviet Union. Yet another measure was the eagerness with which concrete commitments were made, both before and after 17 January. The initial contributions of military forces were made speedily; the per capita level of the 40,000 troops was exceeded only by the United States itself. Most importantly, the British demonstrated a clear willingness to resort to the use of force if necessary and to become involved in combat missions once force was used, particularly in the final phases of the destruction of the Iraqi army. Moreover, support for American leadership was reflected not only in Parliament (the House of Commons voted 534 to 57 in favor of the use of force, with the leaders of both the Labour opposition and the Liberal Democrats arguing that Saddam Hussein had to be beaten) but within the country as a whole. Opinion polls before 17 January showed markedly high support for the use of force compared to other countries in the coalition: 75 percent favored the use of force, with only 18 percent opposed; a month afterwards, the figure had risen to 90 percent fully in favor of the war.[44]

But the British case was exceptional. The rest of the portrait painted here of followership in the Gulf conflict surely does not match the picture usually painted of American leadership. When one examines each of the so-called followers in the Gulf conflict in more detail, one quickly discovers that there were in fact very few states that were bound to follow. Indeed, only one state unambiguously demon-

[43] If Thatcher's intervention was crucial in stiffening Bush's resolve, one can reasonably ask who was following whom. For accounts of the Aspen meeting, see "The Road to War," *Newsweek*, 28 January 1991, 58; Craig R. Whitney, "The Empire Strikes Back," *New York Times Magazine*, 10 March 1991, 34.

[44] "Back to the Bulldog Stuff," *The Economist*, 19–25 January 1991, 51; the mid-February figure from Whitney, "The Empire Strikes Back."

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strated the criteria of followership over the course of the conflict, suggesting rather different conclusions from those usually drawn about American leadership.

The analysis here suggests that while numerous states found themselves going along with the United States, most were not true followers. Judging by their concrete behavior and not merely the fine rhetoric of their political leaders, most simply did not buy into the vision of a new world order that evolved only after everyone was on board in August 1990. For if the new order started off as a truly multilateral enterprise (numerous nations chipping in for a common cause, as Bush put it during a news conference on 30 August 1990) it rapidly became a purely American project.

It is not that the government in Washington did not continue to act within a multilateral framework throughout the conflict. On the contrary, the Bush administration has clearly been one of the most multilaterally-minded American governments in the postwar period. Both the president and his secretary of state worked assiduously at channeling the conflict through the United Nations; at keeping in touch, often personally, with other leaders; and at widening the support for the anti-Iraq line.[45] The real problem was that leadership turned into headship, where decisions for the group are arrived at unilaterally by a leader whose overweening power ensures that subordinates will have few other options than to comply. This quickly became the case with all of the major decisions that defined the coalition's response to the invasion. Even some of the smaller decisions were decided unilaterally by the United States. For example, Resolution 678 approved the use of "all necessary means" if Iraq had not withdrawn "on or before 15 January," but was silent as to the time zone in which the resolution would become effective. The determination that the resolution meant midnight Eastern Standard Time (rather than midnight Kuwait time, eight hours earlier) was made by American, not United Nations, officials.

Such decisions typically represented American preferences, which were to be then sold to coalition partners who were carefully massaged by administration officials. The leader's preferences quickly became the group's by default, not by consensus. For no member of the coalition was in any position to resist the overwhelming inertial force of Washington's decision making once it started to roll.

Conclusions

Our aim has been to take issue with the overgeneralized portrait of American leadership in the Gulf conflict in particular and in international politics in general. We have sought to show in this case study of the Gulf conflict that just because the

[45] For an opposite interpretation, however, see the acerbic comments of Krauthammer, who argues that "What we have today is pseudo-multilateralism: a dominant great power acts essentially alone, but, embarrassed at the idea and still worshipping at the shrine of collective security, recruits a ship here, a brigade there, and blessings all around to give its unilateral actions a multilateral sheen. The gulf is no more a collective operation than was Korea, still the classic case study in pseudo-multilateralism." "Unipolar Moment," 25.

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United States is bound to be strong does not mean that it is bound to lead. We arrive at this conclusion by an unorthodox route—by looking at the followers rather than at the leader. For in order to give leadership concrete meaning, a leader must have followers, those willing to buy into a broad vision of collective goals articulated by a leader in whom both legitimacy and trust are placed. Moreover, these followers should be equally willing to commit themselves in concrete terms to that common cause.

We have argued that if these are the key ingredients of followership, then it would appear that the United States had far fewer genuine followers in the Gulf conflict than conventional wisdom would have it. The Bush administration began with an idea in early August 1990 of a multinational sanctioning force, which generated considerable enthusiasm internationally. But that vision failed to swing the coalition when the administration shifted to the military option. The new world order was not a vision that made enough sense to friends and allies that they were prompted to join the United States wholeheartedly in a military venture. The contradictions in Washington's position were too profound, the real motives too unclear, the longer-term goals not sufficiently group centered. In short, in shifting the coalition into military gear, Bush offered too few good reasons why friends and allies of the United States should spill the blood of their nationals or expend their national treasure in what became widely perceived as an American crusade. And yet the coalition held, and the United States did not have to use the kind of bully-boy tactics we have seen in the trade area to prevent defections.[46] At the same time, we have argued that since the alternatives to defection were so costly for all friends and allies of the United States, we should be wary of interpreting this cohesion as followership.

What implications does this line of argument have for the broader debate over American decline? Our conclusions must be tentative, but we would argue that the Gulf conflict, far from confirming American leadership, may paradoxically accelerate a process of decline—not in American power but in American followership. For the Gulf conflict demonstrated that while a few states in the international community may indeed be bound to follow the United States, many others simply do not demonstrate the characteristics of followership we have outlined here.

In our view, the danger for the future of American leadership is that many Americans with their leader-centered analysis of leadership will not be inclined to interpret the lack of enthusiastic contributions to the fighting in the Gulf as a failure of the leader to generate followership. Rather, the danger is that they will interpret it as a failure in others to support the United States—in short, more free-riding cheapness from ungrateful allies.

More importantly, Americans may be inclined to act accordingly,[47] which may

[46] William A. Niskanen, "The Bully of World Trade," *Orbis* 33 (Fall 1989): 531–38.

[47] As *The Economist*, 2 February 1991, 11–12, warned during the middle of the war in an editorial aimed gloatingly at those who were not behaving like Britain, "They'll Remember Their Friends."

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well create a powerful dynamic that has considerable implications for the future of American leadership in the international system. Given the widespread attachment in the United States to a public goods approach to statecraft, it is not surprising that the Bush administration has insisted that other states reimburse the United States for the costs of the conflict. As Fred Bergsten has said, "collective leadership" in this case meant that the United States led and the United States collected.[48] But such a cost-recovery approach to diplomacy carries its own costs. While the Gulf states make their contributions to the Defense Cooperation Account at the United States Treasury gratefully enough, there can be little doubt that not all American friends and allies share their enthusiasm. Others who have not been saved so directly from conquest are distinctly less than happy at being dunned for a conflict whose parameters and conduct they had no part in deciding. Moreover, their unhappiness only intensifies when it is all too clear that their checkbook diplomacy, far from mitigating American resentment, is commonly sneered at as little more than conscience money for those American lives, which it is widely believed were given up for the good of others.

Such a spiral of resentment is, however, inevitable when one is guided by a public goods approach to diplomacy. The problem is that there is no common agreement about what constitutes public goods and free riding in the contemporary international system. On the contrary, these are highly contested terms, as the persistent quarrels over burden-sharing in the American alliance system during the cold war demonstrated. Americans, not unnaturally, tend to think of American statecraft as providing international public goods such as peace, order, and security to the world; they tend to think of smaller countries consuming these goods without contributing to them—the classical free rider. But many in those smaller countries have persistently been loath to accept such parochial Americo-centric arguments that the United States is providing international public goods; likewise, those in smaller states tend to take great umbrage at suggestions by Americans that their behavior constitutes free riding.

In the past, the emotionalism generated by quarrels over burden-sharing between the United States and its friends and allies constituted an irritating burr in the various alliance relationships, but not a serious one. The mutual annoyance tended to be muted by and subordinated to the larger threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the Gulf conflict, however, these same emotions surfaced. But with the waning of the Soviet threat, there was no comparable dampening mechanism. Should the anger and resentment at the reluctant behavior of others that was so evident in the United States at the outset of the Gulf war persist into the postwar period, it may potentially alienate friends and allies of the United States, which will in turn diminish further the ring of possible or potential followers.

The argument advanced here that seeks to link American leadership to followership is even more suggestive when it is noted that the Gulf conflict is a case study

[48] Fred Bergsten, "Economic Implications of the Gulf War," Worldnet, Television and Film Service, United States Information Agency, Washington, DC, 22 May 1990.

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from the security agenda in world politics. One would expect the United States with its great military capacities to have the greatest influence, show most leadership, and garner most followership in this issue area. We suspect that were we to apply renewalist hypotheses to other agendas in international politics—the economic or social dimensions—we would find even less evidence of followership. This suggests in turn that American leadership will have to depend on more than the United States taking the lead and then expecting everyone else to follow. The analysis here suggests that a more nuanced conception of leadership, one that recognizes the importance of followership, will have to be embraced by Americans if the United States is indeed bound to lead.*

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A Palestinian State and Israeli Security

JEROME SLATER

In the aftermath of the 1991 war against Iraq, the prospects for a final, comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict are mixed. The conditions have never been more favorable: the offensive military capabilities of Iraq, the region's most powerful and radical state, have been eliminated, thus removing the main security danger to Israel; the prestige and leverage of the United States is at its peak, not only with Israel but also with the leading Arab states; the Soviet Union is clearly committed to a political settlement and is prepared to work cooperatively with the United States toward that end; the major Arab moderate states of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are genuinely committed to a compromise political settlement; and Syria has steadily moved toward a more moderate position, now indicating it will accept a settlement of the conflict if it gets the Golan Heights back and there is an acceptable resolution of the Palestinian problem.

The Palestinian problem is still the crucial one. Despite the fact that Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein has had a disastrous effect on their political standing and leverage with all the major actors in the region—Israel, the moderate Arab states, and the United States—there is widespread recognition of the fact that a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem remains the sine qua non for an overall settlement. Few if any Arab states can or will agree to the permanent Israeli occupation of Arab lands and the repression of Palestinian nationalism.

But major obstacles to a settlement remain. The prospect that the Israeli gov-

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ernment will agree to a meaningful compromise is remote, both because overall Israeli public opinion distrusts and fears the Palestinians more than ever and because the Shamir-led Likud government, now including even more extremist representatives of Israel's far-right wing, is evidently immovably committed to the territorial status quo and to blocking the creation of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza. Just as ominously, Yassir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are being seriously challenged for leadership among the Palestinians by true fanatics, the Hamas fundamentalist Islamic movement, which rejects all compromise with Israel.

In the present circumstances it is more likely than not that the momentary opportunities for peace—like those following previous wars in 1967 and 1973—will be wasted, and a new slide toward even more devastating Arab-Israeli wars will begin. Only powerful U.S. leadership can break the impending deadlock, and this leadership must include willingness to make judicious use of the enormous economic leverage Washington now has with an Israel that will be seeking billions of dollars in new aid to resettle Soviet refugees. Probably not even economic pressures will move the Shamir government, though, which will use diplomacy to obfuscate the issues and preserve the status quo. For example, shortly after the end of the 1991 Iraq Gulf War and the onset of American peace diplomacy, Israel made it clear it would not even discuss returning territory for peace in the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza.[1] Thus the strategy must be to convince the Israeli public at large that a compromise solution—and therefore a new Israeli government—is in the best interests of the country.

For a number of years there has been a substantial international consensus on the major principles that must guide a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In essence, a settlement must meet the legitimate and reasonable aspirations of Palestinian nationalism and end Israeli occupation of Arab lands (now defined as territory occupied in the 1967 war), while simultaneously protecting the genuine security interests of Israel. The core of this consensus solution is "land for peace": Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights; a new partition of the ancient land of Palestine and the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza; a variety of security measures to preserve the new status quo; the end of the state of war between Israel and the Arab Middle East; and, eventually, the normalization of all diplomatic and economic relations. The Palestinian state must be a limited one: sufficiently independent and sovereign to satisfy the nationalist goals of the mainstream moderates in the Palestinian movement, but sufficiently limited and constrained to ensure the security of its neighbors—both Israel and Jordan. The security measures must include severe limitations on the arms allowed to the new state, neutralization of its foreign policy, the presence of significant international peacekeeping forces to enforce the limitations and in other

[1] *New York Times*, 11 March 1991.

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ways stabilize the situation, and international guarantees of the overall settlement.

For Israel, a Palestinian state raises three quite different issues: ideology, access to water, and security. It is clear that the present Israeli extremist government will never agree to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza for the first reason alone. For nationalist and religious reasons, it insists that "Judea and Samaria" belongs to the Jews and that it will forever remain part of "Greater Israel." Moreover, even far less ideological Israelis agree that Jerusalem must permanently remain unified and under Israeli control.[2]

Second, the perennial Middle East problem of access to water has recently emerged as a major factor in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. After several years of drought, Israel has been running an annual net deficit in water usage of nearly 15–20 percent. Moreover, the rapidly growing Soviet Jewish immigration will substantially increase Israel's water needs. Thirty to forty percent of Israel's present water supply comes from underground aquifers that are partly located in the West Bank. Unless Israel can be assured of adequate water supplies, it is extremely unlikely it will agree to withdraw from the area, regardless of the other issues.[3]

Even without the security issue, the problem of inducing the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories and allow the creation of a Palestinian state would be daunting, but not necessarily hopeless. The water problem might be soluble by a variety of methods, including an agreement on sharing the West Bank sources between Israel and a Palestinian government, continued Israeli access to the waters of the Litani River in southern Lebanon, and international financial assistance to help Israel build large-scale desalinization plants or even import water.

As for the symbolic issues, repeated surveys of Israeli public opinion have shown that large majorities reject the ideological/religious position and remain centrally concerned only with national security. One of the most important findings has been that 30 percent of the Israeli population are "doves," defined to mean they now favor Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state; 40 percent are "ideological hawks," adamantly opposed to withdrawal under any conditions; while the remaining 30 percent are "security hawks," opposing withdrawal at present, but only for security reasons. The critically important implication of this tripartite division of opinion is that the Israeli center is pragmatic rather than ideological and thus potentially could be convinced to join with the dove camp if it can be persuaded that Israel's security would be best served by withdrawal.[4]

[2] On this Israeli consensus, see Teddy Kollek, "Sharing United Jerusalem," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Winter 1988/89).

[3] For discussions of the growing importance of the water problem, see D'vora Ben Shaul, "Divying Up the Drops," *Jerusalem Post*, international ed. magazine, June 1990; Ze'ev Schiff, *Security for Peace* (Washington, DC: Institute for Near East Policy, 1989).

[4] *Jerusalem Post*, international ed., 25 August 1990.

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To be sure, this would still leave the formidable—but not necessarily irresolvable—problem of reconciling the overwhelming Israeli consensus that Jerusalem must remain united and the capital of Israel with the Palestinian insistence that East Jerusalem be separated from West Jerusalem and become the capital of the Palestinian state. Increasing numbers of Israelis are coming to the realization that the present unification of Jerusalem is largely a fiction, as growing intercommunal violence in Jerusalem has resulted in a de facto division along Arab-Jewish lines. Israelis today venture into East Jerusalem and the Muslim quarters of the Old City only at great peril, and very few do so. Thus, the genuine unification of Jerusalem is possible only in the context of peace. If Israelis become convinced of this, the door would then be open for any number of ingenious compromises embodying deliberate political and territorial ambiguities that would allow each side to claim its essential objectives have been met.

As many observers have suggested, the Jerusalem issue should be addressed last, after all other remaining issues have been successfully resolved. In that context, it is not likely that such a purely symbolic question would prove genuinely intractable and block a settlement that otherwise was at hand.

My premise is that the security issue remains the most critical one in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israelis and their supporters are concerned about two quite different security problems posed by a Palestinian state. The first is potential Palestinian irredentism: despite their current commitment to a two-state compromise solution, the PLO or other future Palestinian leaders might regard a limited state in the West Bank and Gaza as merely a first step, the indispensable base for a later drive to regain all of Palestine—that is, to destroy Israel. The second is that powerful rejectionist Arab states—a militarily rebuilt Iraq, Syria, or perhaps Iran, either singly or in the worst case in alliance with each other—might use the Palestinian state in the strategically critical area of the West Bank as a springboard for a massive invasion of Israel.

Palestinian Irredentism

Would a Palestinian state, per se, have either the intention or capability of threatening the security of Israel? Until late 1988, the official PLO position was that Israel was illegitimate and had no right to exist; the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would be merely the first stage in regaining all of Palestine. For this reason, the PLO refused to accept UN Resolution 242, passed with the support of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the wake of the 1967 war, which first outlined most of the basic principles of a compromise solution: in essence, the withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied in the 1967 war in exchange for full peace with the Arab world. However, from the late 1970s onward the mainstream PLO position unofficially began to shift. PLO representatives began emphasizing that the problem with Resolution 242 was not that it accepted the continuing existence of Israel but that it did not recognize any political rights for the Palestinians, let alone make

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provision for the creation of a separate Palestinian state. Rather, it treated the Palestinian question only as a refugee problem. Privately, Arafat and other leading PLO spokesmen began telling Westerners that they would accept a new partition of Palestine and would agree to arms limitations, demilitarized zones, and international peacekeeping forces to enforce a settlement. However, to Arab and Palestinian audiences they continued to talk of regaining all of Palestine.[5]

Throughout the 1980s, despite continued ambivalence and inconsistency, the PLO continued its gradual move toward public acceptance of Israel and the establishment of a limited, constrained Palestinian state as the definitive solution of the Palestinian conflict with Israel. Finally, in November 1988, Arafat officially declared that the PLO accepted a two-state solution based on UN 242 and proclaimed an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. "We totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism," he said, and all parties have the right to exist in peace and security. Since then, Palestinian spokesmen have reaffirmed these positions, have denied they continue to seek the recovery of all of Palestine by "stages," and have privately indicated that the issue of the "return" of Palestinians to their former homes in what is now Israel can be resolved by internationally compensated resettlement in the Palestinian state.[6]

Even so, the PLO position was not without its inconsistencies and ambiguities. The Charter of the PLO, in which the maximalist Palestinian position is explicitly set out, was not officially revoked. On occasion PLO officials would suggest to Arab audiences that the long-term strategy of the PLO was still to regain all of Palestine in stages.[7] More fundamentally, even if the Palestinians currently mean what they say about reaching a compromise peace with Israel, intentions can always change and verbal commitments can be abandoned. Alternatively, the PLO might lose power to more radical Palestinians, a particularly worrisome possibility with the growing strength of Islamic fundamentalism among the Palestinians, as represented by the Hamas movement in the West Bank and Gaza. For these reasons, as Israeli and other opponents of a Palestinian state invariably—and correctly—argue, Israel cannot be asked to trust Palestinian good intentions when its security is at stake. This was the case even before the 1991 Iraqi war,

[5] For an early statement of the emerging Palestinian position by a leading Palestinian intellectual, see Whalid Khalidi, "A Sovereign Palestinian State," *Foreign Affairs* 56 (July 1978); on the trend in the 1970s toward Palestinian acceptance of the need for compromise, see also John Edwin Mroz, *Beyond Security: Private Perceptions Among Arabs and Israelis* (Elmsford, NJ: Pergamon Press, 1980); Harold Saunders, "An Israeli-Palestinian Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Fall 1982); and Edward R.F. Sheehan, "Step-By-Step in the Middle East," *Foreign Policy* 22 (Spring 1976).

[6] The most complete statement of the official PLO position is to be found in Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), "Lowering the Sword," *Foreign Policy* 78 (Spring 1990). Abu Iyad was generally regarded as the most important PLO official after Yassir Arafat, until he was assassinated—probably by Iraqi agents—in January 1991.

[7] For some quotations, see Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, *Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?* (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1990), 73.

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and it is considerably more so after the Palestinians alienated even the most dovish Israelis by their enthusiasm for Saddam Hussein and their cheering of Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israeli cities.

To be sure, Palestinian support for Iraq was in part a function of the understandable frustration and desperation over the violent Israeli suppression of the *intifada* and the totally uncompromising position of the Israeli government in refusing to negotiate with the PLO, withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, or allow the creation of even the most constrained Palestinian state. However, it is equally understandable that the Palestinian behavior has aroused the deepest apprehensions among even the most reasonable and flexible Israelis.

Even conceding that Israeli behavior and attitudes have a lot to do with the behavior and attitudes of the Palestinians—a concession that few Israelis seem capable of making—the fact remains that no settlement of this long and bitter conflict can be based on trust. No serious analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has ever presumed differently. Any peace plan that seeks to meet legitimate Israeli security concerns must start from the premise that the Palestinians might continue to harbor the desire to regain all of Palestine and might later seek to renege on its commitments. The task is to ensure that a Palestinian state will never have the capability of threatening Israel, regardless of its intentions.

Palestinian aggression against Israel could take the form either of organized military attacks or of state-sponsored or condoned terrorism. However, an armed attack against Israel by a Palestinian state would be suicidal madness, facing certain total defeat. The Israelis typically cite geography as the basis of the security concerns—the West Bank is only fifteen miles from Tel Aviv. In fact, geography works in favor of Israel, at least as long as its enemy is only the Palestinian state; such a state would be divided in two by Israel and surrounded on three sides by it. Moreover, a Palestinian attack on Israel would pit a tiny state with one of the world's weakest military forces against one of the world's most powerful ones—fighting for its survival. Israel today has nuclear weapons, a mobilizable army of 540,000 soldiers, short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, over 700 modern aircraft, nearly 4,000 tanks, and thousands of artillery pieces. The PLO has no nuclear weapons, 8,000 fighters, no ballistic missiles, no aircraft, no tanks, and few artillery pieces.[8] As a demilitarized state is the sine qua non of a settlement, a future Palestinian army would have only the arms it needed to maintain internal order. Any attempt to acquire advanced weapons, let alone employ them against Israel, would constitute a casus belli and put an end to the peace settlement and the Palestinian state, which Israel could overrun in a matter of hours.

In short, whatever maximalist goals a Palestinian state might harbor now or in the future, they simply could not be made operational. As a major study of

[8] Joseph Alpher et al., *The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1989).

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Israel's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies concluded: "The balance of military power between Israel and the prospective Palestinian state would be so one-sided that such a state—even if it so desired—could not alone constitute a serious threat to Israel's security and survival. Indeed, Israel is not likely to face serious military difficulties should it decide to reassert its control over the territory of the newly created state."[9]

Indeed, even this conclusion actually understates the constraints a Palestinian state would be under, for other states in the area would also oppose Palestinian irredentism. With Palestinians now comprising 60 percent of the population of Jordan, King Hussein and his largely-Bedouin army have their own vital reasons to control Palestinian radical nationalism; they have successfully done so in the past. Egypt also has an enormous stake in maintaining its peace settlement with Israel and has repeatedly demonstrated its unwillingness to be drawn into war on behalf of the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia, clearly the primary potential source of financial assistance to a new Palestinian state (assuming its anger at PLO support for Iraq does not lead it to turn its back on the Palestinians altogether) is certainly not interested in subsidizing a new focal point of radicalism in the Middle East, especially in the context of a general peace settlement with Israel that included some form of Islamic rule over or administration of East Jerusalem. Finally, there are many indications that Syria can no longer be considered a truly rejectionist Arab state. Even when it was, it had no interest in being drawn into war with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians, as it has demonstrated by preventing the PLO from attacking Israel from Syrian territory since the Syrian-Israeli 1975 disengagement agreement.

The establishment of a Palestinian state should also greatly reduce the incentive for continued terrorism—most of which has been designed to force Israel out of occupied Arab territories—as well as provide a powerful hostage against its continuation. Given the vulnerability of a Palestinian state to Israeli retaliation, a Palestinian government would have no rational incentive to employ or condone terrorism; on the contrary, it would have every reason to effectively prevent it. Of course irrationalism, especially in the Middle East, can never be ruled out. But it is instructive that after Shiite terrorism forced an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 1985, there was no attempt to continue the terrorism inside Israel itself, as Israeli authorities feared. Perhaps it was because the Shiite goal was attained, or perhaps it was because Israel successfully deterred continued terrorism by the threat of massive retaliation. No matter, for the situation in the West Bank and Gaza would be similar. What worked in the case of the Shiites should surely work in the case of the citizens of a Palestinian state, who not only would have their lives, homes, and property to lose, but their country as well.

To be sure, as long as Israel exists, there is likely to be some irreducible level

[9] Ibid., 102. The Jaffee Center is generally regarded as Israel's most prestigious defense analysis center; the study cited here included several Israeli reserve generals.

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of fanatical terrorism directed against it. However, the creation of a Palestinian state should lessen the level, not increase it. In any case, terrorism—unlike organized invasion—in no way threatens the existence of Israel. Indeed, even for an individual Israeli, the odds of becoming a victim of terrorism—as opposed, say, to becoming the victim of a traffic accident—are minute. In the final analysis, Israel may have to learn to live with some limited terrorism, an unavoidable consequence of Israel's existence in the Arab Middle East.

In sum, the creation of a Palestinian state, per se, should actually improve Israeli security. It would substantially reduce Palestinian incentives to continue the struggle against Israel, while adding little to its capabilities of doing so. The existence of the state would serve as a hostage against irredentism, for the Palestinians would now have a powerful interest in avoiding provocations to Israel that could result in massive retaliation or even the reoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza and a permanent end to the Palestinian state.

The Arab State Threat

For all of these reasons, most Israeli defense analysts are not so much concerned with the creation of a Palestinian state as such as they are with the threat that could be posed by a powerful Arab rejectionist state that following an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the creation of a Palestinian state might suddenly seize the West Bank and threaten to invade and destroy Israel. The two states that have most concerned Israel have been Syria and Iraq; the worst-case scenario would be the spectre of an Arab coalition army on Israel's vulnerable eastern border, including Iraq, Syria, possibly Iran, and even Jordan, if the Hashemite monarchy should be overthrown and replaced by a militant Palestinian regime.

There are four major Israeli studies of this potential problem: a 1985 book by Arye Shalev, a reserve Israeli general now at the Jaffee Institute;[10] a monograph by Ze'ev Schiff, the military editor for the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz*;[11] and the already cited studies by the Jaffee Institute and the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. As these studies point out, the West Bank contains a series of mountain ranges and it abuts Israel's narrow coastal plain, containing most of Israel's cities and industry. If a large Arab army supported by thousands of tanks suddenly seized the high ground of the West Bank, it would be in a position to launch a devastating attack on the Israeli coastal plain, driving westward to the Mediterranean and cutting the country in half before Israel could mobilize and deploy its largely reserve army.

To avoid this potential danger to Israel's very existence, all the Israeli studies argue either that Israel must permanently hold on to the West Bank or at a

[10] Arye Shalev, *The West Bank* (New York: Praeger, 1985).
[11] Schiff, *Security for Peace*.

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minimum must retain substantial military and intelligence forces and installations in the Jordan River valley and on the mountain ridges of the West Bank, regardless of who has "sovereignty" over the rest of the area.[12] These forces would provide early warning and intelligence on any Arab troop movements, and by retaining the high ground they could block an Arab invasion from the east long enough for Israel to mobilize its full wartime army and deploy it in the West Bank or even Jordan. As a result, Israel could conduct a defense in depth and continue its traditional strategy of fighting war on Arab rather than Israeli territory.

The problem with a continuing Israeli military presence on the West Bank, of course, is that it is unlikely to be acceptable to the Palestinians and therefore would block the creation of a Palestinian state. While the moderate wing of the PLO has said it would accept a number of constraints on a Palestinian state, including demilitarization and international peacekeeping forces, it seems most unlikely that it would agree to the indefinite presence of substantial Israeli military forces.

While Israeli concern over a rejectionist Arab military threat from the West Bank is more reasonable than fears about a Palestinian state, on further consideration the argument is not persuasive. To begin with, the likelihood of either an Iraqi or Syrian threat is more remote today than it has ever been, whether in alliance with each other or singly. Syria under Hafez al-Assad has long been a bitter enemy of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime, and it joined the United States and the moderate Arab states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf sheikdoms in the liberation of Kuwait and the military destruction of the Iraqi armies there. Thus, for the foreseeable future the likelihood of Iraqi-Syrian military cooperation is near zero. By itself, Iraq is no longer a threat to Israel. In 1991 the U.S.-led international coalition destroyed Saddam Hussein's most dangerous offensive military capabilities. Rebuilding will take many years, assuming that it can be done at all.

Similarly, the threat posed to Israel by Syria alone has also rapidly declined. Even in the past, the Syrian threat was probably exaggerated, for Damascus was a good deal less reckless and fanatically intransigent than was suggested by its image in Israel and the United States. Since the early 1970s Assad has accepted UN 242 as the basis for a settlement and has repeatedly told the United States and others that the major issues between Syria and Israel are Palestinian self-determination and the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. In the past year, the Syrian position has further moderated, as Mikhail Gorbachev has greatly reduced Soviet military assistance to Syria and has repeatedly warned Damascus that Moscow will support only a political solution to its conflict with Israel.

Faced with declining Soviet support and growing isolation in the Arab world, the Syrians have clearly reevaluated their posture as the leading Arab rejectionist

[12] Schiff places less emphasis on intelligence and warning stations in the West Bank, noting that in the opinion of many experts Israel could find acceptable alternatives within its own territory and *through satellite reconnaissance.*

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state. In May 1989 Syria endorsed an Arab summit conference resolution that accepted a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since then Assad has moved to reestablish good relations with Egypt, which has no intention of being drawn into a new war with Israel. Thus, if the Palestinian problem were resolved, the major remaining issue between Syria and Israel would be the Israeli occupation and annexation of the Golan Heights.[13]

In short, given the internal divisions in the Arab world, the decline of Soviet military support of Syria and Iraq and Moscow's commitment to a peaceful settlement, the dramatically increased U.S. military role in the Middle East, and Israel's own deterrent power, the likelihood of a major Arab assault on Israel is extremely low. If Israel were to agree to the creation of a Palestinian state, the incentives for any new Arab war against Israel would be reduced still further. Not only would the major cause of Arab hostility against Israel be removed (especially if it were accompanied by Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights), it would not be lost on the Palestinians and their Arab supporters that a Palestinian state in the West Bank would become the battlefield on which a war launched by Arab armies would be fought.

Still, circumstances could change and the potential for an eastern Arab war coalition threat could become more plausible in the future: Syria remains a military power, Iraq might in the future rebuild its offensive military capabilities, major shifts in Arab policies or changes in regime cannot be ruled out, etc. In the final analysis, Israel must have the capability of meeting a potential major Arab threat, however unlikely at present. It does not follow, however, that Israel must retain military forces in the West Bank, which almost certainly precludes a peaceful settlement with the Palestinians based on the creation of a Palestinian state.

There are two major deficiencies in the arguments of the Israeli defense analysts. First, they fail to consider the possibility that an international peacekeeping force indefinitely stationed on the territory of a Palestinian state could serve the same intelligence, early warning, deterrence, and to some extent even war-fighting functions as an Israeli force. Even more importantly, by focusing solely on Israel's conventional military capabilities, they radically underestimate the effects of the Israeli nuclear deterrent. One of the most serious consequences of Israel's unwillingness to openly acknowledge that it has nuclear weapons is that its defense analysts evidently feel they cannot discuss the nuclear dimension and must deal only with conventional deterrence. The rather startling result is that the most prestigious and important Israeli defense analyses are quite misleading, for they all but ignore the single most critical variable in any realistic assessment of Israel's security problem.

[13] There have been numerous reports in recent months that Assad is ready to talk peace with Israel, if it agrees to give back a demilitarized Golan to Syria. Other issues will arise, including Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, but it is the Golan that is the highest priority for Syria. See *New York Times*, 17 July 1990; *Jerusalem Post*, international ed., 28 July 1990.

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An International Peacekeeping Force

In order to provide a working model for other international peacekeeping missions in the future, as well as to make it psychologically easier for the Palestinians to accept the limitations on their sovereignty inherent in the presence of foreign military forces on their territory, an international peacekeeping force should be constituted under the auspices of the United Nations. The most effective force would include substantial contingents from major powers, including not only American troops but possibly Soviet forces as well.

Although the idea of joint superpower forces to enforce the demilitarization of a Palestinian state while simultaneously providing some reassurances to the Palestinians against Israeli military actions has been around for some time, in the context of cold war it received short shrift. Today, however, the increasing cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf crisis, and perhaps beyond that in the Middle East generally, has made evident the dramatic convergence of interests of the world's leading military powers.

Moreover, cooperative U.S.–Soviet action does not depend on Gorbachev remaining in power in the Soviet Union, for even before Gorbachev there was substantial evidence that the Soviets sought a genuine political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as preferable to continued conflicts that threatened to drag the superpowers into dangerous confrontations.[14] For example, from the late 1960s onward the Soviets regularly presented comprehensive plans for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement that were quite consistent with the international consensus and, except for the provisions for a Palestinian state, were very close to various American peace plans: the end of the state of war between Israel and the Arab states and the gradual normalization of political and economic relations; a mutual commitment of all sides to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; a phased Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; the creation of a limited Palestinian state; the establishment of demilitarized zones to be policed by international peacekeeping forces; and joint superpower guarantees of the overall settlement.

During the cold war years none of the Soviet proposals for a superpower-mediated overall settlement were put to the test by either Israel or the United States. However in 1990 and 1991, U.S. opposition to active Soviet participation in seeking a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict all but ended,[15] and the climate is far more propitious for favorable consideration of a joint U.S.–Soviet role in an international peacekeeping force to preside over an Arab-Israeli settlement. To be sure, given the sweeping Soviet retrenchment from international commitments and the vast Soviet domestic problems, it is far from clear that the Soviets would

[14] For a full discussion, see Jerome Slater, "The Superpowers and an Arab-Israeli Political Settlement: The Cold War Years," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Winter 1990–1991): 557–577.

[15] See President George Bush's news conference on 10 September 1990, in which he invited Moscow to play a greater diplomatic role in Middle East peace efforts, *New York Times*, 11 September 1990.

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be willing or capable of playing an active role in the Middle East. But even Gorbachev repeatedly has made it clear that he considers the Middle East as an area of particularly vital and enduring concern to the Soviet Union.

In any case, while a Soviet role in an international peacekeeping force under the appropriate circumstances would be desirable, it would not be essential. More important is that the force be a substantial one, that it could not be removed without the unanimous consent of all the major parties, and that it include American troops and technicians. Americans operating intelligence and early-warning installations in the West Bank would provide Jerusalem the same or perhaps even greater capabilities as would Israeli installations.[16] At the same time, counterpart installations could monitor Israeli military preparations and movements, providing reassurances to the Palestinians and other Arab states. Equally or more important, the presence of such a force would be a powerful deterrent against violations of the agreement, especially a major armed attack against Israel mounted by Arab armies from Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere. Finally, if deterrence should fail, the international force should be sufficiently large and well armed so that it could not be summarily brushed aside by invading armies. The war-fighting capabilities of the international force certainly would be sufficient to meet any purely Palestinian violations, and in the remote case of an all-out Arab attack, they would be capable of preventing a lightning occupation of the West Bank that is the central concern of Israeli defense analysts. At a minimum, the force could hold the high ground and the mountain passes through which an invading force would have to pass long enough to allow international reinforcements to arrive and, probably more importantly, to allow full Israeli mobilization.

In similar fashion, an international peacekeeping force could facilitate an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. A demilitarized Golan would prevent Syria from shelling Israeli settlements or using the high ground to stage a full-scale attack on northern Israel. As in the West Bank, American forces operating as part of an international force could provide intelligence, early warning, and deterrence against any Syrian violations of the agreement, while Soviet or other contingents regarded as friendly by Syria could provide similar assurances against potential Israeli violations.[17]

To be sure, this suggests that the presence of an international force in the West Bank and Golan, especially if it included Soviet forces, would not only constrain and deter Palestinian and other Arab military action; it would also constrain unilateral Israeli action. For example, it would be much more difficult for Israel

[16] Shalev concedes that "a U.S. presence . . . could answer most of Israel's security needs, including the prevention of a surprise attack." See Shalev, *The West Bank*, 111. A U.S. presence within an international context would serve the same function.

[17] There are reports that Secretary of State James Baker has indicated to Israel that the United States would be prepared to send its own forces to guarantee a demilitarized Golan Heights returned to Syrian sovereignty. *Jerusalem Post*, international ed., 16 March 1991.

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to respond to acts of terrorism by massive retaliation, the policy it has often followed until now. For many Israelis this would be a high price, though it is hardly evident that it should be so regarded. Aside from the moral issue, there is a real question of whether massive retaliation over the years has not done more to precipitate terrorism than to deter it (notwithstanding the special circumstances concerning the possible export of Shiite terrorism from southern Lebanon to Israel). In any case, it is probable that the incidence of terrorism would decline with the creation of a Palestinian state, both because the incentive for terrorism would be lessened and because the Palestinian internal security forces and the international peacekeeping force could take a variety of steps to prevent it.

For these reasons, it is far from obvious that Israel would be paying any price at all. Even if it did, some restrictions on unilateral Israeli freedom of military action would be a necessary and legitimate price for Israel to pay for a settlement. Israeli behavior since 1967 has given the Palestinians and other Arabs genuine reason to fear Israeli expansionism. The net gains to Israeli security from an overall settlement of its conflict with the Palestinians and the leading Arab states would far outweigh the costs.

A U.S.–Israeli Defense Alliance

Yet another major deterrent against an Arab attack would be a formal U.S. commitment to come to the assistance of Israel if its territorial security within internationally recognized boundaries were to be threatened by a major Arab attack. Such a commitment could be given added credibility by the stationing of symbolic numbers of American military forces inside Israel, much as the U.S. commitments to defend Berlin and South Korea were made credible by the stationing of ground combat forces there.[18]

The Israelis have been of two minds on the value of such a step. On the one hand, they often argue that such a commitment is unlikely to be offered by the United States, would be unreliable if it were, and would make Israel too dependent on the United States for its defense. On the other, on several occasions Israeli leaders have unofficially suggested that under the proper conditions they would welcome such a U.S. commitment.

The argument that the United States would be unwilling to make a formal military commitment to the defense of Israel within internationally recognized boundaries is not persuasive. In the first place, the United States has been moving closer and closer to a de facto alliance with Israel since the early 1960s, when it became Israel's major supplier of economic and military assistance. The American support of Israel initially rested essentially on moral grounds—sympathy for a small democratic state populated by survivors of the Holocaust and threatened with annihilation by the Arabs. By the late 1960s, the moral commitment

[18] As initially proposed by Richard Ullman, "Alliance with Israel?" *Foreign Policy* 19 (Summer 1975).

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was powerfully supplemented by the growing American belief that the United States had a vital national interest in preserving the existence of Israel, now seen as a strong American anticommunist ally in a largely hostile area. By the 1970s, Israel's position as a "strategic asset" of the United States was central to American policy in the region. And even as anticommunism declines in importance in the post-cold war period, the rise of Muslim fundamentalism throughout the region has strengthened the U.S. perception of Israel as a powerful military ally in the oil-rich Middle East.

As a result of these American perceptions, of growing economic and military assistance to Israel, of U.S. actions to deter possible Soviet intervention in the 1967 and 1973 wars, and most recently the close Israeli-American cooperation in the Gulf war, including the operation of Patriot missile sites in Israel by American soldiers, the Arab states now take for granted that the United States will not allow the destruction of Israel. To help bring about the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979 the United States committed itself to supply modern arms to Israel on a regular and continuing basis; to provide contingents of U.S. military personnel to patrol the demilitarized zones in the Sinai; to take diplomatic, economic, and military measures as appropriate if the security of Israel is endangered by Egyptian violations of the treaty; and to support Israel if its survival or security is threatened by "a world power." Since the 1980s the American defense establishment has been developing increasingly close military and intelligence links of various kinds with the Israeli armed forces and intelligence services. Finally, in the wake of the Persian Gulf crisis it is likely that Israel will receive billions of dollars worth of the most advanced U.S. military weaponry.

In effect, the United States already has a de facto commitment to Israel's existence. Despite the effect of Israel's repression of the *intifada* and its intransigent political position, Congress and the American public still are fundamentally supportive of Israel. The sending of U.S. Patriot missile units to Israel in the war against Iraq was overwhelmingly supported by public sentiment.

An Israeli settlement with the Palestinians would enormously strengthen the moral basis for this support. If a formal U.S.–Israeli security alliance—possibly including the stationing of U.S. troops inside Israel—were strongly supported by presidential leadership and presented as a necessary component of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is highly likely it would receive broad political support in the United States. In the wake of the Gulf war, the old Israeli argument that the United States would never be willing to send troops to fight and die for Israel is far less persuasive, and the credibility of such an American commitment would be high.

Nor would such a measure necessarily strain U.S. relations with the Arab world. Given the existing ties between the United States and Israel, it is doubtful that the major moderate Arab governments would oppose a formal alliance and a somewhat deepened American military presence in Israel, so long as it was accompanied by Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Indeed, there have been many indications that

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moderate Arab leaders would at least privately welcome an American military commitment to Israel within its pre-1967 boundaries, for it would provide them with a powerful argument against pressures from rejectionists to continue a dangerous and futile struggle against Israel.

The final Israeli objection to a U.S.–Israeli defense alliance—and to an international peacekeeping force—is that Israel must remain self-reliant rather than depend on the support or guarantees of the outside world. In fact, this argument is a double fallacy. In the first place, Israel is not self-reliant now, but is already critically dependent on American economic and military assistance. Ninety-eight percent of Israel's arms imports are from the United States, and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is totally dependent on Washington for access to the most advanced military technology.[19] From 1949 through 1984, the United States provided Israel with over $28 billion in military and economic assistance, over half of which was in outright grants. Beyond that were billions of dollars in a variety of hidden U.S. subsidies, including favorable U.S. tax treatment for private donations, the extension of credit by the Export-Import Bank, the exemption of Israeli products from U.S. import duties, free Israeli access to American advanced technology, and the like.[20]

Since 1984, official U.S. governmental aid to Israel has increased still further, averaging $1.8 billion in military grants and $1.2 billion in economic loans annually, and more in 1990–1991.[21] Counting all forms of governmental and private foreign aid, Israel receives between $4–5 billion annually, or 15–20 percent of its total gross national product.[22] Put differently, this sum amounts to well over $4000 for each Israeli family.[23] In the estimate of many Israeli economists, U.S. aid is the difference between relative affluence and a collapse of the Israeli economy.

In short, Israel is hardly economically or militarily self-reliant. However, the more important point is that in the context of an overall peace settlement, Israel

[19] Stephen Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 233.

[20] Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 333.

[21] In addition to its regular $3 billion appropriation for economic and military aid to Israel, for fiscal year 1990, Congress approved an additional $666 million in various forms of de facto economic and military subsidies. See *Jerusalem Post*, international ed., 23 December 1989. In the wake of the Iraqi war, the United States sent an additional $650 million in "emergency" assistance to Israel for 1991, and there are a variety of indications that one result of the Gulf crisis will be still further increases in U.S. direct assistance and indirect subsidies, economic as well as military, to Israel.

[22] The precise figure is difficult to arrive at because of some ambiguity over what should count as aid. Yakir Plessner, a Hebrew University economist, estimates that total U.S. governmental economic aid, German reparations, and private Jewish support comes to a total of $4–4.5 billion annually. See Plessner, "Change from Within," *Israeli Democracy* (Spring 1990): 8.

[23] Bruce Kuniholm, "The Palestinian Problem and U.S. Policy" in Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Mark A. Bruzonsky, eds., *Security in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 190; Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest*, 333.

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would not have to rely on the United States or international guarantees to any greater extent than it already does. Israel would not be asked or expected to disarm. If all else failed, it would have the same powerful conventional and nuclear forces with which to defend itself as it does today. International peacekeeping forces and a formal U.S.–Israeli defense alliance in no sense would be a substitute for Israeli defenses, but rather would be a net addition to them.

Israel's Nuclear Deterrent

By far the most powerful component of Israeli deterrence is its substantial nuclear force. Though Israel continues to deny officially that it has nuclear weapons (typically by saying ambiguously that it will not be the first state to "introduce" nuclear weapons into the Middle East), there is no doubt that it is already a nuclear power. The consensus estimate is that its force comprises 100–200 warheads and includes both strategic nuclear weapons for deterrence and tactical nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use. The delivery systems include supersonic jet bombers, short-range missiles, and the 1,500 mile Jericho ballistic missile; cruise missiles are being tested now.[24]

As early as the late 1960s, Arab political and military leaders assumed that Israel had nuclear weapons and would use them if its heartland was threatened by invading Arab armies.[25] In 1969, according to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's confidante Mohammed Heikal, Nasser told Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya that it was no longer realistic for Arab leaders to seek to liquidate Israel, both because the superpowers wouldn't allow it and because there was "a strong probability" that Israel had nuclear weapons.[26] For this reason, neither Syria nor Egypt had plans to attack Israel within its 1967 boundaries in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and it was Israel's nuclear deterrent that evidently played a major role in convincing Anwar Sadat to reach peace with Israel several years later.[27] If the Arab states were deterred by Israeli nuclear weapons then, they are almost certainly even more deterred in the 1990s, when they face many more such weapons and a wider, more potent range of delivery vehicles.[28]

It must be assumed that the major Arab states will eventually acquire nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction, such as the chemical weapons that

[24] For a detailed discussion of Israel's nuclear forces, see Shyam Bhatia, *Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1988).

[25] For discussions of the Arab recognition of Israel's deterrent during this period, based on statements of Arab political and military leaders and reviews of the Arab military literature, see Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 56–61, 87–88; Nadav Safran, *Israel, Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 596–597; Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1987), 196–197.

[26] Mohammed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle Press, 1975), 76–77.

[27] Safran, *Israel, Embattled Ally*, 596–97.

[28] For example, Assad of Syria has told American officials that because of Israel's nuclear weapons, another war with Israel would have intolerable consequences. *New York Times*, 7 June 1988.

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Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and probably Libya already have. However, this should not materially undermine Israel's deterrent. Once Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) arrives in the Middle East, it should deter any offensive use of nuclear weapons, but not defensive or retaliatory uses, as in the superpower MAD standoff. Any minimally rational leader interested in the survival of his own state must assume that if Israel faced imminent destruction by invading Arab armies, it would use its nuclear weapons regardless of whether it faced retaliation in kind, in Samson-like fashion pulling the walls down around its enemies as well as itself.

Conclusions

Most outside observers of the historical Arab-Israeli conflict are unimpressed with Israel's historical, religious, and ideological claims to Judea and Samaria or the West Bank, but they do take the security argument seriously. On closer inspection, the security argument is also considerably exaggerated, especially in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement sponsored and guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union—or even just the United States, if Soviet participation is unrealistic in the present circumstances.

Under the conditions outlined here, for a number of reasons the creation of a limited Palestinian state would enhance Israel's security rather than endanger it. First, the withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights and the meeting of the Palestinian demand for self-determination would largely remove the two most important causes of general Arab hostility to Israel: its occupation of Arab lands and its suppression of Palestinian nationalism. Indeed, the possible reemergence of Iraqi or Iranian expansionism has created the basis for a tacit alliance between Israel and most of the Arab states in the region, particularly Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly even Syria. The Palestinian issue and the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights are the major obstacles to such a dramatic realignment of forces in the Middle East.[29]

Second, the creation of a Palestinian state would give the Palestinians an enormous vested interest in peace that they now do not have and, therefore, a reason to oppose rather than support Arab rejectionism. In effect a Palestinian state would be a powerful hostage against such rejectionism, for its very survival would be dependent upon its not posing a threat to Israel, whether by terrorism or by serving as a springboard for an Arab attack against Israel.

Finally, an end to Israeli intransigence and a withdrawal from its onerous occupation role in the West Bank and Gaza would solidify Israel's alliance with the United States and enormously increase its support in the rest of the world.

As a number of commentators have observed, there is a critical distinction between Israel's political borders and its security borders. A withdrawal from the

[29] As noted by Moshe Maoz, "Iraq: Strategic Opening for Israel," *New York Times*, 9 August 1990; and Abba Eban, *London Times*, 4 August 1990.

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West Bank and Gaza and the emergence of a Palestinian state would change Israel's political borders; but its eastern security border would continue to be the Jordan River or even the eastern Jordanian border with Iraq. It is well known that Israel would regard any Syrian or Iraqi movement of forces into Jordan—let alone into the West Bank—as a casus belli, requiring an immediate Israeli response. The creation of a Palestinian state would not change matters, for Israel could reoccupy a demilitarized Palestinian state in the face of an imminent threat from the east in a matter of hours.

If, moreover, the creation of a Palestinian state took place in the context of an overall Arab-Israeli settlement sponsored and guaranteed by the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union, and perhaps other major powers, the security threat posed by a Palestinian state would be still further diminished. What would be the likelihood that a Palestinian state would be used as a base for an all-out attack on Israel, either by the Palestinians themselves or by any Arab state, when preparations for such an attack would be quickly detected and Israeli forces could rapidly reoccupy the West Bank well before Arab armies arrived there; when an attack would constitute an act of war not only against Israel but also the United States, the Soviet Union, and the community of nations as represented in the UN; when the invaders would have to overrun substantial international military forces and then, if they succeeded in doing that, contingents of U.S. military forces stationed inside Israel proper; and when all this would be preliminary to meeting the fully mobilized military forces of Israel, considered to be the best in the world, armed with nuclear weapons, fighting to defend the very survival of the state, and carrying the battle from its outset to the territory and population centers of its attackers?

In these circumstances, a Palestinian state would in effect be a buffer against rather than a springboard for an Arab attack against Israel. Whatever the dreams of the Palestinians, they would have no incentive at all to become the battlefield on which the most destructive war in history would be fought.

In the final analysis wouldn't there be *some* risk for Israeli security as a result of the creation of a Palestinian state, regardless of all the steps that could be taken to minimize it? That is a bad question. The right question is: compared to what? Security is always relative; there are risks, trade-offs, and uncertainties no matter what course of action—or inaction—is chosen. Of course, it is possible to imagine worst-case scenarios in which a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement, no matter how it is constructed to ensure Israeli security, nonetheless breaks down. But worst-case scenarios developing out of the present deadlock can be far more easily imagined. Is it reasonable to assume that Israel would achieve a net gain in its security from a comprehensive settlement based on the creation of a limited Palestinian state, relative to the risks of no settlement?

Put differently, the hidden premise of those who focus on the risks of change is the remarkable one that there are few costs or risks inherent in the status quo. On the contrary, the existing moral, economic, political, and military costs of the Israeli denial of a state to the Palestinians are already enormous. And the

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future risks include a continued deterioration in all respects, along with the further undermining of Israeli democracy and internal stability and quite possibly a catastrophic war.[30]

The present Israeli mentality illustrates a familiar human predicament, which might be called the psychological tyranny of the status quo: for all the acknowledged costs and risks of the existing situation, they typically seem preferable to a leap into the unknown. But history has only too often shown this to be a fallacy, ending in national or international catastrophe. For example, Israel refused to consider withdrawal from the Sinai until the stalemate was broken by the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which almost led to an Israeli defeat and a superpower confrontation. Though Israelis often refer to that war as the earthquake, its consequences could well be almost trivial compared to an Arab-Israeli war with the weapons of the 1990s.

The central mistake Israel makes today is to define its security in the most narrow terms, focusing only on the theoretical capabilities of its enemies and ignoring what it can do to change their intentions. Just as Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai dramatically changed Egyptian intentions, so an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights would dramatically diminish the Palestinian and Syrian motivation to make war on Israel; and it would eliminate most of the basis for Arab support for Iraq, Iran, or any other rejectionist state.

Given the existence of practical alternatives, including an achievable comprehensive settlement guaranteed by the cooperative action of the leading world powers, Israel's present policy is unnecessary, morally unsuitable, and dangerous to itself and the peace of the Middle East. Even in the absence of a comprehensive international settlement, Israel's conventional and nuclear power makes it questionable that its security requires the retention of the West Bank and Gaza and the denial of a limited state to the Palestinians. With such a settlement, the security argument is most unpersuasive.*

[30] During the Iraqi war, an Israeli survey revealed that two-thirds of Israeli Arabs enthusiastically supported Saddam Hussein. See *Jerusalem Post*, international ed., 20 August 1990. Thus, in this way as well as others, continued Israeli intransigence on the Palestinian issue endangers internal as well as external Israeli security.

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Reassurance in International Conflict Management

JANICE GROSS STEIN

Deterrence is not uniformly appropriate as a strategy of conflict management among adversaries. Evidence drawn from different kinds of studies now suggests important limiting conditions that constrain the utility of deterrence. This article looks at strategies of reassurance that might substitute for or supplement deterrence and compensate for some of its obvious risks in the management of a relationship among adversaries. Deterrence can fail at times regardless of how well it is executed. Strategies of reassurance are conceived broadly as a set of strategies that adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of a threat or use of force. I assess the likely interaction between strategies of deterrence and reassurance under different conditions.

Deterrence and Reassurance

Theories of deterrence are a subset of theories of rational choice. They include far more, however, than the assumption of rational calculation.[1] Deterrence seeks

[1] Joseph S. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40 (January 1988): 248; Duncan Snidal, "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985): 25–57; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," *World Politics* 41 (January 1989): 208–224; Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence Theory," *World Politics* 41 (January 1989): 183–207.

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to prevent undesired action by convincing the party who may be contemplating such action that its cost will exceed any possible gain. Generally, theories of deterrence treat hostility as a constant and assume intent by a would-be challenger to engage in undesirable action.[2] The fundamental concern then becomes how the calculations of a would-be challenger can best be manipulated from the outside. Theories of deterrence look at the ways in which one actor can manipulate threats to influence another's calculation of likely cost and benefit.[3] If deterrence is to work, the defender must carefully define the unacceptable action, communicate the commitment to punish transgressors or to deny them their objectives, possess the capability to carry out this threat, and demonstrate the resolve to do so.[4]

Strategies of reassurance begin from a different set of assumptions than does deterrence. They too presume ongoing hostility but, unlike deterrence, root the source of that hostility not in an adversaries' search for opportunity but in an adversary's needs and weaknesses. Reassurance strategies include not only the attempt to reduce miscalculation through verbal assurances but a broad set of strategies that adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of the threat or use of force.

To examine the utility of strategies of reassurance and the conditions that constrain their effectiveness, we look at four strategies that differ in the scope of their objectives and in their combinations of the elements of reassurance. They vary as well in their relevance to different kinds of deterrence. In cases of immediate deterrence, defenders anticipate a challenge and threaten to punish or to deny a would-be challenger its objectives in an attempt to deter. General deterrence refers to the existing power relationships between adversaries and works by preventing a would-be challenger from even considering a use of force because of the obviously adverse consequences of military action.[5]

To reassure, leaders can attempt through restraint not to exacerbate the pressures and constraints that operate on their adversary to use force. Second, they can try informally to develop norms of competition to regulate their conflict and reduce the likelihood of miscalculated war. Third, leaders can try to break out of habitual threat or use of force through less conventional methods of irrevocable commitments. Leaders can attempt as well to put in place informal or formal regimes designed specifically to build confidence, reduce uncertainty, and establish acceptable limits of competition.

Strategies of reassurance are, of course, particularly appropriate for a defender who is trying to deter. Some may also be useful, however, to a would-be challenger in a deterrence relationship who, while actively considering the option of a resort to force, nevertheless attempts to persuade a defender of the limits of its objec-

[2] John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[3] Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31 (October 1979): 292.

[4] Richard Ned Lebow, "Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique" in Paul Stern et al., eds., *Perspectives on Deterrence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Richard Ned Lebow, "Deterrence Failures Revisited," *International Security* 12 (Summer 1987): 197–213.

[5] Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, rev. ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), 28.

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tives, the benefits of negotiation, and the importance of acceptable limits of competition. We look as broadly as possible, therefore, at the utility of reassurance strategies from the perspective of both parties to an adversial relationship.

Strategies of reassurance are useful in the first instance insofar as they reduce the risks of deterrence. Deterrence can provoke rather than prevent a challenge from a frightened or vulnerable adversary, because it intensifies the pressures on a would-be challenger to act. It can also fail because a defender or a challenger misinterprets the other's intentions and signals; under these conditions, it becomes ineffective. Finally, it can be irrelevant when initiators are insensitive to threats and their consequences. This is most likely to happen when their attention is focused on their own needs. In short, deterrence can at times be provocative, ineffective, or irrelevant.

Different strategies of reassurance attempt to compensate for these three kinds of difficulties. The exercise of restraint, both in the language leaders use and in the deployment of military forces, can reduce the risk of provocation. Leaders can also attempt to reduce the difficulties of interpreting their own and their adversary's intentions by providing more valid, consistent, and reliable information. They may seek to reassure each other, for example, by communicating through third parties who are credible to all sides. Syria and Israel have communicated through the United States repeatedly in the last decade in an attempt to reassure each other of the limits of their intentions. Strategies of reassurance can also attempt to reduce the uncertainty that is endemic to adversarial relationships by clarifying the acceptable limits of conflict and developing shared norms of competition; in so doing, they reduce the likelihood of miscalculation.

Strategies of reassurance can also attempt to prevent an anticipated challenge by persuading an adversary that it has more to gain through diplomacy than force. For a defender, reassurance of this kind can complement or substitute for deterrence; it attempts to alter the context in which leaders consider a use of force. A defender can convey to a would-be challenger its willingness to negotiate important issues in an attempt to make diplomacy more attractive than force. The important step is to persuade an adversary that negotiation is a serious alternative. In this context, a strategy of reassurance attempts to change the conditions under which leaders consider a use of force; it is distinct, however, from the process and substance of negotiation which may follow. Negotiation generally refers to the exchange of proposals to reach mutually satisfactory joint agreements in a situation of interdependence.[6] A reassurance strategy is one of prenegotiation, which attempts to make negotiation a salient and attractive option; it is used in the process of getting to the table rather than at the table itself.[7]

This kind of strategy is especially useful when leaders are heavily constrained

[6] Janice Gross Stein, "International Negotiation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective," *Negotiation Journal* 4 (July 1988): 221–231.

[7] Janice Gross Stein, ed., *Getting to the Table: Processes of International Prenegotiation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

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by political weakness or allied pressure. To the extent that an alternative to the use of force can be made politically salient and visible, an adversary may decide to postpone a use of force in order to explore negotiation as an alternative. Similarly, leaders who are actively considering a use of force can clarify the limits of their objectives and in so doing encourage a defender to consider concessions in the expectation that negotiation is a credible option.[8]

These short-term strategies of reassurance are likely to be more relevant to conflicts that are propelled by mutual hostility, misperception, and mistrust than to those that are largely issue driven. They are useful to the latter insofar as they attempt to create alternatives to force and make an option of negotiation credible and politically salient. They are, however, especially helpful to the former insofar as they attempt to clarify intentions, minimize uncertainty, reduce the likelihood of miscalculation, and develop a discourse that is less likely to inflame leaders and publics. However, even when they are successful, short-term strategies of reassurance may accomplish no more than does deterrence when it succeeds; they achieve a temporary military standdown and buy time. More ambitious strategies of reassurance seek to minimize the need of both parties to manipulate the risk of war.

Leaders can, for example, attempt to create informal or formal regimes to build confidence, reduce uncertainty, and establish acceptable limits of competition. In so doing, they attempt to change the context of an adversarial relationship, alter stereotypes and misconceptions, reduce uncertainty about intentions, and establish rules of the road that limit the likelihood of miscalculation. To the extent that any of these strategies of reassurance succeed, they make deterrence less necessary and create opportunities for alternative strategies of conflict management. In assessing the effectiveness and limits of these strategies, the analysis of reassurance moves beyond the framework of deterrence to the broader context of foreign policy. Indeed, it is precisely this broad perspective that is often missing in the analysis of deterrence.

Reassurance can be used both as an alternative to or together with strategies of deterrence. British leaders attempted through restraint, for example, to reassure Argentina's leaders in 1982 rather than to deter. Leaders can also attempt to reassure even as they are trying actively to deter. In October 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger simultaneously attempted to deter the Soviet Union and to reassure its leaders of the limits of American intentions. Under these conditions, the mix and sequencing of strategies is likely to be important to the outcome.

Strategies of reassurance, like deterrence, are difficult to implement. They too must overcome strategic, political, and psychological obstacles.[9] Cognitive barriers to signaling, for example, can just as readily obstruct reassurance as they can deterrence. Other obstacles are specific to strategies of reassurance and derive from

[8] Ibid.

[9] Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

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the political and psychological constraints leaders face when they seek to reduce tension and reassure an adversary. We identify these obstacles and assess their interaction with strategies of deterrence.

Generally, strategies of reassurance have received less attention in the strategic literature than has either deterrence or cooperation. Cooperation between adversaries on security issues can take place across a broad spectrum of issues even when the parties do not consider a use of force likely.[10] The four strategies of reassurance examined—the exercise of restraint, the creation of norms of competition, the making of irrevocable commitments, and regime-building—are only a few among many possible variants. They are neither mutually exclusive nor logically exhaustive. Moreover, the evidence in support of these strategies is an uneven mix of quantitative and qualitative data, single case study, comparative case analysis, and laboratory experiment. These four strategies of reassurance have been chosen for analysis largely because there is some relevant evidence of their interaction with deterrence. The test of the effectiveness of strategies of reassurance is their contribution to the avoidance of war and ultimately the creation of alternatives to the threat or use of force among adversarial leaders who are hostile and suspicious of one another.

Restraint

Leaders may recognize that political conditions can compel an opponent to use force in the immediate future and attempt to prevent these pressures from becoming dangerously intense. This is no easy task. It may be very difficult to reduce the domestic political and economic pressures that are so often critical to a challenger's decision to use force. These kinds of factors are often not subject to manipulation, especially from the outside. However, even if leaders cannot directly affect the political environment of their opponent, at the least they can try to refrain from actions that would be likely to exacerbate the pressures on their adversary to attack.

Restraint can also be important in reducing the likelihood of miscalculation when adversaries find themselves enmeshed in an escalating series of threats and military deployments. In 1987, India and Pakistan found themselves caught up in a cycle of spiraling troop movements. In the autumn of 1986, India announced plans for unusually large war games scheduled for February and March 1987 at a newly completed training site in the Rajasthan desert near the border of the Pakistani province of Sind. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi described the operations as routine and assured Pakistan that India had no hostile intent. Given the unprecedented size of the Indian maneuvers, however, verbal reassurances were not enough to allay the fears of military leaders in Pakistan. Pakistani leaders also

[10] Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

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expressed concern that secessionists in Sind might ally with Indian forces. In response, Pakistan deployed military divisions just across the border from the Indian states of Punjab, Jammu, and Kashmir. These areas had been the site of fighting between India and Pakistan in the past.

Officials in both India and Pakistan admitted that neither wanted war. None of the disputes was sufficient in and of itself to provoke war, and both recognized India's military superiority. Despite the mutually acknowledged difference in military capability, however, leaders in Pakistan and India both sent additional troops to the border area even as they expressed alarm that an accidental shot by either side could lead to full-scale fighting.

As both India and Pakistan became increasingly alarmed, both pledged to exercise restraint and agreed to high-level discussions designed to ease tension and allay mutual fear. The two delegations to the talks approved a partial withdrawal of approximately 80,000 of the 340,000 heavily armed soldiers who faced each other along the north-central border and agreed to further negotiations to arrange withdrawal of the remainder. The agreement provided further that until the Indian army exercises had ended, Pakistan would continue to deploy its armor and troops in the Punjab. The two sides undertook as well to exercise "the maximum restraint" and to avoid all provocative actions along the border. Neither side was confident that deterrence alone could prevent war and each recognized the need for restraint. The language each used to describe the agreement is revealing: Humayan Khan, the Pakistani ambassador to India, explained that "it was a question of mutual reassurances," since each side felt provoked by the other; Alfred Gonsalves, India's chief negotiator and acting foreign secretary, added that Pakistan had been reassured of India's intentions.[11]

A strategy of restraint can reduce some of the obvious risks of deterrence. Because it uses the language of reassurance rather than threat, it can allay the fears of leaders caught in a process of escalation. In this case, mutual restraint by both India and Pakistan reduced the likelihood of miscalculation and escalation. However, restraint can be both demanding of and dangerous for those who use it.

It is demanding because it requires leaders to monitor their adversary's political pressures, strategic dilemmas, the leaders' estimates of the political and strategic costs of inaction, and assessment of the alternatives. A strategy of restraint encourages leaders to consider their adversary's calculus within the broadest possible political and strategic context. Like deterrence, it requires leaders to view the world through the eyes of their adversaries; there are formidable cognitive and motivational impediments to reconstructing the calculus of another set of leaders. Perhaps because leaders pay attention to the vulnerabilities of their adversary as well as to its opportunities when they consider restraint, they may be able to overcome at least some of these impediments. At a minimum, they are more likely to do so than leaders who consider only deterrence.

[11] Steven R. Weisman, "India-Pakistan Troop Tensions Ease," *New York Times*, 5 February 1987.

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A strategy of restraint is not only demanding; it can also be dangerous if it culminates in miscalculated escalation. When deterrers are attentive to the weaknesses of an opponent, to the possibility that they may provoke an adversary who is as yet uncommitted to a use of force, they are more likely to exercise restraint. Would-be challengers, however, may misinterpret restraint and caution as weakness and lack of resolve.[12] Argentina's leaders did so in 1982.

As the dispute with Argentina over the Falklands/Malvinas intensified in 1982, Britain was extremely sensitive to what its leaders considered important domestic contraints on the Argentinian leadership. Attuned to the political weakness of their opponents, British leaders refrained from making overt threats or visible military preparations to defend the Falklands. The impact of the strategy of restraint was the obverse of what British leaders had intended: it strengthened the resolve of those in Argentina's government who favored military action.[13]

Argentina's leaders went to war in large part because of their expectation that Britain would tolerate a use of force. The British dilemma—whether to seek to prevent miscalculated escalation through restraint or to deter a premeditated challenge through threat and demonstration of resolve—is a recurrent problem in the choice of a strategy of conflict management. The policy problem is compounded by the fact that strategies designed to prevent the occurrence of one often tend to exacerbate the likelihood of the other. More troublesome still, it may not be apparent before the fact which of the two routes to war is the more likely.

Evidence of the interactive impact of restraint and deterrence is fragmentary and episodic. The limited evidence available suggests that each carries with it the risk of serious error. An exercise of restraint may avoid provocation of a beleaguered or frightened adversary but may also increase the likelihood of miscalculated escalation. The language of threat and demonstration of resolve, on the other hand, may reduce the probability that a challenger will underestimate a deterrer's response, but it may also provoke a vulnerable and fearful opponent.

Norms of Competition

Adversaries can also attempt to reassure one another of the limits of their intentions through the development of informal, even tacit norms of competition in areas of disputed interest. Informal, shared norms among adversaries may delegitimate certain kinds of mutually unacceptable action and consequently reduce the need to manipulate the risk of war. They may also establish mutually acceptable boundaries of behavior and reduce some of the uncertainty which can at times lead a would-be challenger to miscalculate.

[12] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58–113.

[13] Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War" in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*, 89–124.

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The experimental literature is relevant only indirectly because it examines the impact of shared norms on the propensity of players to cooperate. In one experiment, players were allowed pre-game discussion; they subsequently invoked social sanctions against "cheats" and "greed" and continued to cooperate despite the experimenter's use of increasing payoffs for defection.[14] Shared norms may also transform players' preference structures and consequently change the game matrix to permit cooperation.[15] More directly related to deterrence, it has been suggested that a concession that is readily interpreted as adherence to a shared norm is less likely to be interpreted as evidence of weakness and provoke a miscalculated challenge.[16]

Analyses of historical cases also deal with the impact of shared norms on war avoidance. The United States and the Soviet Union attempted to develop explicit understandings of the limits of competition when they signed the Basic Principles Agreement in 1972 and a year later a more specific agreement on consultation to deal with crises that threatened to escalate to nuclear war. These agreements were not a success, in part because the formal documents masked significant disagreement and differences in interpretation. If anything, the unrealistic expectations they aroused, the dispute over interpretation of the agreements, the consequent allegations of cheating and defection, and the ensuing distrust and anger exacerbated the management of the conflict between the two nuclear adversaries.[17]

The United States and the Soviet Union were far more successful in establishing less formal and less explicit norms of competition in Cuba and then in the Middle East.[18] In both cases they did so because of a shared fear that their competition could escalate easily to a serious and dangerous confrontation. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy promised that the United States would not invade Cuba in return for an assurance that the Soviet Union would not again deploy offensive weapons on the island. There was some ambiguity, however, in subsequent years about the scope of the agreement and its duration. In August 1970, the Soviet Union inquired through diplomatic channels whether the agreement still remained in force. The Nixon administration reiterated its commitment to the shared norms of com-

[14] Philip Bonacich, "Norms and Cohesion as Adaptive Responses to Potential Conflict: An Experimental Study," *Sociometry* 35 (March 1972): 357–75.

[15] Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," *American Political Science Review* 80 (March 1985): 1095–1111.

[16] Paul Stern et al., "Conclusions" in *Perspectives on Deterrence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[17] Alexander L. George, *Managing U.S.–Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); Janice Gross Stein, "The Managers and the Managed: Crisis Prevention in the Middle East" in Gilbert Winham, ed., *New Issues in Crisis Managment* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 171–98.

[18] George, *Managing U.S.–Soviet Rivalry*; Alexander L. George, "U.S.–Soviet Global Rivalry: Norms of Competition" (Paper presented to the XIIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, 1985).

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petition and shortly thereafter invoked this understanding to object to the construction of a base in Cuba to service Soviet submarines.

Again in 1978, diplomatic discussions between Soviet and American officials focused on the replacement of older fighter-interceptor aircraft with newer ground-attack planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union reassured the United States of its intention to deploy only a limited number of aircraft and the matter was resolved. The United States and the Soviet Union were less adept at handling the deployment in Cuba of a brigade of Soviet combat forces later that year. Although the shared norms did not appear to include ground forces, the Carter administration, under pressure from vocal critics in the Senate, nevertheless objected publicly that their introduction violated the common understanding and was illegitimate. The Soviet Union refused to withdraw the forces or to change their configuration but reaffirmed the training mission of the forces that were present.[19] Although the shared norm of competition was ambiguous, capable of multiple interpretation, and sensitive to domestic political processes, it nevertheless focused the attention of Soviet and American leaders on the boundaries of competition and generally led to the mutual clarification of intentions and to a clearer definition of acceptable limits.

The usefulness of norms of competition in the Middle East provides a more dramatic illustration of their capability to regulate conflict and reduce the risks of deterrence. The United States and the Soviet Union acknowledged tacitly that each may come to the assistance of its ally if it is threatened with a catastrophic military defeat by the ally of the other. To avoid such an intervention, the superpower must compel the regional ally who threatens to inflict such an overwhelming defeat to cease its military action.[20] The Soviet Union invoked this tacit norm in 1967 and again in 1973. Even before the United States attempted to deter Soviet intervention in 1973, it had already moved to compel Israel to cease its military action and to reassure the Soviet Union immediately of its intention to do so. Deterrence and reassurance worked together; indeed, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of one from the other on the management of that conflict.[21]

Evidence of the preconditions and effectiveness of shared norms of competition is again episodic and unsatisfactory. Very little analysis has been done; there is as yet no systematic comparative analysis across cases of the interactive impact of shared norms and deterrence. Alexander George notes that these tacit and in-

[19] Gloria Duffy, "Crisis Prevention in Cuba" in George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry,* 285–316.

[20] George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*; George, "U.S.-Soviet Global Rivalry," 11; Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 276–278; Christer Jonsonn, *Superpowers: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy* (London: Frances Pinter, 1984); Yair Evron, "Great Powers' Military Intervention in the Middle East" in Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer, eds., *Great Power Intervention in the Middle East* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991), 17–45.

[21] Janice Gross Stein, "Extended Deterrence in the Middle East: American Strategy Reconsidered," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987): 326–352.

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formal norms of competition in and of themselves do not provide a sufficiently stable basis for the management of conflict between the two superpowers; they lack both institutionalized arrangements and procedures for clarification of their ambiguities and extension to new situations.[22] He suggests that in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, shared norms of competition varied in utility according to the resources and strategies available to the superpowers, the domestic and international constraints they faced, leaders' capacity to formulate and differentiate their own interests as well as to evaluate the interests at stake for their adversary, the magnitude of each superpower's interest, and the symmetry of the distribution of interest. Tacit norms and patterns of restraint were more likely to emerge, for example, in areas of high-interest asymmetry than in areas of disputed or uncertain symmetry.

The preconditions for the development of effective norms of competition are rigorous, demanding, and unlikely to be met in many adversarial relationships. Indeed, the obstacles to success of shared norms are no less than those confronted by the strategy of deterrence. The cognitive and motivational limits to leaders' capacities to differentiate and rank their own interests, as well as to evaluate the interests at stake for their adversary, are as severe as those limiting defenders' capacities to assess the interests of would-be challengers. Political pressures may encourage leaders to probe the limits of shared norms even as they incite would-be challengers to test the limits of commitment. Given these obstacles, it is surprising that in an area of disputed symmetry like the Middle East, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to agree tacitly on a shared norm. When norms of competition were shared, the available evidence suggests that they did reduce some of the real risks of deterrence.

It is possible, however, that the association between the development of norms and the reduction in the risks of deterrence is spurious, that norms develop only when the conflict is easily managed or both sides are strongly committed to avoiding overt conflict. Under these conditions, shared norms would have little independent impact on reducing the risks of deterrence.[23] Evidence drawn from the Middle East, however, suggests that they were important in clarifying intentions and establishing limits in a conflict that had been very difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union to manage. Paradoxically, they did so by motivating the United States not only to deter but simultaneously to reassure the Soviet Union that Soviet fundamental demands would be met. Additional research is needed, however, to identify those cases where shared norms of competition have succeeded and where they have failed to reduce the risks of deterrence, and also to assess the relationship of shared norms to other variables that contribute to the success and failure of deterrence.

[22] George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*; George, "U.S.-Soviet Global Rivalry."

[23] Robert Jervis, personal communication, 1988; Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, "Normative Constraints on the Use of Force Short of War," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (September 1986): 224.

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Irrevocable Commitment

When leaders recognize that misperception and stereotyping govern their adversary's judgments as well as their own, they can try, by making an irrevocable commitment, to reassure their adversaries of their benign intentions and to create incentives for negotiation. Analysts of deterrence have explored the usefulness of irrevocable commitments in reinforcing the credibility of deterrent threats.[24] This kind of commitment can also be useful to a defender in a deterrence relationship to signal its intention to negotiate and thereby reduce the costs to a would-be challenger of the status quo.

It can be useful as well to a challenger who anticipates great cost both from the perpetuation of the status quo and a resort to force. Indeed, under these conditions, a challenger may be more willing to run the serious risks of a strategy of irrevocable commitment. When leaders consider the status quo unacceptable and illegitimate, they are especially likely to consider a challenge to deterrence. Simultaneously, however, they may attempt through a strategy of irrevocable commitment to persuade their adversary to enter into serious negotiation to reduce the costs of the status quo. This is precisely the strategy adopted by Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat in 1977.[25]

Dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations in the autumn of 1977 yet unprepared to accept the status quo, Sadat began again to consider seriously a use of force and simultaneously searched for a dramatic move that would both reduce the tension and distrust between Egypt and Israel and induce Israel to make major concessions. It was the distrust built up over decades, he argued, that constrained the attempt to negotiate the issues at stake and fueled the cycle of wars. He first considered asking the five permanent members of the Security Council to meet in Jerusalem with the parties to the Arab-Israel conflict but was dissuaded by President Jimmy Carter, who warned that such a strategy would fail.[26] Secret negotiations between Egypt's deputy prime minister and Israel's foreign minister followed in Morocco, where each agreed to make a critical concession: Israel indicated its willingness to return most of the Sinai peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty, and Egypt agreed to peace and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.[27] Although not fully satisfactory to either party, both sides began to consider negotiation as a credible option. Yet neither was convinced of the sincerity of the other's intentions.

[24] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 131–37.

[25] Zeev Maoz and Dan S. Felsenthal similarly analyze Sadat's strategy as a "self-binding" commitment. See "Self-binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (Spring 1987): 177–200.

[26] Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 306–7; Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam, 1982), 307.

[27] Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (New York: Knopf, 1981), 44–52.

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Shortly thereafter, in a speech to the People's Assembly in Cairo, Sadat offered to travel to Jerusalem to address Israel's parliament personally in an effort to persuade its members of the sincerity of Egyptian intentions. The reaction was outrage in the Arab world, incredulity among the Israeli public, and alarm among some of the senior military in Israel who considered the proposed visit a ruse to provide cover for a renewed attack. Within days, however, Sadat came to Jerusalem and spoke to the Knesset of the Egyptian terms for peace. Egyptian demands were unchanged, but Israel's leaders and public paid attention to the deed rather than to the words. In large part through this single, dramatic act of reassurance, Sadat changed the trajectory of the conflict by changing Israel's incentives to negotiate.

Why did reassurance succeed? Several factors were at play, some general and some specific to the historical context. First, the initiative was irreversible: once the president of Egypt travelled to Jerusalem, he could not undo the deed. Because it could not be reversed, the action was treated as a valid indicator of Egyptian intentions rather than as a signal that could be manipulated.[28] Israel's leadership and public recognized the irreversibility of the action and consequently gave it great weight.

Second, the substantial political cost to President Sadat of breaking the long-standing Arab taboo of not treating directly with Israel was also apparent to Israel's leaders. Dissension within the Egyptian government was pronounced; the Egyptian foreign minister resigned in protest. A tidal wave of criticism from the Arab world engulfed the Egyptian leader, and Arab states moved in near unison to sever diplomatic relations with Egypt. Experimental studies suggest that people determine the motives of a donor by how much the gift cost the giver in utility: the greater the relative cost to the donor, the less likely ulterior motives.[29] These studies in attribution are consistent with evidence of the impact of the cognitive heuristic of "proportionality":[30] Israel's leaders reasoned that Egypt's president would not incur such heavy costs were he not sincere.

Third, Sadat's arrival in Jerusalem challenged the most important set of beliefs about Arab goals among Israel's leadership and public. A broad cross-section of Israelis had assumed that Arab leaders were unrelentingly hostile, so much so that they were unprepared to meet Israel's leaders face to face. Once these core beliefs were shaken, it became easier for Israelis, as cognitive psychologists predict, to revise associated assumptions and expectations.

Fourth, President Sadat spoke over the heads of Israel's leadership directly to Israel's public. With his flair for the dramatic, he created the psychological and

[28] Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[29] Stuart S. Komorita, "Concessions-Making and Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17 (December 1973): 745–62; Dean G. Pruitt, *Negotiation Behavior* (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 124–5.

[30] Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "The Limits of Cognitive Models: Carter, Afghanistan and Foreign Policy Change" in Dan Caldwell and Timothy McKeown, *Diplomacy, Force and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander George*, (1992).

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political symbols that would mobilize public opinion to press their more cautious and restrained leaders. In so doing, he removed a constraint on Israel's leaders and created a political inducement to action. The strategy of reassurance had multiple audiences and multiple constituencies.

Fifth, the president of Egypt adopted a strategy of reassurance only when he judged that the conflict between Egypt and Israel had "ripened for resolution."[31] In 1977, both sets of leaders shared a common aversion to war. Sadat's initiative took place after a war that both sides lost. The military outcome of the war in 1973 persuaded civilian and military leaders in Egypt of Israel's superior military capability under almost any set of conditions. Moreover, Sadat was reluctant to risk the gains he had made with such difficulty in 1973. Nevertheless, he was unwilling to perpetuate the status quo and began again to consider a use of force, even though it was an unattractive option. Estimates of inferior military capability and a committed adversary were not sufficient to deter. Equally important, Israel's leaders had become pessimistic for the first time about the efficacy of deterrence as an exclusive strategy of conflict management. Because one was pessimistic about the benefits of a further use of force and the other about the stability of deterrence, they were willing to consider seriously alternative strategies requiring major political concessions, even though they knew these concessions would be politically costly among their respective constituencies.

Under this very special set of conditions, reassurance through irrevocable commitment succeeded brilliantly. We must be very careful, however, in extrapolating from this single case. The two critical components that make an irrevocable commitment reassuring to an adversary are its obviously high cost to the leaders who issue the commitment and its irreversibility. The strategy has been used so infrequently in part because it is often very difficult and very risky to design a commitment that is both high in cost and irreversible.[32] Leaders frequently have neither the resources nor the information necessary to make irrevocable commitments. A simulation of tacit bargaining in arms control finds, moreover, that leaders are rarely certain enough about an opponent's response to make a large gesture, while the opponent is rarely trusting enough to respond enthusiastically to a small one.[33] In designing strategies of reassurance, therefore, leaders face a difficult trade-off: they are more likely to make offers that are reversible and less costly; but reversible low-cost offers are far less persuasive to an adversary as an indicator of intentions.

Like deterrence, outside the laboratory reassurance through irrevocable commitment also requires a degree of freedom from domestic political and bureau-

[31] William I. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1985); Janice Gross Stein, "The Alchemy of Peacemaking: The Prerequisites and Co-requisites of Progress in the Arab-Israel Conflict," *International Journal* 38 (Autumn 1983): 531–55.

[32] Maoz and Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments," 198.

[33] G.W. Downs and D.M. Rocke, "Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987): 297–325.

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cratic constraints. In Egypt after the October War, Sadat had great autonomy in decision making and, indeed, could withstand the resignation of his foreign minister. This kind of autonomy is far more difficult to achieve in highly institutionalized and open societies where interests are vested in existing strategies. The making of an irrevocable commitment to leaders long identified as antagonists can also be difficult to justify to the public. Yet, it is the public nature of the commitment that contributes to its irreversibility and credibility.[34] For all these reasons, the making of irrevocable commitments that reassure effectively is likely to be difficult for both a would-be challenger and a defender.

Limited Security Regimes

In an effort to reduce the likelihood of an unintended and unwanted war, adversaries have agreed, at times informally, on principles and put in place procedures to reduce the likelihood of accidental or miscalculated war. Technically, these arrangements are referred to as limited security regimes. The concept of regime was borrowed from international law and broadened to incorporate the range of shared norms, principles, rules, and procedures around which leaders' expectations converge.[35] These principles and procedures may be formal or informal, tacit or explicit, but because some norms are shared, the behavior of leaders is constrained. A rich literature explores the creation and impact of regimes in the international political economy, but far less attention has been devoted to the analysis of the creation and impact of limited security regimes.[36]

The creation of limited security regimes is most likely when leaders share a common aversion to war and its consequences.[37] A shared fear of war is not restricted only to the nuclear powers; it occurs among conventionally armed states as military technology threatens ever greater destruction. The evidence that is available suggests that limited security regimes among adversaries are more likely to be created in the context of general deterrence, which enhances the shared aver-

[34] Maoz and Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments," 191–192.

[35] Stephen Krasner, ed., "International Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Special Issue 1982): 2.

[36] Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics* 37 (October 1984): 1–23; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985): 226–54; Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict," *International Journal* 40 (Autumn 1985): 599–627; Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986); 753–76; Joseph S. Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.–Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1987): 371–402; Oran Young, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," *World Politics* 39 (October 1986): 104–22; Roger K. Smith, "The Non-Proliferation Regime and International Relations," *International Organization* 41 (Spring 1987): 253–81.

[37] Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982); Arthur Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) 25–54; Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection."

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sion to war; under these conditions, there is synergism between deterrence and reassurance.[38]

The distribution of power contributes in important ways to the creation of international regimes. Analysts have speculated on the impact of different configurations of power. Robert Jervis suggests that in the classical balance-of-power system, the weaker states had little option but to accept the security regime put in place by the great powers.[39] Security regimes have also been created in the aftermath of an important change in the distribution of power, especially after a major war.[40] Analysts have suggested as well that the existence of a hegemon facilitates the creation of limited regimes; their evidence is drawn primarily, however, from the international political economy rather than from issues of international security.[41] As a recent analysis of the nonproliferation regime demonstrates, however, the presence of a hegemon is not a necessary prerequisite of the creation of a limited security regime. On the contrary, collective action occurred in a period of hegemonic decline.[42]

Limited security regimes can be attractive to adversaries because they fulfill important functions and provide valuable resources to their members. Insofar as even limited security regimes provide reliable, low-cost information about members' activities, they make action less opaque, estimation less difficult, and reduce the likelihood of miscalculation. They reduce uncertainty both about the behavior of adversaries and about the boundaries of the conflict. In the limited security regime in place between Egypt and Israel from 1974 to 1979, for example, the United States routinely circulated intelligence information about the military dispositions of one to the other. Limited security regimes also link issues together, lengthen the "shadow of the future," and increase the incentives to sacrifice immediate benefit for future gain.[43] This "functional" theory explains regime maintenance rather than the creation of regimes. Insofar as the functions a limited security regime can perform are known to would-be members, however, they can become incentives to participate when adversaries share a common aversion to war.

Finally, adversaries may consider participation in a limited security regime if it improves the accuracy of detection and reduces the likelihood of defection. A regime may permit adversaries to monitor each other's actions with increased confidence by providing more complete and reliable information, by increasing surveillance capabilities for all parties, or by invoking the assistance of outsiders as

[38] Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection"; Nye, "Nuclear Learning"; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence: Alternative Strategies of Conflict Management," *Journal of Social Issues* 43 (Winter 1987): 5–71.

[39] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Special Issue 1982): 357–78.

[40] Ibid., 369–71; Kegley and Raymond, "Normative Constraints."

[41] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 38–60; Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

[42] Smith, "The Non-Proliferation Regime," 268–9; Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 46.

[43] Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 88; Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics* 40 (January 1985): 1–24.

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monitors. It can give leaders more leeway than they otherwise would have to meet a prospective defection by increasing available warning time.[44]

Evidence drawn from the Middle East illustrates the possibilities and benefits of limited, informal security regimes that, although created under the most adverse conditions, nevertheless endured for a considerable period of time. Building upon a series of limited arrangements agreed upon in the context of general deterrence, Egypt and Israel with the help of the United States were able ultimately to agree on a set of principles and to put in place a complex series of procedures designed to reduce the probability of miscalculated escalation. Limited arms control provisions, creation of buffer zones, sharing of intelligence information, the deployment of an international force, and the involvement of the United States as a third-party guarantor worked together within the framework of a formally agreed-upon limited security regime to reduce uncertainty, clarify intentions, and minimize the risk of unintended war until the two parties were able to conclude a peace treaty. Most of the elements of the limited security regime were subsequently incorporated into the formal peace treaty.

Reassurance through the creation of limited security regimes has not been restricted only to Egypt and Israel. During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union established a series of limited regimes designed to reduce accident and miscalculation and to delimit the scope of their conflict. They began with efforts to improve communications in crisis through the establishment and then the modernization of the hotline. Other limited regimes followed: in 1967, the demilitarization of outer space; in 1970, a nonproliferation regime; in 1971, a set of measures to reduce the risks of accidental war; and in 1972, a limited regime to reduce the likelihood of accident and miscalculated conflict at sea.[45] In 1986 the superpowers and their allies negotiated a limited security regime designed to build confidence in central Europe. Advance notification and inspection of large military maneuvers were expected to reduce uncertainty, reassure an alarmed adversary, clarify intentions, and diminish the likelihood of accidental war. In 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers. They have also regulated their conflict in central Europe through the Austrian State Treaty, the Berlin agreements, and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. All of these limited security regimes were created in the context of an ongoing adversarial relationship in which both sides continued to rely on general deterrence to prevent war. Within this context, both sets of leaders attended not only to the aggressive intentions of the other but also to their shared fears and common aversion to war.

Reassurance through the creation of limited and focused security regimes can be of considerable help in reducing fear, uncertainty, and misunderstanding between adversaries. At a minimum, adversaries gain access to more reliable and

[44] Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection."

[45] Sean Lynn-Jones, "A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985): 154–84.

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less expensive information about each other's activities, which can reduce uncertainty, the incidence of miscalculation, and an inappropriate manipulation of the risk of war. In a complex international environment that is often information poor and technologically driven, lower cost and more valid information can be a considerable advantage in more effective management of conflict.

There are, however, serious obstacles to the creation of limited security regimes, even when adversaries share a powerful common aversion to war. First, the cost of unreciprocated participation is inordinately high, because security is prerequisite to all other values and even minor miscalculations can have large consequences.[46] The defection of an adversary from a regime is almost certain to have graver consequences when the issue is security than, for example, when it is economic. The magnitude of the consequences of error makes limited security regimes especially difficult and risky to build. Closely related to the absolute scope of potential loss in security disputes is the difficulty in estimating the probability of loss. Estimation of the motives and intentions of adversaries is very difficult, as is the interpretation of an opponent's behavior. Precisely because the consequences of error are so great, leaders have an understandably pronounced fear of deception.[47]

Fear of a surprise attack can encourage leaders to try to build limited security regimes, but it can also make their attainment immeasurably more difficult. Leaders who otherwise might prefer to participate in a limited security regime may nevertheless refrain if they fear a devastating surprise attack. If the advantage to the side who strikes first is large, then leaders are not likely to weigh future benefits heavily in an uncertain and dangerous present. On security issues it is often difficult and dangerous to forgo present advantage for future benefit.[48] In short, the critical obstacles to the creation of security regimes lie in the unique dangers and consequences of error, dangers that are manifest in the extraordinary difficulties of detection and the grave consequences of defection.[49]

Nevertheless, analysis of the creation and maintenance of limited security regimes is valuable insofar as it highlights the frameworks that adversaries have created to improve the management of their conflict. A careful reading of the very small number of studies of limited security regimes suggests that the relationship between deterrence and reassurance is interactive: general deterrence can be a critical precondition of limited security regimes among adversaries, and reassurance can eliminate some of the discourse of threat that otherwise might inflame a frightened adversary. In this sense, general deterrence and reassurance can become reinforcing strategies of conflict management.

We still need to know a great deal more, however, about how limited security regimes are created and maintained. Current theories give inadequate weight to the cognitive and motivational factors that are crucial to the formation of regimes.

[46] Jervis, "Security Regimes."
[47] Lipson, "International Cooperation."
[48] Oye, "Explaining Cooperation."
[49] Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection."

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Although the distribution of power and the configuration of interests are important variables, they do not adequately explain the creation of the nonproliferation regime or the limited security regimes in the Middle East.[50] What leaders know and what they learn is central. It is, after all, leaders' expectations and preferences that are treated as the critical intervening variables by analysts of international regimes. Nevertheless, there is no explicit theory of cognitive change, no explanation of how leaders' expectations stabilize, converge, and change.

There has been little systematic analysis, for example, of the impact of cognitive schemas, heuristics, and biases on leaders' expectations; nor is the analysis of the maintenance and demise of security regimes informed by an explicit theory of learning.[51] How do leaders interpret and reinterpret shared norms? One of the significant benefits of international economic regimes is their autonomous impact, their "lag" effect, even after underlying political and economic conditions have changed. Even though interests change, the international institutions that were created remain in place and continue to regulate conflict in the international political economy.[52] Can we expect the same beneficent impact from limited security agreements? Do leaders change their definition of their interests in part because of their participation in limited security agreements? Does sufficient "learning" occur to mitigate the intensity of some international conflicts?[53] If so, under what political and strategic conditions does this occur?

Nor do existing theories pay sufficient attention to motivational explanations of leaders's definitions of their interests. Although interests are an essential variable in the explanation of regime creation, they generally are specified through microeconomic reasoning.[54] Insofar as leaders are motivated by the fear of war, however, models of rational choice may obscure the impact of fundamental psychological processes on leaders' preferences. Political and strategic needs may also significantly affect the way leaders value the costs and benefits of a limited security regime. The impact of fears and needs on leaders' evaluations of the prospect of gain and loss through participation in limited security regimes remains unexplored and unspecified.

Analyses of the creation, maintenance, and impact of limited security regimes have only just begun. The empirical studies are few, and the theory is still developing.[55] Through controlled comparative analysis, historical cases can be identified for investigation and richer theoretical models can be developed. Explanations must assess the impact of domestic political processes as well as strategic

[50] Smith, "The Non-Proliferation Regime"; Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection."

[51] See Nye, "Nuclear Learning"; James Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986): 849–94.

[52] Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization* 36 (Special Issue 1982): 185–205.

[53] Nye, "Nuclear Learning."

[54] Keohane, *After Hegemony.*

[55] Jervis, "Security Regimes"; Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection"; Nye, "Nuclear Learning"; Smith, "The Non-Proliferation Regime."

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conditions on leaders' needs and expectations and model processes of learning and change. In short, the research agenda must explore when and how in the context of general deterrence adversaries' fears and needs can best be exploited to put in place limited security regimes to reduce the likelihood of unwanted war.

Conclusion

Analyses of strategies of reassurance draw widely from the behavioral sciences, but little attempt has been made either to integrate discrete sets of theoretical propositions or to test their validity in different kinds of international environments. The available evidence is fragmentary, often episodic, frequently open to multiple interpretation, and difficult to evaluate. It is, however, drawn increasingly from a wide range of experimental, simulated, and historical studies. It is within this context of partial and at times flawed theory and uneven evidence that the following tentative propositions are put.

Evidence is beginning to cumulate from a range of historical studies about the factors that contribute to the failure of deterrence, but not enough is known about the conditions associated with its success.[56] The evidence suggests indirectly that deterrence is most likely to succeed when adversarial leaders are motivated largely by the prospect of gain rather than fear of punishment. In practice, then, leaders must determine whether an adversary is driven largely by opportunity before determining whether or not the theory is likely to be relevant. That determination, unfortunately, lies outside the scope of the theory; consequently, policy makers encounter serious difficulties in assessing the appropriateness of an attempt at deterrence. The evidence suggests as well that deterrence is more likely to succeed when an adversary has the political and strategic freedom to exercise restraint, is not misled by grossly distorted assessments of the political-military situation, and is vulnerable to the kinds of threats a deterrer is capable of making credible. The timing of deterrence may also be important. The effectiveness of deterrence is likely to be enhanced if it is used early, before an adversary becomes committed to a use of force and becomes correspondingly insensitive to warnings and threats. Insofar as these strategic, political, and psychological conditions are not met, deterrence is increasingly likely to become ineffective, irrelevant, or even provocative.

When would-be challengers are motivated largely by need and are seriously constrained at home and abroad, strategies of reassurance can supplement or substitute for deterrence. Strategies of reassurance attempt directly to reduce the incentives to the threat or use of force and indirectly to make the use of force less likely through reduction of uncertainty and the establishment of norms that can regulate the management of conflict. As in deterrence, however, the theoretical literature is frequently insufficiently sensitive to the cognitive, motivational, political, and strategic factors that can limit the effectiveness of these kinds of strategies.

[56] Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990).

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Preliminary historical and comparative research suggests that strategies of reassurance may at times be effective in reducing some of the obvious risks of deterrence. Restraint, the development of informal norms of competition, and irrevocable commitments can help to reassure a vulnerable adversary, reduce the likelihood of miscalculation, and create alternatives to the use of force. Longer-term strategies of reassurance designed to increase confidence can in addition help the parties to move away from the use or threat of force as their dominant mode of discourse. To succeed, however, all these strategies must overcome some of the same psychological, political, and strategic obstacles that confound deterrence.

Strategies of reassurance are most likely to succeed with an adversary who is concerned largely about its own security and does not seek primarily to exploit. Determining whether a would-be challenger is motivated primarily by opportunity for gain or vulnerability is extraordinarily difficult, however, for the policy maker as well as for the scholar, who subsequently has access to historical evidence. Leaders' explanations of their decisions, moreover, traced through the historical evidence, may not always provide the basis for an accurate attribution of their motives. They may have seen an opportunity but in justifying their decision to use force, emphasize their weakness and need.

Although "opportunity" and "need" are theoretically distinct concepts, in practice they are not mutually exclusive. The dichotomy between the two is almost always blurred in specific historical cases. What one leader sees as an avoidance of loss, another may interpret as the pursuit of gain. Indeed, the way goals are framed may have important consequences for the behavior of national leaders. After the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, for example, debate raged among responsible American officials as to whether the Soviet Union was motivated primarily by the attempt to avoid loss or to seek gain and exploit an opportunity.[57] This difference in attribution had important implications for policy. Those who considered that the Soviet Union was motivated by gain were more punitive in their policy recommendations than were those who considered that Soviet motivation was primarily defensive.

The way goals are framed and interpreted is, of course, conditioned by preconceptions as well as by evidence. Determining the relative weight of need and opportunity as motivating factors of an adversary's strategic choices is extraordinarily difficult. In most cases, both are likely to be present in different degrees. This determination is critical, however, because it speaks to the appropriate mix and sequencing of deterrence with strategies of reassurance.[58] Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin suggest, for example, that a combination of firmness and concern is most effective in managing social conflict.[59] Not enough is known, however, about the

[57] Lebow and Stein, "The Limits of Cognitive Models."

[58] Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simon, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, and Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[59] Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (New York: Random House, 1986).

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interactive effects of deterrence and reassurance in different sequences under different conditions. Only through systematic comparison of cases of deterrence and reassurance, both when they succeed and fail, can contingent generalizations about their limiting conditions be established.

It is important as well to analyze the outcome of strategies of reassurance both inside and outside the context of deterrence. An adversary's mixture of need and opportunity, for example, may be important in determining the effectiveness of strategies of reassurance. If an adversary is driven largely by domestic political needs or strategic weakness, then reassurance may be more appropriate as a substitute for deterrence. If adversarial motives are mixed, reassurance may be more effective as a complement to deterrence. When an adversary is motivated primarily by opportunity, reassurance is likely to misfire and encourage the challenge it is designed to prevent.

Designing strategies of conflict management that combine components of deterrence and reassurance in appropriate mixes and sequences is no easy task. There are formidable obstacles to the success of these strategies, individually and collectively, and the risks of one are often the benefits of the other. No single strategy is likely to work across cases under different strategic, political, and psychological conditions. Nevertheless, sensitivity to the limiting conditions of each strategy, to its relative strengths and weaknesses, and to its interactive effects is essential to the management of international conflict short of war.*

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Health Care Market Reform in Congress: The Uncertain Path from Proposal to Policy

THOMAS R. OLIVER

In 1980 Ronald Reagan swept into the presidency on a wave of antigovernment sentiment after promising deregulation, decentralization, and restoration of individual responsibility and opportunity. This pro-competitive, antiregulatory temperament was captured in legislative proposals to stimulate competition in the financing and delivery of health services.[1] In the 96th and 97th Congresses from 1979 to 1983, several bills were introduced to create financial incentives to expand consumer choice in purchasing health services, induce greater price competition among health care professionals and institutions, improve efficiency in the organization and delivery of services, and ultimately lower the costs of health care.

The moment appeared ripe for an earnest attempt at structural reform of the health care system: national health care expenditures continued to increase at a pace well above the costs of other consumer goods and services, with hospital expenditures leading the way. The highly regulatory hospital cost containment program offered by President Jimmy Carter had gone down to defeat in 1979.

[1] A 1983 article in this journal noted the ascent of health care market reform onto the American political agenda and examined the underlying theory and key provisions of the leading proposals. See Bonita A. Wlodkowski, "Caveat Emptor in Health Care," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Spring 1983): 35-45.

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The pro-competitive measures seemed to offer a rational, comprehensive alternative for policy makers anxious to deal with soaring health costs and federal budget deficits. Finally, pro-competition advocates occupied key positions in both the Congress and the administration.

Yet nothing came of these pro-competitive proposals that promised to enhance consumer choice and save individuals and the government billions of dollars at the expense of a bloated health care industry. Instead, in March 1983 Congress enacted a new prospective reimbursement system to regulate hospital payments under the Medicare program. This payment system amounted to direct price-setting by the federal government—in the eyes of many, the antithesis of the ideal of market-oriented, pluralistic reform.

How can one explain this rapid turn of events in the legislative policy process? This article utilizes the models of congressional decision making proposed by John W. Kingdon[2] to trace the rise and fall of health care competition proposals on the political agenda. In his earlier model, Kingdon outlined the goals that guide legislators' voting behavior and the cognitive process that members of Congress use to arrive at policy decisions. In his subsequent study on agenda setting and formulation of policy alternatives, he argued that legislators apply the same process they use in voting to other earlier decision points in the policy making process. In particular, these models emphasize the importance of consensus in creating impetus for legislative action and explain why, lacking consensus or other overriding support in the policy environment, many issues and policy alternatives never receive serious consideration in congressional committees and executive policy councils.[3]

In this view, proposals for broad market reform were rejected in favor of Medicare rate regulation, because of conflicting forces in the policy-making environment. Ultimately, there was no consensus on wide-scale market reform. In light of legislators' goals and three sets of environmental constraints—interest group opposition, lack of public opinion support, and abandonment of pro-competition positions in the executive branch—it can be understood why Congress opted to focus on short-term measures to control federal health expenditures rather than to follow free-market ideology.

The Policy Problem: Control of Health Care Costs

Health care reform is an issue that during the 1960s and early 1970s achieved great prominence on the congressional agenda. Americans perceived that despite the presence of the most sophisticated health care technologies in the world, there were significant shortcomings in the distribution, quality, and efficiency of their

[2] John W. Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting," *Journal of Politics* 39 (August 1977): 563–95; John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).
[3] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 157–59.

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health services. To meet these shortcomings, Congress authorized a number of programs—subsidies for hospital construction and modernization, hospital and medical insurance for the elderly, education and training grants for the health professions, physician peer review, medical assistance for the poor, developmental grants for comprehensive prepaid medical care organizations, and state and regional health services planning.

In a sense, each of these programs was part of the groundwork for a comprehensive national health insurance (NHI) system. Policy makers felt that once the large gaps in the system were closed, the next logical extension in social welfare policy would be publicly financed health insurance for all individuals and families. This was the idea underlying the proposals of leaders in congressional health policy such as Edward Kennedy, the ranking Democrat on the health subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, and Wilbur Mills, former chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee overseeing the Medicare and Medicaid programs.

Unfortunately, while public programs improved the quality and equitable distribution of health services, the costs of health care began an inflationary spiral that continues to the present. Policy analysts and politicians failed to understand how expanding insurance coverage would increase the use of health services; how new technological developments would raise the unit costs of medical diagnosis and treatment; and, most importantly, how perverse economic incentives for health care providers and consumers alike would stimulate excessive production and consumption of health services.[4] The resulting increases in the use and intensity of health care produced an inflation in costs that far outpaced price increases in the general economy. Per capita spending on personal health services rose from $181 in 1965 to $1,090 in 1981. In that same period, national health expenditures increased from 6.2 to 9.8 percent of the gross national product.[5]

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, rising governmental outlays for health programs not only jeopardized plans for universal NHI but also came to be perceived as significant obstacles to a balanced federal budget.[6] Two policy options to curb the growth of the health care sector emerged in Congress at this time. The first approach was to establish guidelines for hospital rate increases. Hospital services, which accounted for over 40 percent of all personal health care expenditures and were experiencing a spectacular price inflation of over 15 percent per year, were

[4] Aaron Wildavsky's analysis of the "political pathology of health policy" concluded that governmental subsidies for medical care had resulted in uncritical investment in high medical technology with minimal returns to the health of Americans. Aaron Wildavsky, "Doing Better and Feeling Worse: The Political Pathology of Health Policy" in John Knowles, ed., *Doing Better and Feeling Worse* (New York: Norton, 1977), 105–24.

[5] Robert M. Gibson and Daniel R. Waldo, "National Health Expenditures, 1981," *Health Care Financing Review* 4 (September 1982): 23.

[6] Linda E. Demkovich, "Competition's Coming On," *National Journal*, 12 July 1980, 1152. This concern is also discussed in Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 179–80.

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an obvious target for regulatory action. Yet even a weakened version of the hospital cost containment bill offered by the Carter administration was soundly defeated in 1979.[7] The technical and administrative complexity of the proposed legislation made it unsalable in the face of intensive lobbying from the health care industry.[8] Along with universal NHI, the regulatory approach did not fit with the basic political requirements of the times.[9]

What was needed was a policy alternative that recognized "the need to hold down the costs appearing on the federal budget, the need to allow private insurers to retain a major role in health care, and the need to limit the size and scope of government activity."[10] An attractive option to regulation, according to many analysts, was market-oriented reform—the introduction of a systematic set of new incentives to encourage greater competition among health care providers, improve efficiency in the organization and delivery of health services, and in the long run control the escalation of health care costs. The market reform alternative presented an opportunity to simultaneously exploit the "problem window" created by chronic health care cost inflation to the "political window" opened by the incoming Reagan administration's pro-market stance. The following section summarizes the rationale and policy objectives of the pro-competition proposals—attempts to formulate good public policy in an era of deregulation.

Principles of Health Care Market Reform

The market approach to cost containment attempted to overcome four failures in the traditional system of health care financing and services. First, individuals have little motivation to forgo consumption of health services when they are covered by comprehensive, tax-free insurance for even routine procedures and when they share little or no costs of each additional service. Second, the traditional fee-for-service payment mechanism rewards health professionals for providing more, not fewer, medical tests and treatments. This economic incentive reinforces professional norms for high quality care. Third, the lack of consumer knowledge and information about medical care creates a dependence on the health professional; in effect, the provider controls both the demand and the supply of services and hence the costs of those services. Finally, most payments to hospitals and professionals are based on the costs of care rather than on competitive prices, so efficiency is not rewarded in most services.

These failures, advocates of competition argued, affect the decisions that individuals make in consuming health services. There are two types of decisions: the first is the decision to seek treatment at the time of illness, and the second is

[7] Alain C. Enthoven, *Health Plan* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1980), 98.

[8] Paul J. Feldstein and Glenn Melnick, "Congressional Voting Behavior on Hospital Legislation: An Exploratory Study," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 8 (Winter 1984): 686–701.

[9] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 153–57.

[10] Enthoven, *Health Plan*, 161.

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the purchase or selection of a health insurance plan. Accordingly, two general approaches were proposed to control costs through price competition.

The first approach was to force people to share more of the costs of each procedure or service they receive. Patients were then expected to seek care in less expensive settings or forgo services that they believe will have only a small benefit. The main problem with this strategy was that it is extremely difficult to provide the health care consumer with complete information on the costs, risks, and benefits of various health services in various settings. Furthermore, in the case of acute illness the patient is in no position to weigh this information but instead is likely to seek the best medical care available. In reality, the physician or other health professional will usually be the proxy for the patient in deciding what volume and timing of medical treatments are appropriate. And a physician paid on a fee-for-service basis is in a position to benefit both the patient and him or herself by doing more at the expense of the "medical commons."[11]

The second approach emphasized competition between alternative delivery systems and traditional fee-for-service medical practices. Individuals were to be offered several choices of insurance plans with different benefits, cost-sharing requirements, and premiums, and often with different participating physicians and hospitals. They would select the package best suited to their needs, conscious of both the scope and price of each plan. This approach channels the purchasing power of the consumer through the plans, which then are responsible for assuring that an appropriate level of services is provided to their subscribers. In order to compete on the basis of price, the plans must control the services they deliver so that costs do not exceed the fixed revenues paid by subscribers. They are able to do this by reducing the amount of high-cost services such as hospital care and increasing the volume of ambulatory services and preventive care. Under competitive conditions, prepaid health plans such as health maintenance organizations were shown to cost 10 to 40 percent less than conventional, fee-for-service medical care.[12]

Legislative Proposals and Policy Objectives

This vision of organized health care competition was embodied in economist Alain Enthoven's Consumer Choice Health Plan, which served as the prototype for most of the pro-competition bills introduced in the 96th and 97th Congresses.[13] The specific legislative components of the pro-competition strategy

[11] James F. Blumstein and Frank A. Sloan, "Redefining Government's Role in Health Care: I a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?," *Vanderbilt Law Review* 34 (May 1981) 857, 869.

[12] Harold S. Luft, "How Do Health Maintenance Organizations Achieve Their 'Savings'?" *New England Journal of Medicine* 298 (15 June 1978): 1336–43; Harold S. Luft, "Assessing the Evidence on HMO Performance," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 58 (Fall 1980): 501–36; Harold S. Luft *Health Maintenance Organizations: Dimensions of Performance* (New York: Wiley, 1981).

[13] The Consumer Choice Health Plan, originally commissioned but then rejected by Secretary c

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included: reducing or eliminating the tax deductions for health insurance premiums by employers and the excludability of health benefits from employees' taxable income; providing multiple choice of health plans for employees, Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries; requiring an equal contribution of the employer or government toward the purchase of these plans regardless of the costs of the plans.

The pro-competition proposals had several policy objectives. First, they were primarily concerned with long-term, system-wide reform.[14] They addressed not only the pressing issue of increasing health care costs, but also the underlying organizational and financial characteristics of health services that give rise to cost inflation. In this respect, competition advocates explicitly rejected short-term programs aimed at trimming budget deficits. David Stockman, a proponent of market reform first as a congressman and later as director of the Office of Management and Budget, claimed the catalyst for his bill was the irrationality and unworkability of the original hospital cost containment legislation.[15]

A second objective of the competitive strategy was to foster the development of multiple forms of health care organization and financing. Beyond the historic fee-for-service payment mechanism and indemnity insurance plans, a pluralistic system would incorporate health maintenance organizations, health care alliances, independent practice associations, preferred provider organizations, primary care networks, and other emerging entities. The goal of the pro-competition measures was to remove any organizational bias in the financing system due to tax subsidies or lack of choices in insurance plans; consumers would select among competing plans on the basis of benefits, as in the past, and on price as well.

The competitive model also intended to force the health care consumer to differentiate between high- and low-risk medical needs. Much health insurance currently covers services that are either routine or elective in nature and hence is hardly insurance in the classic sense. By eliminating tax subsidies, the pro-com-

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HEW Joseph Califano, was first outlined in Alain C. Enthoven, "Consumer-Choice Health Plan (I): Inflation and Inequality in Health Care Today: Alternatives for Cost Control and an Analysis of Proposals for National Health Insurance," *New England Journal of Medicine* 298 (23 March 1978): 650–58; "Consumer-Choice Health Plan (II): A National Health Insurance Proposal Based on Regulated Competition," *New England Journal of Medicine* 298 (30 March 1978): 709–20. The full proposal was set forth in Enthoven, *Health Plan*. Pro-competitive proposals introduced in the 96th and 97th Congresses included S. 1485, Health Incentives Reform Act of 1979, introduced by David Durenberger; H.R. 5740, Health Cost Restraint Act of 1979, introduced by Al Ullman; H.R. 850, Health Care Reform Act of 1981, introduced by Richard Gephardt and David Stockman; S. 130, Comprehensive Health Care Reform Act, introduced by Orrin Hatch; and S. 433, Health Incentives Reform Act of 1981, introduced by David Durenberger.

[14] See Alan Murray, "Administration Urges Slash in Federal Health Care Role, Calls for 'Competitive' System," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 March 1981, 417; and Wlodkowski, "Caveat Emptor in Health Care," 45.

[15] Linda E. Demkovich, "New Congressional Health Leaders – The Emphasis Is on Competition," *National Journal*, 5 July 1981, 1096–7.

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petitive proposals attempted to equate a dollar's worth of health insurance with a dollar of earned (taxable) income; the consumer would thereby be encouraged to insure only high cost, unexpected services and pay for routine services out-of-pocket as he or she would for other goods and services. Alternatively, individuals would subscribe to a prepaid, comprehensive health plan, which can offer lower premiums due to its ability to reduce the use of high-cost procedures. A by-product of this policy was to encourage low-cost preventive medicine and health promotion activities.

A final objective of the competition bills was to include the elderly and the poor in the mainstream of health care. Although the Medicare and Medicaid programs would have remained as governmental responsibilities, beneficiaries would be given vouchers and allowed to enroll in a private insurance plan of their choice. This strategy would increase the access of the poor and elderly to all health care providers and lessen criticisms that a two-class system exists—criticisms that became more valid as government cut back on its payments for Medicare and Medicaid.[16]

The competition idea, both in its comprehensive form and in its component parts, had seemingly become a viable alternative as Congress considered its health policies for the 1980s. What were its realistic chances of enactment? Analysis of this question must consider the goals of individual legislators and the forces influencing their policy deliberations.

The Policy-making Environment for Pro-competitive Legislation

Members of Congress, according to Kingdon, search for consensus in the field of forces surrounding a policy issue.[17] As proposals move onto the agenda and toward possible enactment, sources of guidance for decisions include colleagues, party leadership, clientele groups and constituency opinion, the president, executive agencies, and expert analysis.[18] Most of the time, the cues legislators receive from these sources reinforce each other. If instead of consensus they find conflict and controversy among interested parties, however, they are likely to respond to the forces linked to the goal most important to them—that of satisfying constituents, achieving intra-Washington influence, or making good public policy. This

[16] John K. Iglehart, "Medicare's Uncertain Future," *New England Journal of Medicine* 306 (2 May 1982): 1309.

[17] Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting," 574–79; Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 157–59.

[18] Several students of political representation and legislative decision making have identified the various outside actors influencing members of Congress. See, for example, Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," *American Political Science Review* 53 (September 1959): 744–45; Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review* 57 (March 1963): 56; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 15; and Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting," 574

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section examines the field of forces facing legislators as they considered proposals to promote health care competition in the early 1980s.

Congressional Leadership in Health Policy

The most influential actors in establishing the congressional agenda and determining the fate of policy proposals appear to be the members of Congress. Kingdon noted that in hundreds of interviews with political elites inside and outside of government, 91 percent of the respondents mentioned the important role of members of Congress in moving a proposal onto the agenda for legislative action. He recounted a number of cases where individual legislators moved health issues from the planning stage to the "front burner" of congressional politics.[19] A combination of individual incentives[20] and decentralized structure[21] makes Congress a fertile ground for innovative proposals and gives individual members an inordinate influence in policy making.

Most health legislation is delegated to four committees: the Senate Labor and Human Resources, Senate Finance, House Ways and Means, and House Energy and Commerce.[22] The leadership of these committees and their respective health subcomittees serves as a focal point to assess the fate of pro-competition legislation.

Leadership changes resulting from the 1980 national election appeared to create a propitious climate for pro-competition proposals in the Senate. In the Labor and Human Resources Committee, the new Republican chairman, Orrin Hatch, dissolved the health subcommittee that had long been dominated by Edward Kennedy, a sponsor of numerous comprehensive national health insurance bills.[23] Hatch wanted control over the health issues handled in committee and served notice of a policy shift by introducing a pro-competition bill and sponsoring deregulation in the field of occupational safety and health. His health care bill, S. 130, was essentially a new version of the proposal introduced in the 96th Congress by Senator Richard Schweiker prior to his appointment as Secretary of Health and Human Services. Despite the committee reorganization, Hatch's ability to gain approval of a competition bill in the full committee was never certain. There was a large ideological gap between most of the liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans. Kennedy, the ranking minority member, still held

[19] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 37–38.

[20] Among the studies describing legislative goals and incentives are Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees*; Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting"; and David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); and Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 41–43.

[21] See Lawrence C. Dodd and Richard L. Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State* (New York: John Wiley, 1979), 65–129.

[22] Stephen E. Lawton, "Budget Reconciliation: The New Legislative Process," *New England Journal of Medicine* 305 (19 November 1981): 1299.

[23] Murray, "Administration Urges Slash in Federal Health Care Role," 416.

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considerable support for his Health Care for All Americans Act, a plan for NHI that was far more comprehensive and regulatory than Hatch's proposal.[24] Also, Republicans Lowell Weicker and Robert Stafford defected to the Democratic side on enough issues to negate any partisan control in committee votes. Although Hatch was becoming known as a consensus builder and a moderate on health issues, it wasn't clear whether he wanted a pro-competition bill badly enough to push it along with the rest of his conservative social policy agenda.[25]

In the Senate Finance Committee, a pro-competitive shift also occurred in 1980. New Chairman Robert Dole replaced Russell Long, an advocate of government-financed catastrophic health insurance. Dole took a pragmatic role in the face of budget pressures: "None of us believes these [pro-competitive] proposals will provide us immediate savings. And it is immediate savings, in addition to long-term reform, that we need."[26] Avoiding the ideological underpinnings of the competition-regulation debate, Dole voiced support for the Reagan administration's proposed tax on health insurance premiums and at the same time backed a regulatory, fixed-payment scheme for hospitals in the Medicare program.[27]

Dave Durenberger, who in 1980 became the health subcommittee chairman in Finance, viewed competition as a ready policy alternative. Durenberger made health care reform his highest priority upon his election in 1978, and he introduced the first pro-competition bill in July 1979. His support for competition was rooted in his experience in Minnesota, where prior to his election he was involved in getting employers to support the local health maintenance organizations.[28] Durenberger's bill drew heavily on the adoption of competition by the Twin Cities' medical industry and stressed the ideas of consumer choice, devolution, pluralism, access, and exit. Durenberger's legislative task was made easier after the 1980 election with the defeat of subcommittee members Gaylord Nelson, Abraham Ribicoff, and former chairman Herman Talmadge, all of whom supported alternative plans for national health insurance. In addition, Jay Constantine, the staffer who for years managed the Finance Committee's health legislation and staunchly opposed competition, was gone from Capitol Hill. Following a successful reelection bid in 1982, many expected Durenberger to push Dole to consider a long-term reform measure.

In the House of Representative, the prospects for competition were more ambiguous. There were no competition advocates placed in key committee posts, and many Democratic leaders were considerably more pessimistic about the effects of stimulating health care competition.

[24] Demkovich, "Competition Coming On," 1152.

[25] Alan Ehrenhalt, ed., *Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and at Home* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), 1211.

[26] Linda Punch, "Congress Plans Tough Health Cuts," *Modern Healthcare* 14 (April 1982): 24.

[27] Iglehart, "Medicare's Uncertain Future," 1312.

[28] Demkovich, "New Congressional Health Leaders," 1095.

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The pro-competition forces lost an ardent and powerful supporter in 1980 with the electoral defeat of Al Ullman, the Democratic chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. Ullman, like Durenberger, had first-hand experience with health care competition in his home district in Oregon and had sponsored a pro-competitive bill in 1979 to apply those lessons elsewhere in the country.[29] Ullman's successor in Ways and Means, Dan Rostenkowski, placed the medical cost problem in the context of general fiscal concerns: "[T]he nation's economic recovery rests on reducing the awesome deficits set in motion last year [1981]. We don't have any choice this time about raising taxes and cutting defense. Nor can we duck the job of halting the dramatic rise of health benefits."[30] As a means to raise federal revenues, Rostenkowski showed interest in the pro-competitive strategy of limiting the tax exemption of health insurance benefits. His short-term interest, however, was protecting Medicare beneficiaries in the face of the budget-cutting proposals of the Reagan administration.[31]

The health subcommittee in Ways and Means was headed by Andrew Jacobs, who in 1980 replaced Charles Rangel as chairman. Jacobs, a fiscal conservative but fairly liberal on social and health issues, voted in favor of President Carter's hospital cost containment plan in 1979.[32] Still, he was more likely than Rangel to support, if not push, pro-competition bills: "I don't find [the competition proposals] inimical; I find them intriguing. They merit sympathetic hearings." In a *Congressional Quarterly* interview, Jacobs compared buying health care to purchasing automobiles, saying consumers should be given the incentive to become "prudent shoppers."[33] The views of Rostenkowski and Jacobs reflected the norms of fiscal responsibility and prudential policy formulation that predominate in Ways and Means and the other "control committees" in the Congress.[34] The primary role of Ways and Means in health affairs is to oversee Medicare and Medicaid, ensuring the actuarial soundness of the programs and crafting policies that command agreement on the floor of the House.

In contrast, more partisan tones emanated from the House Energy and Commerce Committee, a critical forum for pro-competitive proposals with its broad jurisdiction over health affairs. The leadership of Chairman John Dingell and Henry Waxman, head of the health subcommittee, posed a significant obstacle to competition sympathizers. Dingell's father championed national health insurance in the New Deal era, and in 1979 Dingell supported the Carter hospital cost containment bill. Waxman cosponsored several of Edward Kennedy's NHI proposals in the 1970s and became a powerful force—perhaps the most pow-

[29] Enthoven, *Health Plan*, 151–52.
[30] Punch, "Congress Plans Tough Health Cuts," 24.
[31] Iglehart, "Medicare's Uncertain Future," 1312.
[32] Ehrenhalt, *Politics in America*, 412–14.
[33] Murray, "Administration Urges Slash in Federal Health Care Role," 417.
[34] Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, 149–158; Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees*, 51–57.

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erful—in congressional health policy formulation.[35] He voiced limited support for competition: "We like to see more market forces in the health care arena, and a system run by the private sector rather than the government."[36] Nevertheless, he believed that competition theory needs to be better defined, beyond generalizations "that mean different things to different people."[37] Waxman worried about protecting equitable access to care for high risk patients—primarily the poor and the elderly. "We may set up a system where the competition will be for the enrollment of people who are basically well . . . and [there will be] a refusal to compete for those who are primarily sick and need insurance."[38] He was clearly convinced that government regulation of health services is unavoidable.

A review of the leadership in health affairs during the 96th and 97th Congresses indicates that there was much discussion of steering policy in a pro-competitive direction but little serious legislative activity. It appears that several key members of Congress considered the competition alternative to health care regulation as good, rational policy. There were many more who considered the general idea of competition in medical services worthy of favorable publicity. Indeed, there was little outspoken criticism of competition, even from Waxman, Kennedy, and other proponents of publicly financed NHI; they paid heed to the politics of the times by introducing elements of competition into their national health insurance proposals.[39] Many aspects of the pro-competitive strategy in fact reinforced not only the conservative agenda for deregulation and market-oriented policies but appealed to liberals concerned with strengthening the hand of consumers vis-à-vis professional and institutional interests. Yet, despite the plethora of competition bills and hearings on these proposals in both the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance, no votes were taken to push these measures through the committees to the floor. Why was there no aggressive activity within the Congress to reinforce the "position-taking"[40] in support of health care competition? A critical look at organized interests in the policy environment may yield some clues.

Interest Group Politics

In his model of congressional voting, Kingdon maintained that legislators intent on satisfying constituents consider the views not only of a geographical constituency but also of interest groups that can influence politicians' reputations and

[35] Ehrenhalt, *Politics in America*, 616–17.

[36] Demkovich, "New Congressional Health Leaders," 1093.

[37] Demkovich, "Competition Coming On," 1152.

[38] Murray, "Administration Urges Slash in Federal Health Care Role," 417.

[39] Enthoven, *Health Plan*, 164.

[40] This term was used by Mayhew to describe one of several electorally useful activities of members of Congress. According to Mayhew, members often take public positions on issues to gain favorable publicity and constituent support, but rarely back up their position taking with serious legislative activity. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, 61–62.

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electoral chances.[41] Organized constituencies also play a prominent role in helping set the congressional agenda: three-quarters of all interview respondents said interest groups were very important or somewhat important in determining which health issues Congress pulled from the policy stream.[42] Thus, interest groups are key actors in the policy-making process—"outside of government, but not just looking in."[43] At times, the concern with constituent interests is preeminent. Kingdon found: "[I]n view of the likelihood that important constituents will notice and disapprove of a vote out of keeping with their interests, the constituency consideration will dominate the others. If the issue is of lower salience, however, the congressman has more freedom to allow his policy views or intra-Washington considerations to control his choice."[44]

To the extent, then, that proposals for health care competition generated conflict among the constellation of forces present in the legislative process, we would expect members to choose action—or inaction—preferred by important constituencies. This section reviews the positions that influential clientele groups in congressional committee politics took on the pro-competitive proposals. Surprisingly, almost all groups viewed the proposals as undesirable in significant ways.

Organized Labor

In the past, unions and other employee groups supported the development of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to increase the availability of comprehensive, prepaid health services. Thus, the consumer choice aspects of the competition strategy were compatible with the goals of organized labor, as were plans to pay for the elderly and the poor to subscribe to comprehensive health plans.

The unions smelled a "take away" in the proposed tax law changes, however.[45] The pro-competition measures intended to discourage individuals from choosing comprehensive insurance coverage by taxing any benefits above a certain dollar amount as employee income. This contradicted the social philosophy of the labor movement. Organized labor, as Enthoven pointed out, had a longstanding commitment to universal health insurance.[46] This included a single standard of comprehensive care for everyone as a right. Competition was seen as an excuse to take back the gains made by workers in health benefits and other social insurance.

Further, the proposals would have eroded the power of union leaders negotiating for health benefits with business and industrial employers. The tax-free nature of health insurance made increases in these service benefits cheaper for

[41] Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting," 569–70, 582–83.

[42] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 49.

[43] Ibid., 48–57.

[44] Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting," 578.

[45] Blumstein and Sloan, "Redefining Government's Role in Health Care," 863.

[46] Alain C. Enthoven, "How Interested Groups Have Responded to a Proposal for Economic Competition in Health Services," *American Economic Review* 70 (May 1980): 143.

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employers than increases in wages and salaries, so these benefits had become prolific chips in the collective bargaining process. With a cap on tax-free fringe benefits, employees would prefer wage increases to expansion of health insurance coverage, so there would be no bargaining chips with which to achieve compromise victories in wage negotiations. These reasons armed both employees and their representatives against proposals tinged with competitive, free-market ideology.

Business and Industry

Business and industrial leaders lent cautious support to the general idea of competition in health services in its legislative infancy, but this backing faded rapidly. The costs of employee health benefits were a significant and growing concern for most companies.[47] In 1981, business spent about $60 billion in taxes to support Medicare and Medicaid, paid sick leave, and compliance with health and safety regulations.[48] Yet for the most part, the pro-competitive proposals were seen as an inappropriately coercive strategy by both large and small employers. In testimony before the House Ways and Means subcommittee on health affairs, the director of the Washington Business Group on Health, which represents 186 large corporations, stated:

> Let me be blunt: there is no significant support for federal legislation mandating a competition system. . . . Employers are very reluctant to support any change that would result in imputed income for employees. The objection is less pointed at health than at the broader concern for taxation of all employee benefits and the resulting employee/labor relations problems. A second concern comes from those who believe the collective bargaining system, not tax policy, should dictate the extent of employer contributions.[49]

In the eyes of business and industry, the tax cap was not an "essential" element of competition, but a means to reduce demand for health care and to increase governmental revenues.[50]

Other elements of the competition strategy were more attractive to large employers. These included providing multiple health plans for employees to choose

[47] For example, the Ford Motor Company paid out $550 million, or $290 per vehicle produced, for health services in 1980. See Jack K. Shelton, Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means in U.S. Congress, *Proposals to Stimulate Competition in the Financing and Delivery of Health Care*, hearings before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st sess., 2 October 1981 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1981), 567.

[48] Robert A. Carpenter in U.S. Congress, *Proposals to Stimulate Competition in the Financing and Delivery of Health Care*, 569.

[49] Washington Business Group on Health, statement to accompany testimony to the House Committee on Ways and Means in U.S. Congress, *Proposals to Stimulate Competition in the Financing and Delivery of Health Care*, 558, 562.

[50] Willis B. Goldbeck, ibid., 553.

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from and setting equal employer contributions for each plan to discourage unnecessary choice of high-cost plans. Because of the variation in the costs of health services and the limited availability of competing plans throughout the country, however, employers favored local voluntary efforts to promote competition.[51] A significant move in this direction was the development of private coalitions of employers whose combined market power enabled them to bargain for services with health care plans and institutions in many communities.[52]

Medical Professionals

Enthoven noted a great deal of ambivalence about competition in the leadership of the American Medical Association (AMA) and among physicians in general.[53] Their priority seemed to be maintaining the status quo, as demonstrated by their lobbying against the Carter hospital cost containment plan.[54] Although the AMA, the American Society of Internal Medicine, and other physician groups endorsed certain elements of the pro-competitive strategy, they insisted that all persons must have free choice of providers of care, which many prepaid health plans do not allow due to their closed panel of participating physicians and hospitals; that competition not be extended into the Medicare and Medicaid programs; and that the application of consumer choice and tax reform be limited to employer health benefits.[55] Such limitations would have rendered pro-competitive legislation ineffective and engendered strong opposition from the business community.

Possibly the most subtle yet most threatening aspect of competition for physicians was the encroachment on their professional autonomy. "A true competitive system would require physicians to disclose more information to patients and to acknowledge the patient as the ultimate decision maker."[56] In addition, a surplus of medical doctors was already steering many physicians away from private practice and into salaried positions in competing health plans, where more attention was paid to cost containment. With the growth of the "medical-industrial complex," physicians were increasingly forced to weigh medical judgments against the cost effectiveness of available procedures and the managerial preroga-

[51] Willis B. Goldbeck, testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance in U.S. Congress, *Proposals to Stimulate Health Care Competition*, hearings before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd sess., 19 March 1980 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), 413–14.

[52] Paul Starr, "The Laissez-Faire Elixir," *The New Republic*, 18 April 1983, 20; J. Warren Salmon, "The Competitive Health Strategy: Fighting for Your Health," *Health and Medicine* 1 (Spring 1982): 26.

[53] Enthoven, "How Interested Groups Have Responded," 146.

[54] Feldstein and Melnick, "Congressional Voting Behavior on Hospital Legislation."

[55] American Medical Association, statement to accompany testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means in U.S. Congress, *Proposals to Stimulate Competition in the Financing and Delivery of Health Care*, 537; N. Thomas Connally in ibid., 542–43.

[56] Blumstein and Sloan, "Redefining Government's Role in Health Care," 860.

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tives of large-scale medical enterprise.[57] To the extent that pro-competitive measures would rush this transformation of medicine along, they represented another venue of battle between the once-dominant "professional monopolizers" and the emergent "corporate rationalizers" over health care reform.[58]

Hospitals

The hospital industry was badly divided in its positions on pro-competition bills before the Congress.[59] Teaching hospitals and the nonprofit community hospitals, the dominant institutional providers, now faced disturbing consequences of competition. If they were forced to compete on a price basis with other institutions, they could not afford to continue worthwhile programs for teaching, research, and innovative patient care. Competitive pricing would prevent them from building the costs of these activities into their basic charges for patient care.[60] Also, many inner city and rural hospitals provided a large volume of uncompensated services for lack of any other provider of care. As with the "societal contributions" of teaching hospitals, this charity care raised the nominal costs of treating full-paying patients. Under direct price competition, therefore, the institutions meeting the historical obligation to care for the poor and uninsured would suffer even more. Hospital interests argued that provision for these uncompensated services was not adequately considered in the restructuring of health care financing envisioned by competition advocates. Thus, competition bills received some ideological support but also considerable opposition from the American Hospital Association and the Association of American Medical Colleges.[61]

The most avid supporters of medical price competition were the for-profit, or investor-owned hospitals, represented by the Federation of American Hospitals.[62] Proprietary nursing homes and prepaid group medical practices also advocated a

[57] Arnold S. Relman, "The New Medical-Industrial Complex," *New England Journal of Medicine* 303 (23 October 1980): 963–70; Paul Starr, *The Social Transformation of American Medicine* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Blumstein and Sloan, "Redefining Government's Role in Health Care," 866.

[58] Robert R. Alford, *Health Care Politics: Ideological and Interest Group Barriers to Reform* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 14–15.

[59] Sheila L. Simler, "AHA Struggles to Reach Consensus," *Modern Healthcare* 14 (March 1982): 28.

[60] A paper prepared for the 1981 Private Sector Conference on Health Care Competition at Duke University estimated the cost of these "societal contributions" of academic medical centers to be over $6 billion per year. John W. Colloton, "Competition: The Threat to Teaching Hospitals" in Duncan Yaggy and William G. Anlyan, eds., *Financing Health Care: Competition Versus Regulation* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), 131–95.

[61] American Hospital Association, statement to accompany testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means in U.S. Congress, *Proposals to Stimulate Competition in the Financing and Delivery of Health Care*, 168–71; Earl J. Frederick in ibid., 615–16.

[62] Michael D. Bromberg in ibid., 171–78.

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pro-competition policy. The economic climate was already ripe for these entities, especially those that were part of corporate chains: they had access to capital funds, marketing expertise, and expansive market purchasing power. Their support for competition was broad, although the nursing home industry rejected most proposals concerning Medicare and Medicaid competition as disguised budget cutting by the Department of Health and Human Services.[63]

Insurers

Insurance companies, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, and groups that self-insure for health services severely criticized the pro-competition proposals. Under Enthoven's Consumer Choice Health Plan, the burden of cost containment would shift heavily to insurance plans once individuals had free selection of a plan suited to their medical needs. In the insurers' view, however, the competition that would ensue would not necessarily be fair. The head of the Blue Cross hospital plans suggested that mandated competition would favor those insurers who were skilled at enrolling people whose age and health status assured low utilization of services, rather than those who were actually providing services efficiently.[64]

In fact, the growing competition among health plans was disturbing the profitable pass-through position of conventional insurers in the health care system. Under the old cost-reimbursement system, the cost increases of professional and institutional services were simply passed on to subscribers the next year. With alternative health plans able to deliver comparable services at lower prices to employers and individual subscribers, the Blues and casualty insurance companies were held responsible for curtailing the inflationary practices of hospitals and health professionals, with few if any benefits in the event of success. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with federal budget slashing in the Medicare and Medicaid programs—which shifted billions of dollars of costs to private insurance subscribers—the competition alternative was unappealing to the health insurance industry.[65]

Senior Citizens

A final, forceful constituency was the population receiving Medicare benefits. Opposition to the voucher plan of the competition proposals was voiced in congressional hearings by representatives of the American Association of Retired Persons and the Gray Panthers.[66] Their fundamental fear was that under a com-

[63] David C. Crowley in ibid., 668–72.

[64] Walter J. McNerney in ibid., 336.

[65] Linda E. Demkovich, "Health Insurers Favor Budget Cutting—But Not If It Means They Must Pay More," *National Journal*, 21 November 1981, 2068.

[66] James M. Hacking in U.S. Congress, *Proposals to Stimulate Competition in the Financing and Delivery of Health Care*, 386–96; Frances Klafter in ibid., 396–97.

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petitive system, insurance deductibles and copayments would be raised to levels that would prohibit or discourage poorer elderly persons from seeking needed services that they are entitled to under Medicare. Also, these groups echoed Waxman's concern that insurance plans would not seek to enroll elderly or other high-risk individuals in order to keep their premiums low. Critics of the competition strategy argued that access to health care for senior citizens would decrease, not increase as intended by the legislators.[67]

Thus, the organized constituencies drawn into the debate over health care market reform, though divided, had a predominantly negative influence on the prospects for enactment. No winning coalition of interests emerged to support a pro-competitive strategy. Instead, almost all of the important clientele groups that influence national health policy had substantial misgivings about the supposedly rational solutions offered by advocates for market-oriented reform.

Given this unfavorable array of constituencies, it is not surprising that pro-competitive proposals did not receive the steadfast backing of legislators. Instead, the drafting of bills and scheduling of hearings appeared to constitute attempts by members of Congress to capitalize on a general antipathy toward government regulation; gain favorable publicity at the expense of a bloated health care system that consumed over a tenth of the average citizen's income; or raise public awareness of the competition issue to build the broad-based public support necessary to overcome interest group opposition in the decision-making process.

Public Opinion

In some cases, the salience of an issue and the intensity of support for a solution among the general public are important resources for policy makers seeking to resolve interest group hostility and policy needs.[68] Kingdon observed that in 57 percent of his interviews public opinion was ranked as an important factor in the prominence of an issue on the policy agenda.[69] The visibility of the competitive strategy, however, was limited. In a 1979 North Carolina survey, for example, only 17.5 percent of the respondents had ever heard of health maintenance organizations, a key component of the pro-competition initiatives.[70] The most salient aspects of the competition bills—taxes on employers and employees for health benefits above a certain level—were negative elements in the congressional debate.

[67] Daniel W. Sigelman, "Palm-Reading the Invisible Hand: A Critical Examination of Pro-Competitive Reform Proposals," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 6 (Winter 1982): 578–620; Linda E. Demkovich, "Reagan Takes On the Elderly Again as He Seeks to Slow Medicare's Growth," *National Journal*, 12 September 1981, 1616–20.

[68] David E. Price, *Policymaking in Congressional Committees: The Impact of "Environmental Factors"* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979), 46–48.

[69] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 69.

[70] North Carolina Division of State Budget, *1979 North Carolina Citizen Survey Data* (Raleigh, NC: Division of State Budget, 1979).

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Public support for health care market reform in toto was also suspect. In congressional deliberations the presumed long-term public interest in lower health care expenses received little attention compared to the short-term costs of competition to special interests. Was this because consumer interests were never mobilized—a common fact of legislative life[71]—or because consumer interests ran counter to the market model? Victor Fuchs suggested that most Americans, contrary to economic theory, prefer comprehensive health insurance to reduce uncertainty and to avoid moral choices between medical needs and available funds during illness.[72] Only 54 percent of the persons responding to a 1982 *New York Times* poll favored the availability of cheaper but limited health insurance coverage.[73] In the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, the primary model for consumer choice competition, only one of every nine enrollees chose to purchase low-option plans.[74] In an apt commentary on encounters between academic reason and political reality, Uwe E. Reinhardt contended:

> Remarkably, while American economists were toiling in the trenches, scoring impressive victories in the realm of thought, their fellow citizens yawned and went right on socializing this well-behaved commodity. The notion continued to spread that health care is one of those commodities to which every citizen in a civilized society is entitled regardless of ability to pay.[75]

Thus, the national mood supporting deregulation may not have extended to medical care as readily as many political observers were disposed to believe.[76] While the general climate of opinion apparently helped put the issue of health care competition on the policy agenda, it was of little help in moving specific proposals through the maze of legislative deliberation. Based on the views of the general public and health care interest groups alone, one would not expect constituency-oriented members of Congress to have pushed the pro-competition proposals toward enactment.

Partisan Politics

For a proposal to succeed in a conflictive environment where there is no majority coalition of interests or intense public support, leadership must pass from legisla-

[71] Michael T. Hayes, "The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups: A Critique of Current Theory and an Alternative Typology," *Journal of Politics* 40 (February 1978): 155–61.

[72] Victor R. Fuchs, "Economics, Health and Post-industrial Society," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 57 (Spring 1979): 153–82

[73] Robert Reinhold, "Competition Held Key to Lower Medical Cost," *New York Times*, 1 April 1982.

[74] Sigelman, "Palm-Reading the Invisible Hand."

[75] Uwe E. Reinhardt, "Health Insurance and Cost Containment Policies: The Experience Abroad" in Mancur Olson, ed., *A New Approach to the Economics of Health Care* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 151.

[76] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 153–54.

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tive committees to the Congress as a whole.[77] Here, the critical roles belong to political parties and the president, who can provide a counterweight to even the strongest of interest groups.[78]

When an issue commands the attention of party leadership, either in the Congress or the administration, committee routines become subordinate to partisan politics. This is likely to happen when an issue receives considerable attention in the press and in the Washington establishment and when the president places high priority on the issue and engages in extensive lobbying activities to influence congressional decisions. In that situation, legislators interested in cultivating influence defer policy judgements to party leaders.[79]

Such was not the case for health care competition. Market-oriented reform never received party-wide support from either the Republicans or Democrats. This may be due in part to the complexity and obscurity of the issue. Despite the inexorable rise in health costs nationwide, the only policies for cost containment to capture public attention were those that curtailed benefits. Another complicating factor was the mixed ideology of the reform proposals: while they mainly addressed Republican and conservative themes of restraint of government, fair market competition, and efficiency of health services, they also played to liberal themes of consumer choice and equitable treatment of the poor and elderly. Finally, there was considerable disagreement on the substantive elements of reform, even among Republicans. While most congressional bills stressed consumer choice among competing health plans, presidential advisers pushed for increased cost-sharing provisions in their proposals for Medicare and Medicaid. Without solidarity on even the most basic elements of policy design, health care competition never became a battleground for party politics, and the task of legislative leadership fell to the Reagan administration.

Policies in the Executive Branch

Amid a constellation of competing forces, executive leadership becomes a key determinant of congressional policy. "People in and around federal policy making are often preoccupied with 'the administration.' When the administration considers a given issue a top-priority item, many other participants do too. And when advocates of a given proposal find that they do not have a receptive ear in the administration, they often must downgrade their chances for a serious hearing, at least for the time being. Although it would be overstating the matter to say that the administration always dominates the government's policy agenda, the administration still figures very prominently indeed in agenda setting."[80]

[77] Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964): 699.

[78] Hayes, "The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups," 160.

[79] Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting," 570, 583–85.

[80] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 23.

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In Kingdon's study of agenda setting and policy making, 94 percent of the political elites interviewed cited the importance of the president, the executive office staff, or political appointees in executive agencies in steering the course of a proposed policy. These executive actors played a decisive role in twenty-two of twenty-three cases examined in the study.[81] The critical importance of the executive branch lies in its integrative capacities:

> In developing legislative proposals and priorities, the executive is less likely to focus on the demands of narrowly based groups and constituencies and more likely to perceive tradeoffs between these demands and other objectives. . . . At the same time, the executive has a superior capacity to resolve, or at least mute, conflict within its ranks and to move decisively in controversial policy areas.[82]

There were high expectations when the Reagan administration took office that a pro-competitive health policy would be pushed vigorously.[83] Two former sponsors of pro-competition plans in the Congress held high-level posts in the new administration—David Stockman as the director of the Office of Management and Budget and Richard Schweiker as the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Schweiker established a task force in May 1981 to develop legislative proposals and recruited a private sector task force to advise the HHS group. In late 1981 and early 1982 the White House Cabinet Council on Human Resources reviewed a number of policy options. The Reagan administration's fiscal year 1983 budget indicated that major reforms to "introduce more price discipline into the health care market and moderate the explosive growth of health care costs" would be forthcoming.[84]

Yet, it was not until early 1983 that the administration announced its proposals to control medical costs, nearly a full year after initial plans were debated within the executive branch. The proposals represented an incremental reform of the existing system, if not a full retreat from the pro-competition agenda. The administration limited its program to a tax on employee health benefits over $840 for an individual or $2,100 for a family per year and to an increase in Medicare copayments, accompanied by a ceiling of $2,500 in personal expenses for catastrophic illness. In addition, Medicare recipients would be allowed to enroll in private health plans through the use of vouchers.[85] The 14 March 1983 *New York Times* announced: "The Reagan Administration is abandoning major components of its plan to hold down medical costs by spurring competition. . . . The plan has been opposed by major businesses, organized labor, the insurance industry and medical groups."[86] According to Starr:

[81] Ibid., 24.

[82] Price, *Policymaking in Congressional Committees*, 50.

[83] Starr, "The Laissez-Faire Elixir," 19.

[84] Janet P. Lundy, "Hospital Cost Containment," U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief IB 82072, 24 June 1982, 8.

[85] Starr, "The Laissez-Faire Elixir," 21.

[86] Robert Reinhold, "Reagan Changing Health Cost Plan," *New York Times*, 14 March 1983.

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> The Reagan Administration's difficulties in formulating health policy are similar to the troubles it has had in other areas of economic and social policy. A shared free-market rhetoric often conceals real differences. Not only have there been serious divisions among the policy intellectuals in health care (as there have been among monetarists and supply-siders); but the very idea of health care competition, particularly as Enthoven conceived it, was not in the least attractive to much of the health care industry. There has been a contradiction . . . between the ideological proclivities of conservatives and the pressures of interest groups that make themselves felt in the Republican Party.[87]

Policy Priorities: Budget Relief, Not System Reform

Under pressure to finance budget deficits and increase military spending, the Reagan administration retreated from comprehensive structural reform of health services to a strictly fiscal policy. On the way, the end of health care cost containment came to dominate the means to achieve it. The competition strategy offered long-range savings but little in the way of immediate cost control when taken as a whole. A 1979 report by the Congressional Budget Office estimated that any savings in the first five years following enactment of a pro-competitive bill would be substantially lower than the savings under any version of cost containment regulation.[88] Furthermore, most of the anticipated savings could not be identified since they would be diffused throughout the health care system rather than located in specific programs. Thus, the market reforms offering budget relief—a cap on tax exempt health insurance and Medicare cost sharing—received more favorable attention in the administration than the consumer choice provisions.

A short-term fiscal strategy may have been more appealing to congressional leaders as well. Many of them voiced concern over the runaway costs of Medicare and Medicaid. Since 1970, Medicare payments for hospital and physician services had increased at a rate of 17.7 percent annually and were accelerating. The Congressional Budget Office projected that the hospital insurance trust fund would be depleted by 1987 or 1988.[89] The impending insolvency of the Medicare program spurred policy makers to considerably narrow their definition of the health care cost problem.

This priority on budget relief helps to explain the demise of the comprehensive program for health care competition. In hindsight, it is tempting to argue that because market reform threatened so many constituencies and promised only nebulous long-term savings, it was never a viable policy alternative. But that dismisses evidence that at one time it was considered viable and the possibility that it could at some later time again become viable. The sheer volume of legisla-

[87] Starr, "The Laissez-Faire Elixir," 21.

[88] Linda E. Demkovich, "Reagan's Cure for Health Care Ills—Keep the Government's Hand Off," *National Journal*, 13 December 1980, 2126.

[89] John E. Iglehart, "Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals," *New England Journal of Medicine* 308 (9 June 1983): 1432.

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tive activity, executive reports, and media coverage suggests that health care competition was a potent issue that for a time in the early 1980s commanded serious attention from all parties in the policy-making environment.

Even as the market reform proposals faded from the policy agenda in early 1983, the problem of health care cost control remained and in fact became more pressing, but the "problem window" in the policy stream shifted when the fiscal implications of the Reagan tax cuts and the insolvency of the Social Security trust funds came to light.[90] Still, if consumer choice competition had been the only available solution in the policy stream, it may well have been adopted. Its political downfall was guaranteed, however, when an alternative solution to health care cost containment presented itself in a timely manner. Along with interest group opposition and short-term budget constraints, the pivotal factor that sealed the fate of comprehensive market reform was the arrival of a new system to regulate hospital payments under Medicare.

Congressional Policy Making and the Emergence of DRGs

The Reagan administration proposed a novel prospective payment system for hospitals under Medicare as the 98th Congress convened in January 1983. Acting with extraordinary speed, members of Congress voted to adopt the new system only two months later as part of a package of amendments to the Social Security Act.[91]

There are three compelling reasons why in such short order Congress opted to impose price regulation on hospitals in lieu of a more comprehensive reform offered by the pro-competition proposals. First, the prospective reimbursement system offered a mechanism to halt immediately the increase in Medicare hospital payments. One of the problems holding back the Carter cost containment bills was technically feasibility: there was no way at that time to compare the care delivered at one hospital with other hospitals. The 1979 proposal admitted that "data do not yet exist for classifying hospitals by type of patients cared for."[92]

[90] On the importance of "policy windows" of different kinds, Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, nd Public Policies*, 173–204.

[91] The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 called on the Department of Health and Iuman Services to develop a prospective payment plan. The outgoing Secretary of HHS, Richard E. chweiker, submitted the HHS report to Congress on 28 December 1982. The Reagan administration ormally introduced its proposal on 23 February 1983. Meanwhile, the House Ways and Means ommittee and the Senate Finance Committee held hearings in early February 1983 and marked up ills in early March. The full House passed the measure on 9 March and the Senate followed on 23 larch. Final passage came on 25 March, and the bill was signed into law by President Reagan on 0 April. The details of the proposals and the legislative debate are recounted in Linda E. Demkovich, Who Says Congress Can't Move Fast? Just Ask Hospitals About Medicare," *National Journal*, 2 pril 1983, 704–7; and Iglehart, "Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals."

[92] Enthoven, *Health Plan*, 99. The importance of technical feasibility is noted by Kingdon, *gendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 138–39.

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By 1983, however, a payment system based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) had proven to be satisfactory in a statewide experimental program begun in 1980 in New Jersey.[93] The DRG system established fixed fees for each type of case or illness. Hospitals were paid by the case, not by the quantity of services delivered, and, therefore, were encouraged to cut costs by keeping patients for shorter stays and reducing unnecessary tests and treatments. This new management technology promised what no consumer choice measures could deliver—predictable short-term savings. Tentative estimates by the Reagan administration anticipated savings to Medicare of $1.5 billion in fiscal 1984 and $20.2 billion over five years.[94]

A second factor that enabled Congress to adopt the new Medicare payment system was the vulnerability of hospitals on the issue of cost control. The hospital industry had organized a volunteer cost restraint program in December 1977 as a strategy to defeat the Carter administration proposal. This program resulted in a temporary slowdown in hospital inflation in 1978. Once the threat of legislation passed in 1980, however, the voluntary program was exposed as a mammoth failure: hospital expenses rose by 12.8 percent in 1978, 13.4 percent in 1979, and in the third quarter of 1980 reached an annual inflation rate of 17.8 percent.[95] During 1982, hospital costs increased at three times the rate of inflation in the general economy.[96] The DRG proposals, therefore, seemed well targeted. The hospital industry itself accepted the legislation, if only because the new payment system appeared less onerous than the cost-cutting provisions approved for Medicare under the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act and set for implementation in fiscal 1984.[97]

Since the proposed payment system directly affected only hospitals, it was less likely to arouse the opposition of other interest groups active in health care politics. By further limiting its proposal to Medicare, the Reagan administration avoided the extreme controversy created by the Carter hospital cost containment plan. Changes in the Medicare program did not require significant changes in

[93] The Medicare prospective payment system was based on diagnosis-related groups, or DRGs. Each hospital patient was classified by the diagnosis of his or her medical problem. For each diagnosis, there was an established level of payment based on the average volume and costs of medical tests and treatments involved for that diagnostic category. This payment schedule was adjusted for regional variations in hospital costs and for individual hospitals involved in teaching and clinical research programs. There were a total of 467 groups or cases in the Medicare payment system, which was based on the experimental payment system developed in New Jersey under a waiver from the Health Care Financing Administration. For a history of the political development of the DRG system in New Jersey, see James A. Morone and Andrew Dunham, "The Waning of Professional Dominance: DRGs and the Hospitals," *Health Affairs* 3 (Spring 1984): 73–87.

[94] Demkovich, "Who Says Congress Can't Move Fast? Just Ask Hospitals About Medicare," 704.

[95] Karen Davis, "Regulation of Hospital Costs: The Evidence on Performance" in Duncan Yaggy and William G. Anlyan, eds., *Financing Health Care: Competition Versus Regulation* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), 37–65.

[96] Iglehart, "Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals," 1429.

[97] Demkovich, "Who Says Congress Can't Move Fast? Just Ask Hospitals About Medicare," 704–5.

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the private insurance industry.[98] Certainly, business and labor would be more supportive of hospital cost controls than legislative attacks on employee health benefit packages.

Because DRGs offered short-term fiscal savings and offended fewer constituencies, they were more politically attractive than pro-competitive reform. They were by no means a consensual alternative, however. Most health care groups preferred the status quo, and virtually all interests concerned with health care reform would have preferred more time to plan for such a dramatic departure from cost-based reimbursement policies.[99] The extraordinarily rapid passage of the DRG proposal through the legislative process can only be attributed to a third factor, the linkage of Medicare reform to the larger overhaul of the Social Security program in 1983.

Like Medicare, the Social Security OASDI (Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance) fund faced depletion of its revenues; but the crisis was more immediate and on a vaster scale. Social Security reform was a political as well as fiscal imperative and commanded bipartisan attention. On 2 April 1983, the *National Journal* reported, "When Congress convened in January, social security and jobs were its top priorities. While medicare reform was important, it was clearly considered a back-burner item, House and Senate aids say, until the more pressing issues were dispensed with."[100] But the leadership and staff of the House Ways and Means Committee sensed an opportunity to tie the Medicare DRG proposal to "one of the greatest legislative engines we'll ever see—the Social Security bill."[101] They pressed HHS to complete the administration's formal prospective payment proposal and promptly crafted it into a politically acceptable compromise. Linked to the bipartisan rescue of Social Security a few weeks later, the most fundamental change in the Medicare program's seventeen-year history came into being without the usual prolonged review and debate by interest groups and legislators alike.

The legacy of DRGs illustrates a certain unpredictability in congressional agenda setting and decision making. While ordinarily the policy-making process is characterized by consensus-building, the coincidental "coupling" of problems, policy alternatives, and politics periodically provides opportunities for legislators to formulate and enact policies even in a fragmented field of political forces.[102] In this case, the Reagan administration and congressional insiders seized upon a payment system that had only a brief experimental trial in a single state and incorporated it into a $50 billion national program. Even with the phenomenal

[98] Insurers did argue, however, that a program limited to Medicare would allow hospitals to shift uncovered costs to private patients. Ibid., 705; Iglehart, "Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals," 1429.

[99] Demkovich, "Who Says Congress Can't Move Fast? Just Ask Hospitals About Medicare," 705.

[100] Ibid., 704.

[101] Iglehart, "Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals," 1430.

[102] See Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 181–88, 210–13.

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speed of this transition from a speculative demonstration program into a legitimate policy option, the DRG solution arrived just in time to catch the legislative express offered by Social Security reform. Without the remarkable timing of these developments, the Medicare reform proposal would certainly have been delayed or possibly met the same fate as its pro-competitive predecessors. And the advent of DRGs, a potent new force in the health care landscape, might provide a different lesson for students of congressional policy making.

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Participation and Policy Making in Senate Committees

C. LAWRENCE EVANS

Asked about the selective character of participation during committee deliberations in the United States Senate, Max Baucus of Montana responded: "Often only three or four are participating. There's really not much choice. It has to be that way. There's so little time and, also, we seem to find a lot of problems."[1] Paul Simon of Illinois paints a similar picture: "The problem is that senators are spread so thinly. . . . Often we can only put in an appearance."[2] Questioned about how he manages his committee workload, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island replied: "After a while, you learn to cope, to wiggle things around. I'm lucky because Labor and Foreign Relations are only about 100 feet from each other."[3]

This article is about coping and wiggling. More concretely, it explores a question that is central to understanding the process of lawmaking in the United States Senate: Who participates in the legislative work of Senate committees, why, and what are the consequences for policy making at that stage of the process?

The arguments in this article are drawn from a book-length study of leadership in Senate committees, which examines in depth the committees on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; Environment and Public Works; Judiciary; and Labor and Human Resources.[4] In the larger project, evidence is gleaned from a

[1] Max Baucus, personal interview with the author, 8 July 1988.
[2] Paul Simon, personal interview with the author, 13 July 1988.
[3] Claiborne Pell, personal interview with the author, 26 July 1988.
[4] C. Lawrence Evans, *Leadership in Committee* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

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variety of sources, including personal interviews with U.S. senators and staff assistants, unpublished committee records, and a statistical analysis of participation on a sample of legislation considered by the four panels during the 99th Congress (1985–86).

Here, I report on those findings as they pertain to one central aspect of legislative work in the modern Senate: who participates in committee? The exposition in this article will focus on just one form of evidence: the personal perceptions of senators and their aides. My goal is to capture as accurately as possible how politicians themselves think about the decision to participate in committee. Consequentially, extensive quotations are provided from my interviews with senators and Senate staff. However, the following arguments are fully supported by the more systematic empirical analysis (which has been presented elsewhere), and those results will be cited primarily for purposes of corroboration.[5] A brief description of the statistical study is provided in an appendix.

The Concept of Participation

Before proceeding, it is crucial to carefully define the forms of participation under consideration. There are a variety of modes of participation in Senate committees. For example, senators can introduce legislation, attend hearings, speak during bill-writing sessions (called markups), or contribute language to the committee report. However, three forms of involvement tend to be emphasized by legislators and staff: participation during committee roll-call votes; offering amendments that are incorporated into the final committee bill; and influencing the content of the original draft brought into committee.[6]

Roll-Call Votes. Committee members can influence a piece of legislation by voting on substantive amendments or on motions to report a bill to the floor for consideration by the full Senate. Since a committee member is just one of fifteen or sixteen, the influence over the substance of legislation generated by voting in committee is usually less than that associated with drafting the initial vehicle or offering an amendment that passes. Still, when the division on committee is extremely tight and pivotal voters are wavering, the act of voting can be an important form of participation. An aide to the Commerce Committee described the politics of the vote to report the Product Liability Act to the full Senate in 1985.

[5] Ibid., appendix B.

[6] This conceptualization is based on Richard Hall's study of participation in the House Education and Labor Committee. Hall has shown that speaking and other forms of committee participation not examined in this paper tend to be highly correlated with participation through voting, amending, and drafting. Thus, focusing on these three modes of participation does not distort my conclusions. Hall also demonstrates that in terms of sheer legislative impact, drafting tends to exceed amending, and amending tends to exceed voting—an ordering that is adopted here. Richard L. Hall, "Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making," *American Political Science Review* 81 (March 1987): 105–128.

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> Usually our votes aren't close, but this was a political markup. [Ernest F.] Hollings was leaning on [Daniel K.] Inouye. [Slade] Gorton was gone. So they were down to nine; one more than you need. [Wendell H.] Ford was sitting the vote out because of his business connections. [Nancy Landon] Kassebaum was wavering because she was getting pressure from women's groups, but ending up voting yes. [J. James] Exon was the determining factor. I don't think they were even thinking about Exon: He was an original cosponsor. Apparently, Hollings called him in the hospital and convinced him to vote no by proxy. . . . So it turned out to be 8-8-1.[7]

The Amendment Process. The substantive importance of amendments passed during formal subcommittee and full committee markup sessions also varies, ranging from insignificant technical changes to substitute bills that strike everything after the enacting clause. But successfully passing substantive (nontechnical) amendments typically translates into greater legislative impact than participating in roll-call votes.

Committee deliberations in the Senate usually appear scripted, but this lack of spontaneity should not be interpreted as evidence that amendments in committee do not matter. Most Senate committees require that amendments be submitted in advance of the relevant markup, and consensus about proposed modifications is usually achieved prior to the formal meeting. Given the heavy workload in committee and on the floor, there exist incentives for proponents of a measure to dampen opposition before the markup stage. During the 99th Congress, for example, then Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut requested that legislation aimed at protecting the handicapped be placed on the agenda of the full Committee on Labor and Human Resources. The chair, Orrin Hatch of Utah, initially refused to schedule the legislation because he favored greater reliance on state regulations. Weicker and Hatch eventually agreed to a compromise amendment, which was formally offered in full committee. The negotiations occurred before markup, but the amendment process was the vehicle for a significant legislative impact by both Weicker and Hatch.

The Draft. Being involved at the drafting stage is the most important form of participation. Most often, modification of the draft in markup and on the floor is incremental. But even when significant amendment occurs, the original vehicle generally provides the primary point of reference for later action. As one staffer with twenty years of Hill experience put it:

> I've always felt that there's a lot to being the one who originates the papers, who does the first draft. There's a lot of influence in that, and in setting the agenda too. Whoever gets to do the drafting—even though the other side can make changes—whoever puts it down on paper first is setting the tone, even if it gets edited.

Drafting almost always occurs at the staff level, because senators generally lack the time to become actively involved themselves. The source of the language in

[7] Interviews with staff persons were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Interviews with members of the Senate were all on the record, unless the senator asked that a particular response not be repeated.

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the draft varies widely from bill to bill, but it tends to be a combination of proposals from the executive branch, interest groups, and interested Senate offices, as well as parts of bills introduced in prior Congresses.

The Decision to Participate

Asked what factors lead her to become involved on an issue in committee, Nancy Landon Kassebaum of Kansas laughed, and replied: "Sometimes you really don't know. Sometimes there's a personal interest, or it may be important to your constituents. That's always a primary factor around here."[8] Senators participate in committee because it promotes their goals.[9] A central characteristic of the modern Senate, though, is that senators have to focus to be influential. Much has been written about the proliferation of staff and other office perquisites, but members of Congress still operate subject to binding resource constraints that force them to make difficult choices about when to participate in committee and the extent of their involvement. Member and staff time allocated to one bill reduces the resources available for other pieces of legislation, as well as nonlegislative activities like casework and constituency service.

The scarcity of time and the press of business pervade the modern Senate.[10] Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island spoke of the good old days when he was first elected to the Senate in 1960: "The Senate was much more agreeable when I came here, more fun. [John O.] Pastore used to spend two hours on the floor in the afternoon. I'd love to do that . . . but I don't have time, with meetings and appointments. Mike Mansfield and I once took a five week trip around the world. I could never do that now."[11] In large part, these more pressing time constraints have been generated by increases in the size of the congressional workload. The actual number of bills passed per Congress has declined slightly since the 1960s, but those that pass tend to be more complex and longer than was typical twenty years ago.[12] The concomitant increase in demand for casework and other forms of constituency service has been well documented and contributes to the hectic pace in the Senate. Use of obstructionist tactics has also become more common in recent years, which furthers scheduling difficulties.

[8] Nancy Landon Kassebaum, personal interview with author, 29 July 1988.

[9] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), chaps. 1 and 5. According to Fenno, three goals are held by members of Congress – reelection, making good public policy, and securing influence in the chamber.

[10] For an excellent discussion of the impact of changing time constraints on congressional behavior, see Bruce I. Oppenheimer, "Changing Time Constraints on Congress: Historical Perspectives on the Use of Cloture" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985), 393–413.

[11] Pell interview.

[12] Allen Schick, "Complex Policy Making in the United States Senate" in *Policy Analysis on Major Issues*, U.S. Senate Commission on the Operation of the Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1977).

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In short, although influencing the shape of legislation assists senators in achieving their goals, the abundance of opportunities and the scarcity of resources force them to be selective in their involvement. As a result, senators select a menu of issues to be active on that maximizes the difference between the benefits of goal achievement and the costs in terms of opportunities forgone. A primary consequence of this decision calculus is that it is extremely rare for all committee members to participate in committee deliberations on a particular matter. The opportunity cost of participation shrinks the size of the "effective committee."[13]

If only a subset of the full committee participates in shaping legislation, then the identity of the participants becomes an important question for understanding policy making in the Senate. Although nonparticipants can influence legislation by acting as constraints—by having their views tacitly incorporated in legislation by participating senators—committee members taking the lead shape the contours of debate and function as important sources of information for other senators. In short, participation translates into influence.[14]

The Role of Formal Position

Who participates in Senate committees? The existing literature and my own conversations with senators and staff persons suggest that formal position is the crucial explanatory variable.[15] A central characteristic of the internal structure of Senate committees is that the senators with the most to gain or lose from policy making in a given jurisdiction tend to hold formal positions in that jurisdiction, and these formal positions are associated with the resources necessary to lower the costs of legislative work.

Goals

A relatively wide range of committee bills is likely to be of some relevance to the goals of full committee leaders, the chair and ranking minority member, who often wait in queue fifteen to twenty years before accumulating the seniority necessary to assume formal leadership. The extent of this investment suggests that the issue areas within the committee's jurisdiction are of particular relevance to a full committee leader's goals. In addition, holding a position of formal leadership increases the likelihood that legislation in the jurisdiction will evoke the goal of achieving influence within the chamber. One way senators gain influence with their peers is through effectively fulfilling their leadership responsibili-

[13] Charles Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work As He Sees It* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1963). Hall, "Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making." Hall, in particular, presents a similar conceptualization of the decision to participate.

[14] Richard L. Hall, "Measuring Legislative Influence" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987).

[15] Hall, "Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making."

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ties, and this can provide incentives to exert influence over legislation in their bailiwicks. Thus, a relatively broad class of committee bills will be relevant to the goals of full committee leaders.

While full committee leaders have a general interest in the jurisdiction, legislation will tend to be of focused interest to the goals of subcommittee leaders—the subcommittee chair and ranking minority member. Subcommittee leadership posts are allocated by seniority during the first round of the self-selection process through which subcommittee slots are assigned. In Senate committees, almost all subcommittee assignment requests are accommodated. Subcommittee sizes are set by the full committee chair in consultation with the ranking minority member. In the first round of selection, majority members select a subcommittee to chair according to committee seniority. In practice, all but the one or two least senior members of the majority chair a subcommittee. After all majority members have received an assignment, each selects another, again in order of seniority, and the process is repeated until all majority slots are filled. The minority follows a similar practice. In the first round of selection, minority members choose subcommittees on which to have ranking minority status. After ranking positions are allocated, the process is repeated until all minority slots are filled.

Subcommittee jurisdictions reflect the goals of the subcommittee leaders, as well as rank and file subcommittee members. Indeed, subcommittee sizes and jurisdictions are usually adjusted to reflect the goals of committee members. For example, interest in education issues is widespread on the Labor and Human Resources Committee. In 1991, fourteen of the seventeen committee members were on the subcommittee on Education, Arts, and the Humanities. In contrast, due to the declining salience of consumer issues, only seven senators are members of the Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on the Consumer during the 102nd Congress. Indeed, it is possible to track the rise and fall of issues over time by simply observing how the size of the relevant Senate subcommittee changes.

Subcommittee names and jurisdictions are much less institutionalized in the Senate than they are in the House. When Republicans assumed control of the Senate in 1981, many subcommittees were created or abolished to further the policy interests and legislative agendas of committee members; similar practices were followed in 1987 when the Democrats regained control. Indeed, it is typical for subcommittee jurisdictions to be altered significantly at the beginning of a Congress to better reflect the goals of committee members. When Strom Thurmond became chair of the Judiciary Committee in 1981, for example, he tried to convince Steve Symms to join the committee by promising him a subcommittee chair. After selecting the Finance Committee on the first round of the committee assignment process, Symms had to choose among Judiciary, Labor, and Environment and Public Works in round two. As he later recalled:

> Strom Thurmond really wanted me on Judiciary. He offered to set up a subcommittee and let me chair it. I'm not a lawyer. Thurmond said, "you don't have to be a lawyer—you've got common sense. I'll hire you a lawyer. If you don't like him, I'll hire you

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> another one. . . ." I have enormous respect for Strom Thurmond. He's a statesman. But I ended up choosing Environment and Public Works.[16]

That year, Thurmond created the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism for Jeremiah Denton of Alabama to chair. A former aide to Denton recalled:

> Senator Denton and Senator Thurmond have a very close personal relationship. In 1980 when the freshmen came up, Senator Denton wanted Armed Services and Labor and Human Resources. Thurmond sought him out and said "Admiral, because of what you've been through [seven and a half years in a North Vietnamese POW camp] no one can speak with more expertise on the subject of terrorism." He told Senator Denton that he was creating a new subcommittee on terrorism and he wanted Denton to chair it. Senator Denton was reluctant because he wasn't an attorney, but Thurmond was insistent and Denton accepted.

In the Senate, then, subcommittee sizes and jurisdictions are extremely fluid and responsive to the goals and policy agendas of committee members.

As a result, while committee legislation is likely to be relevant to the goals of full committee leaders, it is likely to be of particular relevance to the goals of leaders of the subcommittee of jurisdiction. They tend to be the policy specialists in that issue area. Through the subcommittee assignment process, those senators with the greatest interest in a jurisdiction tend to gravitate toward leadership posts on the relevant subcommittee, and subcommittee jurisdictions are often designed with the policy agenda of the prospective chair in mind. If the full committee chair has a special interest in some portion of a committee's jurisdiction, he or she often retains it at the full committee level. Competently handling subcommittee legislation can also buttress a subcommittee leader's general reputation for legislative responsibility and effectiveness, promoting influence within the chamber.

Rank and file subcommittee members have also indicated an interest in the jurisdiction by selecting the panel. Subcommittee members not holding one of the two subcommittee leadership posts are usually less interested in subcommittee items, however, than is the case with the subcommittee chair and ranking minority member. For most rank and file subcommittee members, the panel was the second or third one they chose, while for the two leaders it came first. Thus, subcommittee members in general are likely to be interested in legislation emanating from their jurisdiction, but the chair and ranking minority member will tend to be the most interested.

Resources

Legislative goals are pursued at a cost. Without doubt, the inputs most fundamental to crafting legislation are informational: information about concrete al-

[16] Steven D. Symms, personal interview with the author, 27 July 1988.

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ternatives and information about the relationship between these alternatives and the underlying goals of senators.[17] Information per se is not scarce. On the contrary, Senate offices are buffeted with messages from executive agencies, interest groups, congressional organizations like the Congressional Budget Office, constituency groups, and other Senate offices.[18] But politicians are primarily interested in information that is politically useful, and they engage in search procedures to distill what is politically relevant from the overabundance of signals emanating from the decision-making environment.[19]

The primary resources for processing information in the Senate are staff. Individual senators are allocated funds to hire up to three personal staffers to assist them in their committee work, but far more valuable is access to committee and subcommittee staffs. Committee staffers are more likely to be specialists in the policy area and have longer tenure on Capitol Hill than the average personal staff member. Indeed, a typical career path for staffers desiring to stay on the Hill is to move from a personal staff to one of the committee staffs. Senators speak readily about the expertise of the committee staffs. Asked about the role of committee aides, Nancy Landon Kassebaum replied: "Occasionally I think committee staff runs the Senate. It depends on the degree to which members are engaged by an issue. They [aides] generate a lot of the amendments—some seem to drop out of the sky around here. They also have institutional memory. . . . We all know of cases of staff members having enormous influence."[20] As a result, the costs of effective participation tend to be lower for those senators having the greatest access to committee staff resources.

The power to hire and fire committee staffers varies across committees, with control over the staff ranging from the highly centralized practices of the Commerce Committee to the relatively decentralized staffing arrangements on Labor and Judiciary. But on all Senate committees, the chairs tend to have disproportionate control over committee staff resources, and these prerogatives can translate into legislative influence. The full committee ranking minority members also have disproportionate control over minority staff resources, lowering the costs to effective participation for them as well. But the ratio of staff resources is strongly skewed in favor of the majority; as a result, committee chairs enjoy a marked informational advantage over their minority counterparts.

Although the staffing prerogatives of subcommittee leaders vary across different committees, even on panels where the staff is highly centralized at the

[17] See David Austin-Smith and William H. Riker, "Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation," *American Political Science Review* 81 (September 1987): 897–918.

[18] Norman J. Ornstein and David W. Rohde, "Resource Usage, Information and Policymaking in the Senate," in *Senators: Offices, Ethics, and Pressures*, U.S. Senate Commission on the Operation of the Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977).

[19] John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), chap. 9.

[20] Kassebaum interview.

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full committee level, subcommittee leaders have disproportionate access to staff expertise. On the Commerce Committee, for example, all staff members are hired by the relevant full committee leaders; but committee staffers are assigned subcommittee duties and generally work most closely with the relevant subcommittee leaders. According to an aide to John Danforth of Missouri, chair of the Commerce Committee during the 99th Congress:

> There is a lot of subcommittee member input during committee markups because the senators on the subcommittee are the ones most likely to get information from the staff. Although I work for Danforth, when I am working on an issue which concerns the Consumer Subcommittee, I work closely with Kasten [then Subcommittee Chair Robert Kasten]. Of the seventeen senators, he's one of the two or three who is likely to be able to comment intelligently on it during markup. We provide information to other Senate staff when an interest arises, but we don't work very closely with them. Let's say [Paul] Trible wants to know more about amusement parks. His staff member could contact us and we'd brief him. He'd then go back to Trible and brief him. But that's not the same as having us brief the senator directly, reiterate the importance of things constantly, and prep him for markups. That's what we do with Kasten.

Subcommittee chairs on the Commerce Committee also have some say in the staff persons hired to work in their jurisdictions. As described by Wendell Ford of Kentucky, current chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation, "Fritz [current full committee chairman Ernest Hollings of South Carolina] will usually ask 'do you have any objections?' There might be a list of two of three people and he'll ask: 'Do you have a preference?'"[21] Environment and Public Works also has relatively centralized staffing arrangements, but committee aides cite the informational advantage of subcommittee leaders due to close working relationships with the staff.

In contrast, on both Labor and Judiciary, the power to hire and fire subcommittee aides rests firmly in the hands of subcommittee leaders, and the subcommittee staffs are an important source of policy-making expertise for subcommittee leaders on those panels. As is the case with full committee staffers, though, there exists a significant discrepancy by party. Staff resources allocated to the majority far exceed those given to members of the minority party. As a result, subcommittee chairs have an important informational advantage over subcommittee ranking minority members.

Staff members are the fundamental resources for processing legislative information in the Senate, but in dealing with an issue relevant to their goals over a number of years, senators tend to build up their own stock of personal expertise, which can significantly lower the costs of participation in the issue area. The personal expertise of senators can be extensive. An aide to Ernest Hollings, ranking minority member of the Commerce Committee during the 99th Congress (and the current chair), noted his background on a bill to reform the nation's

[21] Wendell Ford, personal interview with the author, 26 July 1988.

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product liability laws. "Did we brief him? Are you kidding? Senator Hollings knows the issue inside-out. He used to practice this kind of law and his views are very strong and known. When Hollings gets energized, he can be extremely forceful and he doesn't need to lean on staff."

Subcommittee leaders also tend to build up considerable expertise from dealing with an issue over a number of years. For example, many observers cited the knowledge of Alan Simpson of Wyoming, chair of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy during the 99th Congress, on immigration issues. Although a senator's personal expertise can act as a substitute for staff work, in practice the two resources go hand in hand. Senators invest the time and effort to become experts on those issues most relevant to their goals, and they also tend to be in leadership positions on the subcommittees with jurisdiction over the issues most relevant to their interests. And these committee leadership posts bring greater access to staff expertise. Those senators with policy expertise on an issue tend to be part of the full or subcommittee leadership, or members of the subcommittee of jurisdiction. There are exceptions, but that is the overwhelming tendency.

Thus, there exists a correspondence between policy-making interest and policy-making capability. The senators with the most at stake in an issue area tend to hold positions that provide access to the resources necessary to exert influence. For those senators, the return in terms of goal promotion through actively participating is disproportionately high, while the costs in terms of opportunities foregone are mitigated by their access to staff expertise.

As mentioned, I have conducted a statistical analysis of participation in four Senate committees during the 99th Congress. The results demonstrate that the subset of committee members participating is disproportionately comprised of members holding formal leadership status on a bill, as well as members of the subcommittee of jurisdiction.

Studies of Senate change emphasize the democratization of legislative influence and the declining importance of formal position as a necessary condition for power. In highlighting the lack of norm-based barriers to participation, these studies hit the mark. But other barriers to exerting influence—the scarcity of time and other resources, for example—function as informal constraints. When the process is viewed from the perspective of the individual senator, influence is distributed throughout the chamber. Almost all Senators have formal leadership prerogatives over some policy area and are usually members of about seven subcommittees. Thus, most senators are influential in some policy area. But when participation and influence are examined from the perspective of individual pieces of legislation—the perspective adopted here—it is clear that decision making is not characterized by a large portion of the membership participating. Rather, participation is generally concentrated in the hands of full and subcommittee leaders, and rank and file members of the subcommittee of jurisdiction.

The conceptual framework of this study suggests two additional generalizations about the role of formal leaders, both of which are confirmed by the

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statistical analysis, as well as the more informal perceptions of politicians.[22] First, while committee legislation is often relevant to the goals of full committee leaders, it is usually of particular relevance to the goals of the chair and ranking minority member of the subcommittee of jurisdiction, simply because they chose to focus on those issues. As a result, subcommittee leaders tend to participate more than the full committee leaders of their parties. Second, because the majority party has greater staff resources than the minority, committee leaders of the majority party (both at the full and subcommittee levels) tend to participate more effectively than members of the minority. That is, full committee chairs tend to participate more than the full committee ranking minority member, and an analogous differential exists between subcommittee chairs and subcommittee ranking minority members. In other words, party matters at the leadership level.

The Role of Subcommittees

Since senators choose their own subcommittees, simply being a member of the subcommittee of jurisdiction should increase participation. Of course, subcommittee issues tend to be less relevant to the goals of rank and file subcommittee members than they are to the goals of subcommittee leaders, who revealed the jurisdiction as their top priority during the subcommittee assignment process. Also, rank and file subcommittee members lack control over the subcommittee staff. As a result, rank and file subcommittee members participate more than the average committee member, but much less than the four formal leaders on a bill. Statistical tests reveal that holding other factors constant, membership on the subcommittee of jurisdiction does make a difference in participation, although the magnitude of the effect varies across committees.[23]

In general, though, the impact of rank and file subcommittee membership on participation rates is dwarfed by the effects associated with subcommittee leadership positions. Subcommittees are clearly important in committee decision making, but primarily because of the actions of subcommittee chairs and ranking minority members, not rank and file subcommittee members. In short, generalizations about the role of subcommittees in the U.S. Senate are to a large extent generalizations about the role of subcommittee leaders. Rank and file members tend to exert a significant impact on the shape of subcommittee bills, but participation is clearly greatest at the leadership level.

Some observers of congressional committees have suggested that subcommittees have become more important as arenas for policy making during the past two decades.[24] The result has been a dialogue of sorts about whether or not

[22] Evans, *Leadership in Committee.*

[23] Ibid.

[24] See Roger Davidson, "Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policymaking" in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981).

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congressional policy making approximates subcommittee government. This hypothesis—often called the subcommittee government hypothesis—is of importance, because a shift in the locus of decision making from the full to the subcommittee level implies greater policy-making fragmentation in an already fragmented institution. In other words, if the hypothesis is true, the major decisions on a bill are now being made by fewer members. Since subcommittees are seldom representative of the full committee due to the self-selection that characterizes the subcommittee assignment process, the emergence of subcommittees as the dominant arenas for decision making would have important consequences for the shape of committee legislation and eventually the quality of representation on Capitol Hill.

Although no precise definition of subcommittee government exists, most observers appear to interpret the concept in terms of the organizational independence or institutionalization of subcommittees as decision-making units. According to one influential account, subcommittee government occurs when

> the basic responsibility for the bulk of legislative activity (hearings, debates, legislative markups, that is, the basic writing of a bill) occurs, not at a meeting of an entire standing committee, but at a meeting of a smaller subcommittee of the standing committee. The decisions of the subcommittee are then viewed as the authoritative decisions—decisions that are altered by the standing committee only when the subcommittee is seriously divided or when it is viewed as highly unrepresentative of the full committee.[25]

As Steven Smith and Christopher Deering have correctly argued, if we accept this definition of subcommittee government, then subcommittees in the House tend toward this pattern much more than subcommittees in the Senate.[26] In an imaginative analysis based on data about the proportion of hearings and markups held at the subcommittee versus full committee level, the proportion of committee legislation referred to subcommittee, the extent to which bills are managed on the floor by the relevant subcommittee leaders, and information about committee staff organization, they conclude:

> Subcommittee government has not been fully institutionalized in either chamber, although House committees have moved farther in that direction since the early 1970s. Senate committees, if anything, on balance have moved away from forming independent subcommittees. . . . [s]ubcomittee autonomy, which by definition means restricted participation, is simply not consistent with the participatory individualism of the Senate.[27]

Few observers of the modern Senate would disagree with that assessment, and certainly am not one of them. The primary avenues for policy making in Senate

[25] Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, "The House in Transition: Partisanship and Opposition" in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3rd ed., 41.

[26] Steven Smith and Christopher Deering, *Committees in Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984).

[27] Ibid., 161.

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committees are not formal subcommittee markups, but informal negotiations before the markup process begins and during full committee markups. If we are interested in the legislative role of subcommittees because of the consequences for committee policy making, however, we need to look beyond the question of institutionalization and such simple indicators of subcommittee activity as how often they meet in executive session. Indeed, the analysis of this paper suggests strongly that subcommittee members, particularly the chair and ranking minority member, exert a significant and disproportionate impact over committee bills in the U.S. Senate.

As organizations, subcommittees in the Senate are not highly institutionalized and are not generally important as formal decision-making units. But they are usually comprised of those senators with the most to gain or lose in the jurisdiction; on most committees, significant staff resources are allocated through the subcommittee system. In order to comprehend the policy-making importance of Senate subcommittees, we need to think about the question more in terms of member interest and the allocation of resources, and less in terms of organizational independence and institutionalization.[28] In short, the term subcommittee government probably obscures as much as it reveals, and it would be best just to jettison it from our vocabulary altogether.

Other Factors

Party

Factors in addition to formal leadership position and subcommittee status affect participation in Senate committees. The most obvious candidate is party. It has already been argued that a senator's party is of consequence at the leadership level, primarily because of staffing disparities. But does party make a difference in general? For example, staff resources for the majority are greater than those allocated to the minority. Does this mean that the typical majority member participates more than the typical member of the minority?

In fact, statistical tests suggest that for committee members in general, party has little effect on participation, an interesting result given the strikingly different incidences of partisan cleavages on some of these committees.[29] However, both participants and observers have sensed a more bipartisan approach in the Senate relative to the House. For example, a number of senators with experience in the other chamber have commented on the greater bipartisanship they found in the Senate. According to Democrat Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, who was elected to the Senate in 1976 after three terms in the House, "[w]hen I first came over here,

[28] Hall and Evans make a similar argument in their analysis of the role of subcommittees on three House Committees: Agriculture, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor. Richard L. Hall and C. Lawrence Evans, "The Power of Subcommittees," *Journal of Politics* 52 (May 1990): 335–55.

[29] Evans, *Leadership in Committee*.

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I was struck by how much more things worked out member to member rather than one side to the other."[30] Republican William Armstrong of Colorado, who has served as a minority member in both chambers, echoed those comments: "The partisanship in the House is a disgrace. My service in the House was a radicalizing experience. I came to the Senate with a mood of anger—bitterness—which has now largely subsided."[31] Labor and, in particular, Judiciary often deal with intensely partisan issues, but the rules of the Senate provide incentives for the majority not to exclude the minority. Individual members have significant procedural prerogatives, which are often employed by senators in the minority to influence the shape of committee bills.

Apprenticeship

The apprenticeship norm is a well known part of Senate lore, but recent observers argue that it has declined in importance and provide evidence that the participation of new senators has increased over time.[32] On the other hand, new members have not accumulated the expertise that is often necessary to participate effectively. Although their activity levels have increased since the 1950s, they may still participate less than their more senior colleagues simply because of their relative inexperience with committee issues and the Senate in general.

My statistical study of participation in Senate committees does not support this hypothesis.[33] For two of the three committees with new senators, there are no effects on participation, and for the third (the Judiciary Committee) the impact is actually positive. These results differ substantially from patterns found in House committees. In particular, Richard Hall has shown that freshmen representatives are less likely to participate than their more senior colleagues.[34] What accounts for this difference across the two chambers? First, senators face different expectations and constraints than House members. The media and constituents expect U. S. senators to take the lead on important national issues. The small size of the chamber provides greater opportunity for participation. Of the five newcomers on the four committees I studied during the 99th Congress, four assumed a leadership position on one or more of the subcommittees, while House members often wait three or four terms to assume a subcommittee leader-

[30] Andy Plattner, "The Lure of the Senate: Influence and Prestige" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 25 May 1985, 993.

[31] Ibid., 993.

[32] The classic description of the Senate folkways is provided by Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); an account of change in the norms of the Senate David W. Rohde, Norman J. Ornstein, and Robert L. Peabody, "Political Change and Legislative Norms in the United States Senate" in Glenn R. Parker, ed., *Studies of Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1985); also see Barbara Sinclair, "Senate Styles and Senate Decision Making, 1955–1980," *Journal of Politics* 48 (February 1986): 877–908.

[33] Evans, *Leadership in Committee*.

[34] Hall, "Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making."

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ship post. Leadership posts bring staff resources that lower the costs of participation for new members.

In addition, many new senators are former House members, which further reduces the startup costs of influencing legislation. Former House members tend to gravitate toward the same jurisdictions they focused on during their House careers, and personal expertise built up in the other body transfers over to the Senate. Paul Simon of Illinois is an excellent example. Known for his expertise in employment and training issues in the House, as a new senator in 1985 he became the ranking minority member on the Labor Committee's Subcommittee on Employment and Productivity and was a key player on education issues in general. Asked why he joined the Labor Committee, Simon replied: "It was education. I was a leader on the issue in the House and when I ran for the Senate—I hadn't planned on running for the Senate—I said I would join the Labor and Human Resources Committee."[35]

Prior experience in the House was also consequential in shaping the roles of Commerce Committee newcomers Albert Gore of Tennessee and John D. Rockefeller, IV of West Virginia. Gore had served four terms in the House and had been a member of both the Science and Technology and Energy and Commerce committees while a congressman. Portions of both comprise the jurisdiction of the Senate Commerce Committee. Rockefeller is a former governor of West Virginia and had no House experience. Observers of Commerce Committee politics agreed that Gore played a more active role than Rockefeller in committee legislation during their first year in office, with Gore occasionally aggravating more senior members.

In the modern Senate, new members are generally encouraged to participate in committee decision making. These senators can face greater information costs to participation, but these learning costs appear to be much less relevant for the Senate than they are for the House. Senators are more likely to have legislative experience at the national level, are more likely to hold formal leadership positions and have greater access to staff expertise, and are more likely to be judged by the press and the electorate by their policy-making effectiveness.[36] The Senate has also been described as an "incubator for presidential candidates," and senators are often mentioned as presidential timber during their first terms.[37] Presidential aspirations can be furthered by taking the lead on issues of national importance, which often translates into participation on bills in those issue areas. Indeed, both Gore and Simon were candidates for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination during their first terms in the Senate.

[35] Simon interview.

[36] Stephen Hess, *The Ultimate Insiders: U.S. Senators in the National Media* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986); Barbara Hinckley, "The American Voter in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 48 (September 1980): 641–650.

[37] Robert L. Peabody, Norman J. Ornstein, and David W. Rohde, "The United States Senate as a Presidential Incubator: Many Are Called but Few Are Chosen, *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Summer 1976): 237–258.

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Electoral Proximity

The Washington styles and constituency styles of U.S. senators are shaped by the six-year electoral cycle that structures their political lives,[38] and the proximity of reelection may affect a senator's legislative work in committee. But what is the nature of the effect? On the one hand, as the campaign approaches, the opportunity costs of allocating staff and member time to legislative involvement should rise, lowering the probability that a senator gearing up for reelection will participate effectively in committee. On the other hand, senators are more likely to campaign on their legislative accomplishments than are representatives, and issues tend to play a greater role in Senate campaigns; all this may act to dampen the impact of the electoral cycle on legislative work. Of course, the connection between having a reputation for power and actually having an impact is not necessarily direct. But taking the lead on bills can generate significant electoral returns. Efforts by Bob Kasten of Wisconsin to push product liability reform in 1985, the year before his reelection, provide an example of a senator using legislative work to buttress his standing back home; and there are countless others. The continuing nature of the Senate's agenda is also of consequence. Kasten's bill, the Product Liability Act, had been marked up in a slightly different form during the 98th Congress and resulted from efforts dating back to early 1981. Thus, much of the legislative work that went into the initiative was done well before Kasten began gearing up for reelection, lowering the opportunity costs to him of pushing the measure during the 99th Congress.

In short, two countervailing hypotheses exist about the effect of the proximity of reelection on participation, and these work in different directions. One may dominate the other, and as a result, the impact of electoral proximity on participation will be unambiguous. Or both tendencies may be at work, in which case the evidence will be less clear cut. My statistical analysis of participation in Senate committees generates little evidence that the participation of senators in committees declines sharply the year before they run for reelection. On the contrary, there appears to be some evidence that participation actually rises, although the results are mixed. The largest and only statistically significant impact occurs on the one committee that is unambiguously constituency oriented—the Commerce Committee.[39] Committee work may draw resources from campaign activities, but if the jurisdiction is of particular relevance to a senator's constituency, the trade-off between committee work and constituency service is mitigated.

Participation and Policy Making

The subset of active participants on a bill during committee deliberations in the U.S. Senate tends to be some combination of the two subcommittee leaders,

[38] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The United States Senate: A Bicameral Perspective* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1982).

[39] Evans, *Leadership in Committee*.

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rank and file subcommittee members, and the full committee chair and ranking minority member. Given that senators choose those subcommittee assignments—particularly leadership posts—that have jurisdiction over issues they and their constituents most care about, the phenomena of selective participation may add additional bias to committee decision making by narrowing the values and interests that are represented during the committee stage of the process. Indeed, Richard Hall has argued that on most issues, "the membership of a committee or subcommittee abdicates its considerable legislative authority to some subset of self-selected members."[40]

Of course, nonparticipation does not necessarily imply abdication. During the 99th Congress, Paul Laxalt of Nevada was not an active participant on many Judiciary Committee issues, even though he was a senior member of the committee and chair of its important Subcommittee on Criminal Law. Laxalt chose to allocate his time to other activities, ranging from the pursuit of democracy in the Philippines to being the president's best friend in the Senate. In 1985, for example, Laxalt played no significant role in committee deliberations over S.J.Res. 2, a proposed constitutional amendment to allow silent, voluntary prayer in public schools. On that measure, subcommittee chair Orrin Hatch and ranking member Dennis DeConcini took the lead. One would not want to argue that Laxalt's nonparticipation implied abdication, however, as his views on prayer in the schools resemble those of Orrin Hatch, and those views had an impact on the outcome through Hatch's very considerable participation.

On the other hand, nonparticipation *can* signal that certain interests are not being fully represented. Some of the environmental measures considered by the Environment and Public Works Committee during the 1980s are illustrative. The committee is dominated by moderate environmentalists, but there has always been a group of western conservatives on the committee who are oriented more toward industry. These senators have repeatedly voiced frustration at not being able to effectively participate in committee because they lack the information necessary to be conversant in what is an extremely technical policy area. The committee staff, they argue, is biased toward the environmentalist viewpoint and has something approaching a monopoly over the information necessary to make policy. These senators are a minority on the committee and lack the votes to dramatically alter the direction of committee policy, but they argue that they could better modify legislation in committee if they had greater access to technical expertise.

The most forceful and articulate proponent of this position has been Alan Simpson of Wyoming, assistant Republican leader and a member of both Judiciary and Environment and Public Works. Simpson spoke at length about his frustration with the committee.

> About twenty people in the United States understand Superfund legislation. It takes away the yeast of legislating when all is leavened the same way. . . . The staff is using

[40] Hall, "Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making," 105.

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> us as its troubadours. . . . There should be more balance, a balance of thought. . . . There's all this talk about how uranium mill tailings will leave you sterilized. That's not true. Antelope eat the grass that grows over them. . . . I sent some of the staff to see a surface mine in Wyoming. . . . It wasn't anything you'd want to take a picture of, but it was filled in and covered with grass. The only difference is the grass is a little greener. But they thought "*surface coal*—Pittsburgh, thirty years ago. . . ." You don't have that zealousness on Judiciary. I can't go to an Environment and Public Works meeting and in all confidence be sure what I hear is right, and not tilted. The staff is just too committed, too hell-bent.[41]

The staff of Environment and Public Works reflects the pro-environmentalist viewpoint that has dominated the committee for two decades. But for western conservatives, Simpson argues that there exist informational barriers to effective participation in committee. As chair, Robert Stafford of Vermont gave the western conservatives a dedicated slot on the committee staff to represent their preferences, but they are still operating subject to an informational disadvantage.

Thus, the policy consequences of selective participation depend on the nature of the policy area. If a bill evokes the goals of a broad spectrum of senators and barriers to entry are low, then selective participation simply reflects a division of labor that George Mitchell of Maine calls "the natural order of things in a legislature."[42] Clearly, school prayer falls into this category. Interest was widespread and the cost of time to gather information for participation was low.

On the other hand, most issues are much less clear cut. For example, many environmental issues are potentially relevant to the goals of a broad class of senators, but the level of technical complexity increases the costs of participation to those lacking staff resources in the area. Again and again during committee consideration of the reauthorization of Superfund, Simpson argued that the majority of committee members simply did not know what was in the bill. In short, even on salient issues there can exist informational barriers to participation, and selective involvement clearly has implications for the range of values and interests that are represented.

The senators with access to the resources necessary to participate operate subject to constraints, however. If they diverge too sharply from the preferences of a majority of committee members, the benefits of searching out the information necessary to participate will eventually countervail the costs. How far those participating can stray before being roped back through the amendment process will depend on the policy area: the relevance of the issue to the goals of nonparticipants and the costs of searching out the information necessary to be effective.

But perhaps the best evidence that selective participation has consequences for policy making are the efforts of senators in recent years to alter the internal operations of the Senate to reduce scheduling conflicts and promote greater participation in committee. In 1983, for example, the Pearson-Ribicoff Commission recommended the elimination of eight standing committees, including the

[41] Alan K. Simpson, personal interview with the author, 4 August 1988.
[42] George J. Mitchell, personal interview with the author, 7 July 1988.

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Budget and Intelligence committees, to help rationalize the schedule. The commission's report also argued that the proliferation of subcommittees has led to excessive specialization and recommended the elimination of subcommittee staffs in order to reduce fragmentation within Senate committees. The following year, a temporary select committee to study the Senate committee system, chaired by Dan Quayle of Indiana, was established. The committee held two days of hearings, which quickly evolved into an examination of the operation of the Senate as a whole. But a major complaint throughout the testimony was that senators are overscheduled, reducing their ability to effectively participate in committee deliberations. Like Pearson-Ribicoff, the Quayle Committee generated no significant alterations in the committee system, but there still exists significant sentiment to alleviate the time pressures that so constrain members of the Senate.

Conclusion

During the 1950s, the attention of congressional analysts focused on the United States Senate. In recent years, however, attention has shifted toward the House. As a result, we know relatively little about the process of lawmaking in the Senate of the 1990s. This article tries to fill some of these gaps by exploring who participates in committee deliberations in the Senate, why, and the consequences for policy making. Participation in Senate committees is clearly selective and concentrated among those members in positions of formal leadership—full and subcommittee chairs and ranking minority members. Thus, in describing the modern Senate as a highly individualistic institution in which all members are free to participate in shaping legislation, we need to be careful. When we examine the Senate member by member, most senators do exert influence in some issue area. But when we examine the process bill by bill, it is apparent that only a subset of the committee is active, and the subset of active members is dominated by those in formal leadership positions. Senators simply lack the time and staff resources necessary to be effective on a broad cross section of committee issues.

The narrow base of participation in Senate committees has consequences for the nature of representation and policy making in the institution. On salient legislation lacking significant technical complexity, there are few barriers to participation, and we can expect that a wide range of preferences will be considered. But many issues are extremely complex. In these issue areas, most senators will lack the interest and staff resources necessary to participate effectively. As a result, certain viewpoints and preferences will have a disproportionately high impact on the process of lawmaking in Senate committees, while other viewpoints and preferences will find it hard to be heard effectively.

Appendix

As part of a book-length study of committee leadership in the contemporary U.S. Senate, I have undertaken a systematic analysis of participation in the Senate committees on

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Commerce, Science and Transportation; Environment and Public Works; Judiciary; and Labor and Human Resources. For reasons of tractability, I focus on a sample of sixty-two pieces of legislation considered in the four committees, primarily during 1985. Included in the sample are all of the bills marked up in the committees during 1985 for which committee consideration was more than perfunctory. Then a sample of more routine bills was added. In constructing the sample, an effort was made to include legislation from all of the subcommittees of the four committees and then to add additional legislation from those subcommittees that were particularly active.

Participation has long been recognized as an integral component of policy making in committee, but until the recent work of Richard Hall, students of committee politics have lacked the data necessary to examine participation in congressional committees with much precision.[43] Hall used a combination of verbatim markup transcripts and focused interviews with knowledgeable staff persons to devise an individual level, bill-by-bill measure of the participation of members of the House Education and Labor Committee during the 97th Congress. The participation indicator I employed is adapted from that research. More concretely, my indicator of committee participation takes on one of the following four values for each committee member for each committee bill: 0 = no participation; 1 = a nonunanimous roll-call vote occurred in either the subcommittee or full committee markup, of the bill and the senator voted in person; 2 = the senator offered a nontechnical amendment during the subcommittee or full committee markup, and it was accepted and incorporated into the bill; 3 = the Senator had an impact on the content of the draft. Thus, for the bills in each committee's sample, all committee members are assigned a score ranging from zero to three, with three denoting the highest level of participation and zero the lowest.

Data on both voting and amending in committee are drawn from verbatim transcripts of subcommittee and full committee markup sessions during which the bills were considered. In order to gather information about which senators influenced the shape of the vehicle brought into markup, I interviewed staff persons knowledgeable about each bill, beginning with the simple question: "Who shaped the draft brought into markup?" Of course, shaping the draft does not always translate into greater influence than passing an important amendment; and passing an amendment may be less important than casting the deciding vote on whether or not to report a bill to the floor. Still, the views of senators and their aides, my own observations, and Hall's systematic investigation all suggest strongly that drafting tends to be more important than amending, and amending tends to be more important than voting.

To discern what factors explain the extent to which a committee member participates on a particular committee bill, a multivariate regression analysis with the participation indicator serving as dependent variable was run for each of the four committees. Results are presented in Appendix B of my *Leadership in Committee*.

[43] Hall, "Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making."

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Prerogative Power and the Reagan Presidency: A Review Essay

RICHARD M. PIOUS

In 1990 Princeton's Fred Greenstein asked the question: "Ronald Reagan—Another Hidden-Hand Ike?"[1] Like Dwight Eisenhower, Reagan had won two terms; and like Ike, Reagan had trouble with his syntax and his command of facts at press conferences. Both presidents seemed lackadaisical in their duties ("It's true hard work never killed anybody, but why take the chance" Reagan quipped). They often blundered on policy issues, yet somehow both managed to retain the affection of the American people. Greenstein's assessment was that Reagan was no Eisenhower: he was no "hidden-hand president." If anything Reagan was a "no-hands" president.

What happens to the vast powers of the presidency, especially its national security prerogatives, when a "no-hands" president occupies the Oval Office? The best answers to date come from two White House reporters, a historian who specializes in looking at the documentary record, and a constitutional lawyer.

Presidential Reportage and Presidential Power

Lou Cannon's *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* is based primarily on his own observations as White House reporter during the Reagan years and on interviews with virtually everyone who worked for the president (including forty with Reagan).[2] The result is the most authoritative account yet produced on the Reagan administration.

[1] Fred Greenstein, "Ronald Reagan—Another Hidden-Hand Ike?" *P. S.* 19 (March 1990): 7–13.
[2] Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).

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The first part provides a personality profile of Reagan, building on Cannon's earlier biography and more than 1,000 articles he has written about Reagan. Cannon argues that Reagan played the role of president, following the script set out for him by his media advisers. The president was inattentive and forgetful about policy issues but was adept at memorizing his lines for the day. Although he wrote the overall script himself, he could be manipulated by Nancy Reagan and by Michael Deaver—the "chief impresario of Reagan's first term."[3]

The most interesting observations involve Cannon's explanations of how Reagan processed information and made sense of the world. "The source of Reagan's inspiration was less the Constitution than the movies" he argues.[4] Reagan could only understand things if they were presented as a story; he could only explain something if he narrated it; he could only think about principles if they involved metaphor and analogy. Only people who used concrete examples rather than abstract propositions could get through to him. Reagan had superb political instincts and a photographic memory, defeated experienced politicians on the road to the White House, yet is considered by many observers to be dumb. Cannon doesn't think Reagan is stupid and explains what goes on in Reagan's brain by relying on the theories of Howard Gardner, a Harvard psychologist who pioneered the theory of "multiple intelligences."[5] Reagan ranked high in interpersonal and bodily kinesthetic intelligences, and high in some aspects of language intelligence, but quite low in logical and mathematical intelligence. (Perhaps. But one might argue that Reagan was simply a man at home in his body and blessed with street savvy, common sense, and mother wit—a Plunkitt on the Potomac.)

Palace intrigues form a major part of this book. Cannon believes that Reagan himself selected the cast that played roles in his administration. But Reagan was no John Kennedy, looking for male bonding from a pack of best and brightest; he was no Lyndon Johnson, seeking to be stroked at every turn by obsequious courtiers; he was no Richard Nixon, spinning out paranoid fantasies of enemies out to get him. He was—simply put—not really there. Into the vacuum stepped the heavy hitters: Secretary of State Alexander Haig attempting to become Vicar of Foreign Policy and being blocked by Vice President George Bush and Chief of Staff James Baker; Edwin Meese trying to become chief of staff and being aced out of it by Michael Deaver and Nancy; Secretary of Treasury Donald Regan and Chief of Staff Jim Baker switching positions and then waking a dozing president to let him know about it, and so on. These boys play hardball over at the White House: Baker edges out Meese to become chief of staff, and allies with Deaver to dominate Reagan's schedule. In turn, Meese and Martin Anderson team up against the Legislative Strategy Group run by Richard Darman, who in

[3] Ibid., 53.

[4] Ibid., 97.

[5] Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences*, (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

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turn battles David Stockman of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) over Stockman's proposed Social Security cuts. Stockman's rosy forecasts for the economy provoke Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) chair, Murray Weidenbaum. In foreign policy it is one brushfire war after another: Haig and National Security Assistant Richard Allen square off for control of foreign policy; after Allen is gone, it is Haig's turn to fight off William Clark, and Haig and Vice President Bush square off for control of the Crisis Management Team. For the most part, Reagan sleeps through it all.

Cannon's narrative of the Iran-contra scandal takes up much of the second half of the book. He seems to have interviewed almost everyone involved, and he reported on the Reagan White House while events were in motion, which gives his account great authority. The patterns in Reagan's first term—an inattentive president unaware of issues, surrounded by a manipulative White House staff and cabinet beset with personal rivalries—are largely responsible for the dysfunctional decision making that led to the crisis. Cannon tells of the conflicts between Reagan and the statutory members of the National Security Council (NSC) during the crisis. Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger both fought against the sale of arms to Iran. But their own bitter rivalry prevented them from forming a coalition that might have put an end to the negotiations. Reagan overruled them at every turn, throwing his lot in with his NSC staffers.

But what did Reagan know and when did he know it? Did he commit an impeachable offense? Any researcher of these events can start with three mutually exclusive hypotheses about the president's role.

Plausible denial. Reagan ordered the arms sales and the diversion of funds, gave it over to Lt. Colonel Oliver North (deputy director of political-military affairs on the National Security Council staff) to operate and to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey to superintend. The operation was camouflaged not only to conceal the role of the U.S. government but also to conceal the role of the president. In this version of events, Reagan gives orders down the chain of command to North and is fully briefed by Vice Admiral John Poindexter.

Henry—Becket. King Henry calls out to his nobles in agony, "Who will rid my kingdom of this troublesome priest Thomas à Becket?" The nobles need no orders to kill Becket in the cathedral; merely the hint from their sovereign will do. In the same way, Reagan asks, "Who will rid my hemisphere of these troublesome Sandinistas?" Up step North, Casey, Poindexter, and Lt. Colonel Robert McFarlane to give the king his wish with no command (unconstitutional, illegal, and impeachable) having ever been issued. Reagan told McFarlane to keep the contras together "body and soul," and he and other officials acceded to this wish. "It was my idea to begin with," Reagan says about aid to the contras. In this version, Poindexter never briefs the president, because he knows that the president will agree to the diversion of funds and then be implicated.

Rogue elephants. A coalition of high-level national security managers made and implemented policy on their own, going well beyond what the president

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intended, and did so to further the aims of their own organizations. Casey, blocked by Congress from using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for operations in Central America, decides (according to North) to create an off the shelf, self-sustaining operation that can bypass congressional authorizing, appropriation, and oversight functions. In this scenario, Reagan is deceived by his subordinates, who fail to brief him in timely fashion, provide him with incomplete information, and manipulate him to obtain his consent for the record.

Cannon provides evidence for both the second and the third theories. He tells us that while interviewing Reagan for this book, the ex-president denied any knowledge of the diversion. But Cannon reports that "what Reagan certainly knew and consistently conveyed to his subordinates was that the contras needed far more help than Congress was willing to give them," and that North "was carrying out missions that Reagan wanted accomplished, both in his efforts to free the hostages and to help the Nicaraguan rebels."[6]

Cannon also contends that Reagan's principal advisers often found him "inattentive, unfocused, and incurious," and beset with serious hearing problems that left him confused and distracted.[7] Thus it seems likely to Cannon that at some point Poindexter would have gone in to brief Reagan about the operation and the diversion, but it was also likely that Reagan did not grasp the seriousness of what was being told to him. As with so many other things, he would simply have nodded assent and promptly forgotten about the entire matter. (This seems to be the operative theory of Brent Scowcroft, a member of the Tower Board, and McFarlane as well, though it has been denied under oath by Poindexter before the congressional committees and at his trial).

Perhaps the most extraordinary and revealing aspect of the whole affair involves Reagan's testimony before the Tower Board: Reagan could not remember what he had or had not ordered or authorized; he could not remember if he was involved in an arms for hostage sale or an attempt at diplomacy with Iran; and he could not remember what his aides told him to tell the board. At one point Reagan picked up a memo from his desk and read it to the Tower Board; it contained instructions from his staff on what it would be politic to tell the board. The stunned troika recessed the proceedings, realizing just how serious the presidential befuddlement was for the nation. It may, however, have been one of the greatest Reagan performances. Cannon points out that in the past, when caught between a rock and a hard place, Reagan had used his befuddlement and memory loss to his advantage. Perhaps he had done so deliberately here, though no one but Reagan will ever know. (If he did so, it would give an entirely different meaning to Greenstein's assessment of a "no-hands" presidency.)

For Cannon, the most important question is whether or not the arms deal was a trade for hostages or a venture in diplomacy. He shows conclusively that

[6] Cannon, *President Reagan*, 718.
[7] Ibid., 706.

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Reagan's primary concern was getting back hostages, that he was willing to trade arms to secure their release, and that the notion that there were moderates in Iran was a figment of the imagination of shady intermediaries promoting the sales. When the revelations about arms sales triggered White House efforts to contain the crisis, some White House aides tried to convince the president to admit to the American people that he did trade arms for hostages. Reagan kept insisting that he had not done so, stubbornly refusing to admit the obvious.

But why Reagan's motives should be the central focus of the Iran-contra inquiry escapes me. In fact, a straight arms-for-hostages deal might be exculpatory. For one thing, the very first provision of the executive agreement between President Jimmy Carter and the government of Iran, signed 19 January 1981, provided that the United States would not attempt to influence the internal affairs of Iran. To argue that the president was trying to bolster moderates in Iran is to argue that he was violating this international agreement. For another thing, the idea of doing anything one can to rescue hostages has great appeal. A focus on hostages rather than diversion of funds to the contras puts the attention on a misguided but understandable effort at humanitarian aid. To place attention on the diversion, however, is to raise graver issues of dispensing with the law (the Boland amendment prohibiting such aid), circumventing Congress in foreign policy making, making a mockery of the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, and making a nullity of the congressional appropriations power.

Cannon makes it seem as if Reagan simply committed a foreign policy blunder. But the pattern of double-dealing just may have been central to the way the Reagan administration conducted much of its foreign policy. Cannon's reliance on interviews with Reagan insiders may have thrown him off the trail. He argues that during the Iran hostage crisis of 1980, the Reagan administration kept the Carter staff in the dark about its intentions as part of a conscious strategy: the idea was that Carter could honestly tell the Iranians they were likely to be in bigger trouble with Reagan if they did not cut a deal before the new president took office. Cannon quotes Meese saying in 1981 that their signal to Iran was: "Don't expect a better deal from Reagan."[8] By 1991 some observers were suggesting that a deal might already have been cut by campaign director, William Casey, and others in the Reagan camp, and Congress was gearing up for an investigation.[9]

The Scholar's Quest for Documentary Evidence

Theodore Draper has observed the Iran-contra affair from the opposite end of the telescope.[10] He was not a close observer of Reagan and his White House; nor

[8] Ibid., 104.

[9] Gary Sick, *New York Times*, 15 April 1991; Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, *My Turn to Speak* (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon, 1991).

[10] Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).

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did he have access to the 154 participants in the Iran-contra affair about whom he writes. He was uninterested in interviews, because, as he put it, "interviews must be taken on faith because the reader knows only as much as the interviewer chooses to tell him."[11] Instead, Draper consulted the documents, more than 50,000 pages of them, including twenty-seven volumes of depositions in the congressional hearings conducted in 1987 and 2,500 pages of Oliver North's notebooks. His conclusions are remarkably similar to Cannon's: the arms sales were promoted by slick dealers who knew there were no moderates in Teheran; the deal involved the government of Iran, not a dissident faction; the administration officials were following Reagan's express orders in trading arms for hostages; there is no smoking gun that can link Reagan (or Bush for that matter) with the diversion of funds to the contras.[12]

Draper shows how Oliver North and Poindexter rammed their policy through in spite of the opposition of the secretaries of state and defense, dividing up the government into those who knew about further dealings (the NSC staffers) and those who did not (the departments of state and defense), then deceived Congress about these policies, all the time operating with what they believed to be President Reagan's implicit or explicit approval. But that remains the key issue. Did they have his approval in advance, and if so, was it explicit or implicit? Or did they obtain his approval retroactively? Or not at all? On all but the diversion of funds to the contras, Draper believes that they did have his approval, that it was explicit, and that it was given in advance.

Was William Casey the Cardinal Richelieu of the piece, manipulating the system and the president to develop an "off the shelf, self-sustaining" covert operations capability that did not need to go to Congress for funding? Draper's answer is no: Poindexter did not take orders from Casey, did not always brief Casey, and did not relay orders to North from Casey. North's attempts to implicate Casey stem either from an overactive imagination or from a conscious attempt to find a scapegoat and deflect blame that otherwise would remain with the colonel. In fact, Poindexter reported to Reagan on the arms sale initiatives, took orders from Reagan about it, and represented the president to the rest of the government. He managed the successful efforts to get Reagan to sign the various "findings" authorizing the sales, directed the NSC staff (that is, North) to manage government dealings with "The Enterprise," shifted from one set of arms dealers to others, and permitted North to divert funds to the contras. On this point Cannon and Draper agree: Poindexter, not Casey, is their pointman, even though the operations could not have been effected without CIA support.[13]

But Draper too may have missed some of the story. Neither the congressional inquiry nor the court cases completed as of summer 1991 were able to determine

[11] *New York Times Book Review*, 26 May 1991, 17
[12] Draper, *A Very Thin Line*, 571.
[13] Ibid., 263.

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the full extent of the CIA's Central America Task Force's operations between 1984 and 1986. The CIA's own investigation claimed that only six officals knew anything about the arms deals and the attempts to bypass the Boland amendment cutoffs. There is evidence that the chief of the task force met regularly and kept in telephone communication with North.[14] A larger CIA role (and a greater role for Casey) may ultimately come to light if independent counsel Lawrence Walsh decides to pursue these leads.

Draper puts the ultimate blame on the President. He overrode legal and policy objections raised by his secretaries of defense and state. He bought into arguments that if the president orders it, it can't be illegal—much as Nixon had done in Watergate. "The Iran-contra affairs were not an aberration," Draper concludes, "they were brought on by a long process of presidential aggrandizement, congressional fecklessness, and judicial connivance."[15]

The high prerogative view of presidential power is still with us, of course. In 1989 Congress passed an intelligence reform bill that would have forbidden presidents from soliciting or diverting funds for illegal activities—even on national security grounds. The bill was vetoed by President Bush.

The Constitutional Lawyer and the Quest for Collaborative Government

Constitutional lawyers no longer content themselves with doctrinal analyses that legitimize or delegitimize presidential actions. The renaissance in public law has spawned hundreds of articles and dozens of monographs on presidential power. Most blend doctrinal analysis with prescription: they offer constitutional amendments or framework legislation to regulate and limit presidential power. Harold Koh, a professor of law at Yale University, has produced one of the best recent public law studies of presidential prerogative.[16] He contrasts the principles of the original national security constitution developed in 1947—with its emphasis on power sharing, collaboration in decision making, and checks and balances—with the national security constitution of Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan, with its patterns of presidential secrecy, deception, and prerogative actions.

Koh concentrates much of his book on the Iran-contra affair and what it tells us about prerogative power. For Koh, the significance of the affair is that it was an assault that turned traditional constitutional principles on their heads. It violated the understandings of the National Security Act of 1947; but even more important, it violated recent understandings between the branches embodied in

[14] Michael Wines, "Ex-C.I.A. Aide May Give Plea and Help Iran-Contra Inquiry," *New York Times*, 8 July 1991.

[15] Draper, *A Very Thin Line*, 582.

[16] Harold Hongju Koh, *The National Security Constitution*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

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such framework statutes as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980. Presidents have been willing to break the deals they or their predecessors have made with Congress, shattering the comity required to make the Madisonian system work. His analysis of the Iran-contra affair is followed by two splendid chapters (each entitled "Why the Presidential Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs") in which he goes through the pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial legitimation.

Koh concludes his book with a prescriptive section that attempts no less than the restoration of the original national security constitution. His guiding principle is that "American foreign policy grows out of a long-term political process premised upon notions of balanced institutional participation and power sharing."[17] He pins his hopes on new "framework" legislation: Koh proposes an entirely new national security charter which would incorporate the War Powers Resolution, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Intelligence Oversight Act, and provisions of the National Security Act.[18] He also wants Congress to reorganize itself to make the new framework legislation work: he argues for a core consultative group that would advise the president and collaborate in decision making, a congressional legal adviser to monitor the national security apparatus of the executive, and changes in congressional rules to facilitate fast-track responses to executive actions. Koh also has pertinent observations about the secrecy system and the need to share information, and the use of the appropriations power to force collaborative government on the president. Finally, he proposes stating in the law itself that violations of certain of its provisions would constitute "high crimes and misdemeanors."[19]

Koh has provided an ambitious agenda for Congress, but as yet there is no hint of any legislative willingness to act on any part of it. Indeed, one might argue that a Congress that has shown itself unprepared to use the framework legislation already existing is hardly likely to pass an omnibus version with teeth in it. Even members of Congress opposed to the prospect of hostilities against Iraq chose not to use the War Powers Resolution, for example, seeing it as a dead end and likely to be overturned by the Rehnquist Supreme Court at its earliest opportunity. To institute Koh's framework it would take more than inspired legislative drafting: it would require a different set of justices on the Supreme Court. And if the sea change in American politics required to transform the judiciary actually were to take place, it probably would not be necessary for Congress to enact the statutory reforms Koh suggests.

Meanwhile, a majority of the Court legitimizes presidential prerogatives, invalidates congressional oversight mechanisms, and in decisions such as *Dames and Moore v. Regan* provides the executive with maximum latitude in interpreting

[17] Ibid., 153.
[18] Ibid., 158.
[19] Ibid., 181.

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statutes—even those passed by Congress to define and confine presidential emergency powers. The National Security Constitution that Koh rails against is precisely the version the Supreme Court has upheld. And at this moment in political time, no new framework legislation can overcome it.

In Search of Reagan's America

Why weren't Americans outraged by the Iran-contra scandal? Why didn't it lead to the collapse of the Reagan presidency? Some of the answers are found in *Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years*, a study of the relationship between American mass culture and mass media politics by White House reporter Haynes Johnson.[20]

What is chilling in Johnson's account is the extent to which an entire nation began to think like Reagan: personalities became more important than issues; metaphor, analogy, and storytelling became more important than inconvenient facts; emotion displaced reason in political argumentation. "It was an age of illusions when America lived on borrowed time and squandered opportunities to put its house in order," Johnson argues.[21] We became a debtor nation immersed in the New Greed. Johnson takes us on a tour of 1980s America, from the opulent 1981 inauguration through a swing around the sunbelt, heart of the new America and its new conservatism, and ultimately back to the Oval Office (where a sculptured bust of Harry Truman was carted out and a portrait of Calvin Coolidge was hung to mark the Republican return to power). In a section entitled "The Teflon Years" Johnson delivers a most powerful indictment of the Reagan presidency. Reagan in office was a chief anchorman, a master of ceremonies, an entertainer par excellence. "He was the Sun King, presiding electronically over the new national celebration from the White House," blurring the lines between news and entertainment, politics and advertising.[22] Television politics meant slogans, myths, happy endings, and fragmentary, disjointed images, all served up by Reagan's media manipulators for a nightly news audience.

"Was it possible the predominant values of success, winning, fame and fortune that television transmitted into American homes had begun to manifest themselves in the character of the country? Were Americans becoming what they saw?" Johnson asks.[23] From Dallas to superbowls to MTV, Johnson defines American values (winning is everything, greed is good) on the basis of primetime entertainment. It is a devastating description of a nation of viewers rushing headlong from the world of public engagement into a world of private illusion, while their real income drops. Meanwhile the people at the top make out like

[20] Haynes Johnson, *Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).

[21] Ibid., 13.

[22] Ibid., 140.

[23] Ibid., 141.

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the bandits they are, with all of their greed, gold, glitter, and high-net-worth sanctioned and glorified not only by themselves (read Ivan Boesky's Berkeley commencement address) but also by the televangelists, raking in their own big bucks. In the 1980s, Johnson concludes, "God and Mammon had merged and become inseparable."[24]

And what of the prerogative presidency? Johnson describes the covert operations of the Reagan administration in Panama, converted after 1981 by strongman Manuel Noriega into a secure base for the drug operations of Colombian cartels, as well as a secure transfer point for arms from CIA and Israeli sources destined for the contras in Honduras and Nicaragua. "Mixed missions," involving help for the contras and drugs operations were inevitable in Noriega's Panama. "He's a bastard, but he's our bastard," William Casey once explained to Lee Hamilton, chair of the House Intelligence Committee, who questioned how the CIA could knowingly deal with Noriega.[25]

Having followed CIA activities in Panama, Honduras, and El Salvador, Johnson believes that the CIA (or at least director Casey) played a central role in the Iran-contra affair. It is Casey "who set about creating the most remarkable secret operation in U.S. history" by turning to North and "handing off" the football to him.[26] Casey's guiding hand helps North create "The Enterprise," supplies the investors for the arms sales, and introduces North to Richard Secord and other arms dealers.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Johnson's entire book is the country's reaction to the disclosures about the Iran-contra affair. Johnson describes a briefing held by committee counsel John Nields for members of the investigating committee. Nields describes the deliberate misleading of Congress by North and McFarlane, but gets so little response from the members (not all of whom even bothered to show up) that he begins to wonder if he has blown things out of proportion.

Johnson describes the "Olliemania" that blunted and turned back the congressional challenge to the Reagan administration. North epitomizes heroism in Reagan's America. He turns his emotions on and off for the television cameras. He can rationalize anything, believe in anything, claim to be the "wounded warrior" ready to "take the spear in the chest" for his president. At the same time he testifies that he acted solely through a presidential chain of command when diverting funds for the contras. "Lying does not come easy to me" he confesses grimly, "But we all have to weigh in the balance the difference between lives and lies."

Is the nation horrified at these presumptions? At the admission that laws were broken and Congress deceived? No, the people embrace North as a national hero and vilify members of the committee for acting as inquisitors. Johnson describes

[24] Ibid., 196.
[25] Ibid., 272.
[26] Ibid., 284.

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the reaction to North's testimony: telegrams supporting North flood the Capitol, and his savvy lawyer, Brendan Sullivan, puts stacks of them on the witness table in the hearing room. Crowds began shouting "Ollie, Ollie, Ollie" outside the Senate Office Building. Members of the committee bend with the wind: they begin their questioning of North by paying tribute to him as a hero—a hero for the 1980s. The Senate police force and committee aides line up at lunchtime to get their pictures taken with North and get his autograph. Meanwhile committee counsel, Arthur Liman, gets hate mail and threatening phone calls. After the first day, the questioning is taken over by committee members, who keep the focus on the arms sales and the arms dealers. The threat to Reagan's presidency is over.

Conclusion: The New Prerogative Presidency

Presidents in crises over the legitimacy of their exercise of prerogative power have several different lines of defense. They often begin with plausible denials (What U-2 flight? What assassination attempts? What burglary? What arms sales?) followed by minimization of the event ("a third-rate burglary," "The arms could have fit in a single cargo plane"), followed by distancing (minor officials acted on their own), followed by an investigation (the Meese inquiry) and an outside study commission (the Tower Board). If the issue doesn't go away, they can always fire their aides (Nixon's Saturday Night Massacre, Nancy's revenge on Regan), reorganize their staffs (Haig for Haldeman, Baker for Regan), and even appoint a special prosecutor (Cox and Jaworski) or independent counsel (Walsh).

As Harold Koh points out, their constitutional lines of defense are also strong. They can argue that they did follow the law in its letter, or at least its spirit. The courts allow them great latitude in interpretation. They can rest their cases on their constitutional prerogatives, hoping that the courts will use doctrines of standing, ripeness, justiciability, and political questions to throw cases out—or doctrines of inherent power and functional necessity to uphold them. Ultimately they can even rest their cases on the laws of higher necessity.

It is very rare for presidents to get into real trouble over the exercise of prerogative power. Nixon was forced into the constitutional defense of his presidency because he tampered with the electoral process, targeted Democrats for harassment, and because he was Nixon—the man Democrats and liberals loved to hate. Cannon shows us how Reagan avoided the final challenges partly because of his convincing performance before the Tower Board and partly because of a feeling that Reagan had blundered rather than plotted. Too many top leaders of both parties knew too much about Reagan's no-hands approach to the office to see him as a threat to the Republic. (In some ways a weak president may have the best plausible deniability for prerogative actions taken in his name.) Cannon does not mention a final reason why the president got off scot-free—what incentive would Democrats have to impeach Reagan, when his removal from office would only force them to run against *President* Bush in 1988.

As Draper and Koh have argued, Reagan not only got off, he left the preroga-

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tive presidency virtually intact. The Tower Commission got it all wrong. The Iran-contra affair was not due to a weak and uninvolved president mismanaging the national security decision-making process, but was symptomatic of the excesses of the National Security Constitution itself: governmental use of third parties and third-party nations (each with their own motivations for cooperating) to bypass congressional oversight and appropriations powers; authorization of covert operations that provide plausible deniability to top officials; the interpretation of statutes in ways inconsistent with the legislative history in order to nullify framework legislation; the unwillingness of Congress to exercise its powers of legislative oversight; the ineffectiveness of the judicial process to serve as a significant check on abuses of power.

Presidents are playing a shell game, claiming to act according to law yet dispensing with statutory law at their convenience in national security matters.[27] As Haynes Johnson so convincingly demonstrates, the prerogative presidency, operating within the new National Security Constitution, seems to be very much in tune with an American electorate mesmerized by its superbowl-style images of politics and statecraft.

[27] In the most recent example, George Bush's pronouncements that he would welcome congressional support for the Persian Gulf war were followed by a statement, released after Congress passed the Solarz-Michel resolution, which explicitly denied that the president needed congressional authorization to implement the UN resolutions authorizing other means against Iraq.

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Book Reviews

Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy *by Eugene R. Wittkopf. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1990. 391 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $24.95.*

This is a comprehensive piece of scholarship on an important topic. It is part of a wider movement reflected in several recent and forthcoming books that challenges realist theories that assert domestic politics are irrelevant to the fundamental behavior of states in international relations. It analyzes a comprehensive mass of information—largely survey data on mass and elite attitudes over the past several decades, but also congressional roll call data. The analysis is complex and dense but clearly presented; it will amply reward the reader's effort.

Wittkopf supports his conclusions well. Both mass and elite foreign policy attitudes are distributed along two distinct dimensions. One—militant internationalism—is a spectrum supporting or opposed to the use of military force; the other—cooperative internationalism—constitutes the spectrum of attitudes toward détente and international organizations. Together these two dimensions produce four clusters of people: internationalists (combining support for both militant and cooperative versions), isolationists (opposing both), hardliners (supporting the militant but not the cooperative version), and accommodationists (supporting the cooperative but not the militant version).

Good demographic, political, and ideolgical analyses tell us who falls into what boxes. For example, domestic political ideology is strongly associated with foreign policy beliefs. Liberals are strongly accommodationist; moderates and conservatives are spread across the other three quadrants but are almost never accommodationist. Less strongly, party is also associated with foreign policy attitudes, with Republicans generally hardliners. Partisanship has always marked congressional voting on foreign policy, not just since the Vietnam era.

Mass opinion is about evenly divided into all four quadrants; the attentive public and the elites are concentrated into the two versions of internationalism. Perhaps surprisingly, business executives consistently opposed cooperative internationalism and in 1986 often emerged as isolationists.

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The persistent disjuncture between the distribution of opinion at the top and that of the mass public suggests that elites cannot readily manipulate public preferences to fit their own. The public's foreign policy beliefs importantly shape the domestic political environment within which presidents must formulate foreign policy and build support for it. Mass attitudes may not be grounded in a high level of concrete information, but they are stable; and the public is capable of relating discreet foreign policy issues in a coherent and sophisticated fashion.

The data and analysis end prior to the U.S.–Iraq confrontation but nevertheless can be used to illuminate the basis and limits of popular support for U.S. military actions in pursuit of a "new world order." President George Bush's Gulf policy constituted a politically astute appeal to a combination of militant internationalism (use of force) and cooperative internationalism (initial emphasis on economic sanctions and moving to use of force only in cooperation with allies, the USSR, and the UN) to include three of the four quadrants (all but the isolationists). The militarily successful use of force quickly kept that domestic coalition together. In the post-Gulf war world, maintaining that coalition may not be so easy, and any simple assertion that the Gulf experience has insured domestic support for the unilateral use of force internationally is misleading.

BRUCE RUSSETT
Yale University

The Man Who Changed the World: The Lives of Mikhail S. Gorbachev *by Gail Sheehy. New York, HarperCollins, 1990. 401 pp. $22.95.*

Gail Sheehy, a seasoned, polished, and enterprising writer, turns out to have a special fascination with Russia, which she put to good stead in producing this biography of Gorbachev. She spent time in the Soviet Union, interviewing over one hundred people, from Central Committee staffers to Misha's former classmates in his native Stavropol region and his fellow students in law school. She also had good research assistance with published materials in addition to interviewing some fifty journalists, officials, and academics in the West.

To those who know some of her earlier writings, it is not a surprise to find that she is persistent and sensitive and has a good eye for vivid detail and an ear for a well-turned phrase. Her indefatigable enthusiasm appears to have led her to dig up all sorts of previously unrecorded trivia about the lives and times of MSG. "Lives" indeed is not a misprint here: the subtitle gives the clue to the special angle she wishes to explore. She writes: "The theory in my book *Passages* is that each of us develops through adulthood by stages. Between each stage are points of decision between progress and regression where we are challenged to shed a protective structure, and when we do, we are left exposed and vulnerable, capable of stretching in ways we had not known before. . . . And those leaps of inner

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psychological development ultimately become the catalyst for a transformation of the society out of which [we] come" (p. 25). Whether one considers this theory interesting or banal, it is regrettable to have to report that the book—whatever its other qualities—hardly lives up to this billing. Of course, Gorbachev grows and changes over time, as she seeks to show and as other biographers have done. But at least this reader failed to learn what she calls "the secret of a leader," namely, "the tests he has faced over the whole course of his life and the habit of action he develops in meeting these tests" (p. 26).

The young Gorbachev emerges from her pages as an earnest, ambitious conformist, self-conscious as an uncouth "provincial," unusual in lacking the typical greediness for material things and the widespread intimacy with alcohol. Sheehy attributes a considerable influence on him to Raisa, perhaps exaggerating her role. He comes to power with a vision but without a plan. Gorbachev is impressed by events such as the Chernobyl tragedy and *Repentance*, the first film to come to grips with Stalinist terror. If much in this account—for instance, the trips abroad—is familiar, it is fair, readable, and—while at times chatty—generally quite accurate.

Sheehy correctly sees his tragedy in his inability to complete his revolution, caught between admiration abroad and his loss of support at home and the recognition of his failures and shortcomings. But recent events seem to have compelled the author to change the tone of her account from "the man who changed the world" to a "falling red star," leaving the reader a bit uncertain of her judgment.

There is the usual quota of boners and oversimplifications. The Soviet people, we are told, "have always been conditioned to look upon their leader as God" (p. 4); the Ukrainian language "by official decree" no longer existed (p. 32); the circumstances of Aleksandr Yakovlev's exile as ambassador to Canada are incorrectly reported (p. 98); occasionally names are mixed up—for example, Cherbonov for Churbanov (p. 109)—and Imenikirovna Sanatorium is the Kirov sanatorium (pp. 121, 141). It is unlikely that Misha was a "quarrelsome Ukrainian boy" or a "country Cossack." She has no evidence to support the suspicion: at law school how could Gorbachev not have been a KGB informer? It may have been more plausible when she wrote it than it seems today to report: "My Moscow connections continually stressed that the army is irrelevant in the Soviet political power structure" (p. 181).

The book has a few novel insights and a few quotable nuggets. It scarcely helps us answer the great questions about Mikhail Gorbachev.

ALEXANDER DALLIN
Stanford University

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The Glasnost Papers: Voices on Reform from Moscow *edited by Andrei Melville and Gail W. Lapidus. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 359 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $18.95.*

This valuable source book on the early phases of Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* is the product of pioneering collaboration between a group of Soviet Americanists led by Andrei Melville and Berkeley Sovietologist Gail W. Lapidus with her team of editorial assistants and translators. It will be a boon to students and teachers of Soviet politics and can be strongly recommended to nonspecialists seeking better understanding of the dynamics of change in the USSR.

Glasnost, like its partner *perestroika*, is a term well chosen by Gorbachev to rally support for his reforms without dangerously alarming the conservatives, and leaving outsiders to argue and speculate on what might have been his hidden agenda. Its basic connotation, as Lapidus points out in her incisive overview chapter, is merely public disclosure. She identifies its chief purposes as mobilizing the media and intelligentsia behind Gorbachev to offset his relative weakness in the organs of power, undercutting foreign and unofficial sources of mass information, delegitimizing the Stalinist past, and facilitating change by loosening ideological rigidities. Apart from these instrumental purposes, she sees here also a plain quest for truth and a gesture of confidence in the basic legitimacy of the system and its leadership.

Most of the material here dates from 1987 and 1988, the generation-late spring after Nikita Khrushchev's thaw. Although *glasnost* did not mean freedom, it opened the way to freedom for those bold and imaginative enough to take it. Logically it was soon followed by the de facto decriminalization of unofficial, informal groups and associations, and in 1988 of unofficial public gatherings as well. The Communist Party thereby lost its KGB-enforced monopoly of public expression, association, and assembly, which struck at the core of the traditional Soviet system. In the beginning, yet again, was the word.

Apart from Lapidus's chapter and Melville's stimulating introduction and conclusion, there is an excellent general chapter on the origins, unfolding, and early travails of glasnost, followed by several chapters on particular themes: the debates over Soviet history, religion (questionably focused only on the Russian Orthodox Church), the legal system, civil rights and the rule of law, the economy, nationality relations (concentrating on the Nagornyi Karabakh struggle, the Baltic states, Russian nationalism, and the Jews), the "new thinking" in foreign and defense policy, and attitudes to emigrés and foreigners. Unfortunately, there is no chapter specifically on the political system and only some oblique references to the role of the party. Otherwise, the material is generally well chosen, and the arrangement and connecting narrative capture the drama of pro- and antireform debates and the emergence of new political forces. The translators have mostly done a worthy job, but there are quite a few infelicities that cloud the meaning of some sections.

The spring of 1987–1988 was followed by the early summer of 1989–1990, with

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its proliferating unofficial newspapers, hard-hitting TV exposés, hotly contested election campaigns, and vast demonstrations, accompanied by radical changes in political structures and processes. By 1991 the summer storms had set in and with them fears of an impending refreeze. The Melville-Lapidus collection is in this sense dated. But its continued value is ensured, since without a knowledge of these earlier phases of *glasnost*, it is impossible to understand the political and social transformations that followed.

T.H. RIGBY
Australian National University

Can Gorbachev Change the Soviet Union? The International Dimensions of Political Reform *by Zdenek Mlynar. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 184 pp. $28.50.*

Gorbachev in Power *by Stephen White. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 268 pp. $39.50.*

The two books under review, written by seasoned observers of the Soviet scene, complement the substantial body of secondary literature that now exists on the Gobachev period. White's book is intended as an assessment of *perestroika*, while Mlynar's study undertakes to analyze the possibilities for change within the Soviet system. Both books were written as up-to-the-minute analyses, though the authors issue the now requisite caveat on publications about the political situation in the Soviet Union today: all such writings run the risk of being dated or overtaken by the rapid pace of events by the time they are published. Each book devotes attention to issues that are no longer seminal, yet their contribution is in no way undermined by the inclusion of now dated material.

Gobachev in Power chronicles the first five years, 1985–1990, of the Gorbachev era. The seven chapters of the book examine major policy areas connected to or affected by reform. The sections focus on party leadership, democratization, *glasnost*, the economy, the nationalities, international relations, and Mikhail Gorbachev's vision for a new socialism. Each chapter is structured in an identical fashion: the first part provides historical background and the concluding part assesses the issue during Gorbachev's first five years. The book provides much detailed information, which is at once its strength and its weakness. The rich detail is often fascinating, yet it is precisely the focusing of attention on specific events, which frequently do not carry the same weight they did at the time of publication, that minimizes the book's impact.

Chapter one, "From Brezhnev to Gorbachev," is a Kremlinology-style description of the late Brezhnev years, the Andropov and Chernenko periods, and the early Gorbachev power consolidation. White sees continuity between Konstantin Chernenko and Gorbachev rather than viewing Chernenko's tenure, as is more

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commonly the case, as an interruption or a deviation from Yuri Andropov's. The policy agenda White outlines was, he says, established by Andropov and Chernenko and later promoted by Gorbachev. It includes: leadership renewal (that is, cadres renewal), social discipline in the workplace and strengthened law and order in society, attempts to revive some "Khruschevian practices" such as face to face meetings with the public and the publishing of the proceedings of the Central Committee plenums, greater emphasis on openness and publicity (that is, *glasnost*) and continued emphasis on the need to consider and address proposals and complaints of ordinary citizens, and reconsideration of official ideology. In the following chapter, "Democratising the Political System," White provides again in copious detail a description of the political changes through early 1990. The chapter closes with an analysis of the result of the changes, concluding that the tensions between the party and state and between Leninism and popular sovereignty remain unresolved. White comments that "[p]olitical reform, by the late 1980s, had certainly succeeded in dismantling a largely Stalinist inheritance; but it had not yet succeeded in replacing it with a viable combination of Leninism and democracy, of central party control which yet allowed the voters to be sovereign. Even in the view of Soviet reformers an accommodation of this kind was unlikely to be achieved without an extended period of 'learning democracy'" (p. 55). Mlynar makes a similar point in arguing that ". . . pressure 'from below' is often conservative and will require a long-term process before the idea of anything other than an authoritarian model for the sociopolitical system can emerge. In short, a solution will have to be sought both 'from above' and 'from below'" (p. 41). Both Mlynar and White emphasize repeatedly the profound changes necessary for real transformations in the USSR and consequently the prolonged nature of the reform processes.

Indeed, in his third chapter, "*Glasnost*' and Public Life," White's discussion of which topics remain "forbidden" in the press (pp. 77–82) stresses the incomplete nature of change; White asserts that openness in the press "did not and was not intended to mean an unqualified 'freedom of the press'" (p. 77). Chapters four and five of *Gorbachev in Power* focus on two linchpins of *perestroika*: the economy and the nationalities. Chapter four, which deals with the economy, provides the background to the economic crisis and discusses the strategy of economic reform and the failed attempts at reform. The chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the political, ideological, and class issues affecting the prospects for successful economic reform. The chapter on the Soviet multinational state provides some background information about the multinational context in the USSR and information on patterns of ethnic identification. White also describes events in several of the republics that elevated the national question to center stage and charts Gorbachev's (often too late) response to the deepening conflicts concerning the nationalities.

Mlynar's book, which provides much less than White's in the way of chronological and factual information, goes further than White's by suggesting possibilities for successful reform. Mlynar outlines programmatic schemes for achieving ideo-

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logical change, party reform, and democratization, which he defines as "autonomous action by interest groups" (p. 68). Divided into three general sections, "What Can a Radical Reform Mean in the USSR?" "How Can the Political Institutions in the USSR Be Reformed?" and "International Aspects of the Soviet Reform Program," Mlynar's book offers in a discussion accessible to a general (nonspecialist) audience a conceptual treatment of some of the key elements necessary for successful reform.

Mlynar attended university with Gorbachev in Moscow. Because he was one of Czechoslovakia's highest Communist Party officials in the 1960s and one of the principal architects of the Prague Spring in 1968, his perspective on Soviet democratization is of interest to western readers. Though writing from Vienna, where he has lived since 1977, Mlynar's analysis focuses on the Soviet (and Russian) context for reform. Mlynar argues that an important obstacle to change in the USSR lies in its political culture, which he describes as being dominated in Russia and the Soviet Union by "authoritarian, dictatorial decisionmaking from the center as opposed to policymaking based on decentralization and self-administration" (p. 18). Mlynar makes two other major points that shape the contours of his discussion. The first is that reform will have to proceed in the face of a variety of contradictions, and the second is that change must take place within the existing ideological system. The first point remains clear two years after Mlynar completed his manuscript. Mlynar may well be correct on the second point also, but events since 1989 may suggest that as in Eastern Europe (where politics were significantly radicalized after Mlynar wrote this book) ideology may no longer be the glue holding the system together.

Mlynar's book has some egregious translation and editing errors in its English edition. Presumably these mistakes do not appear in the original version. Some of the material in the book is now rather dated, such as the assertion: "The new thinking has neither fundamentally nor irreversibly changed the reality of East-West relations, those between the USSR and the Third World countries, or Sino-Soviet relations" (p. 129). White's book does not contain factual inaccuracies, but does tend to be insufficiently documented in places. This occurs most frequently in chapter one, where the Kremlinology-style detail is at times presented without references. Likewise, in one or two places careless editing has resulted in the omission of citations for notes (for example, the citations for notes 68 and 69 in chapter three are missing). Nonetheless, the minor nature of these errors does not impair the overall high quality of both texts.

The two books differ in style and intent, though their overall assessment is in large part similar. When read together, the books offer a broad-gauged picture of the status and complexity of reform in the USSR. White resists the temptations to make broad predictions and instead closes each chapter in a somewhat inconclusive fashion indicating the issues at play. Mlynar details specific criteria for future change. He emphasizes the contradictions that abound in the Soviet system and in the various reform possibilities. Both Mlynar and White stress the long-

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term nature of reform. White's book will serve best those readers who want to know just what happened during Gorbachev's first five years. In turn, Mlynar's book will help readers to understand in a broad sense some of the ideological, cultural, and political considerations that will shape the long road of reform.

LAURIE P. SALITAN
The Johns Hopkins University

America's Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities *by Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw, and Philip L. Harvey. New York, Basic Books, 1990. 268 pp. $22.95.*

Someone has finally written a book that sees America's welfare state on its own terms—as an American phenomenon and not a laggard behind some Swedish-type model (as those on the Left often contend) nor a corruption of our basic national ideals (as many on the Right would have it). The result is a thought-provoking and highly readable book. It suggests what a required text in a welfare state civics course should be like.

In effect, the authors (a Yale political scientist, law professor, and practicing attorney respectively) have produced a defense brief to counter the conservative prosecution's case that gained currency in the 1970s and 1980s. But as they rightly point out, there is no one source that has produced the widespread misunderstanding. From all sides, the public conversation on U.S. social welfare policy is characterized by rhetorical excess, crisis-mongering, and other distortions. After all, to be shrill is to be heard.

The book's unshrill but spirited message is that America's welfare state is not incoherent, not a failure, not in or veering toward crisis. The operation of our social welfare policies is not contradictory but multipurpose. In particular, America's version of a welfare state is oriented around the twin goals of insuring against common risks of income loss (basically through the Social Security system) and helping those whom opportunity has passed by (largely through means-tested programs that are themselves a compromise between the goals of relieving present and preventing future poverty). America's welfare state is not primarily directed at alleviating poverty, at least not in the sense of redistributing income to raise everyone above an official poverty line. We have what the authors call an "insurance/opportunity state."

The basic format is to identify prominent myths in the American debate on social welfare policy and to counter these with reader-friendly summaries of research findings from the professional policy analysis community. Generally speaking, the acknowledgment of prosecutor's strengths and defense weaknesses seems fair, a notable achievement given the ideologically-charged atmosphere in our social policy courtroom.

Chapter 3 takes on the global indictments so to speak: America's welfare state

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produces undesirable economic side-effects, it is unaffordable now and in the future, and it is politically ungovernable. Verdict: the charges are found to be unproven or hopelessly exaggerated. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 take a comparable approach with regard to means-tested programs (mainly Aid to Families with Dependent Children), Social Security, and medical care respectively. It is only in this final issue of health care financing that the authors feel nonincremental changes are needed, namely to control costs and equalize access through a Canadian-style system of national health insurance. The final chapter is a witty compendium of five useful rules on how not to think about problems of the American welfare state. (Related ideas are explored in greater depth in Albert Hirschman's recent book *The Rhetoric of Reaction*.) This account is a valuable point of entree, but it is scarcely a complete guide to the myths and deliberate political obfuscations that haunt American social policy. For one thing, the book deals almost exclusively with income transfer programs. In aggregate spending terms, these are clearly a huge chunk of the welfare state. But it is the in-kind, community action and social service programs that fueled a good deal of the criticism against the Great Society and welfare state more generally. To see the real, not mythical, failures of our "Opportunity State" one needs to look especially at the disgraceful condition of U.S. labor market policies. (Recent books by Margaret Weir and Gary Mucciaroni are good guides here.)

Another limitation is the book's preoccupation with solely conservative commentary on America's welfare state. Some will find the rehearsal of 1970s-1980s criticisms rather dated, given our current passage through the Bush Thermidor of the Reagan Revolution. More important, there are critiques from the other side of the political spectrum that need to be taken into account. These range from charges that U.S. social policy is an instrument of social control, racism and sexism to concerns that the traditional social insurance model—built in a Fordist era of self-contained industrial economies with male breadwinners holding good-paying jobs—may be inappropriate in postindustrial economies with dual labor markets and global corporations.

Nor is the defense team immune from a little convenient myth making of its own. For example, to characterize the compulsory Social Security system as a form of "self-paternalism" (p. 164) where one forces oneself to save for old age is hokum. Social Security is an intergenerational transfer of income, and Americans need to understand the reality of that social contract. Likewise, it is a form of noncrisis mongering to counter worries about future Social Security financing by pointing out that the projected share of GNP (gross national product) devoted to such spending goes from just under 6 percent in 1990 to slightly below 10 percent in 2060, "a shift of 4 percentage points . . . represents a projected annual increase of an infinitesimal four-hundreths of one percent" (p. 151). Literally true perhaps (though my math suggests an annual .0006 over seventy years), but this also represents a 40 percent increase in GNP share. This is probably manageable, but there is no need to downplay the significance of such changes.

The authors realize that writing a book to dispel myths and identify rules for

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more sensible "policy talk" may not change much. But acting on the faith that it may help, they have made a praiseworthy effort. The stakes are high. As they say near the end, the democratic conversation on what to do about social welfare problems is also a way of asking, "Who are we?" We used to think it was the task of political leadership to help us understand the realities surrounding such questions. That seems to be one faith, among others, that is fading.

HUGH HECLO
George Mason University

Assets and the Poor: A New American Welfare Policy *by Michael Sherraden. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1991. 324 pp. $34.95.*

America, as Michael Sherraden documents, harbors a dual welfare state. One branch is a system of income maintenance for the poor; the other is a program that facilitates asset accumulation among the nonpoor. The former works through direct income transfers; the latter operates primarily through the tax system and delivers vastly higher benefits. The so-called social insurance system, which serves both poor and nonpoor, also benefits the nonpoor most. Not only does the welfare system for the poor fail to promote asset accumulation, it penalizes its clients for whatever modest savings or goods they have managed to acquire.

Sherraden believes this dual welfare system is not only inequitable but inefficient and contrary to the national interest. It does keep poor people alive; it literally maintains them, but it fails to lift them or help them lift themselves out of poverty. The many commentators who have documented the shortcomings of the welfare system have failed to diagnose its fundamental problem. Both conservatives and liberals define poverty only in terms of insufficient consumption and prescribe more consumption as the road out. As reasonable as this appears on the surface, Sherraden contends, it misses the fundamental importance of assets.

Sherraden defends the importance of assets with a melange of ideas drawn from the social and behavior sciences; and a number of his arguments are both arresting and intuitively sensible. He believes that assets affect individual behavior in nine specific, positive ways. In essence, by giving individuals a stake in their society, they channel their behavior along more stable and productive paths. Sherraden also defends the macroeconomic effects of his asset-based welfare policy, which would, he claims, at least modestly increase national savings and capital accumulation.

Sherraden has no patience with culture-of-poverty theorists who believe in the inherent incapacity of the poor to reach sensible decisions about the direction of their lives or with theories that ascribe differences in national savings rates to national cultures. Instead, in some of the most interesting passages in the book, he argues convincingly that among individuals and nations asset accumulation is an

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institutionalized process shaped primarily by government policy through tax subsidies and other incentives.

Sherraden's criticism of other theories and his excursions into history are less successful than his defense of assets. The former, all very brief, are superficial, and he has not read much recent social history or even much of the contemporary history of poverty and social welfare. Fortunately, these weaknesses remain irritants that do not detract from his core argument.

Sherraden's analysis builds to a concrete proposal for what he calls Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). (Reading his proposal brought to mind a much sketchier but conceptually similar proposal, of which he seems unaware, by historian David Hackett Fisher in a 1977 book on the history of old age.) IDAs would be flexible accounts, sort of super-IRAs, for all Americans; they would help them with education, housing, starting a business, and related activities. Despite his criticism of the class bias in welfare policy, Sherraden recognizes that only universal programs that offer benefits to the middle class as well as the poor stand a chance of commanding widespread assent. Sherraden sees IDAs as complementing, not supplanting, existing income transfer programs, which he recognizes as essential. Nonetheless, the danger exists, as he notes, that IDAs could be used as a means of cutting back on essential income transfer programs; he is for my taste too sanguine about avoiding this outcome. He proposes to pay for IDAs through redirecting some of the tax subsidies that now enrich the nonpoor. He does not say how Congress could be persuaded to resist the immense lobbying power that would be mustered for their preservation.

I cannot be as cheery as Sherraden about the prospect of a nation of parents and children around the dinner table in animated discussion of alternative investment possibilities for their IDAs. Nonetheless, his proposal has a lot of intuitive appeal. At the least, it's a fresh, intelligent, thoughtful approach to a persistent problem that policy makers have tried unsuccessfully to solve for the last couple of centuries. For this reason alone, it merits careful attention.

MICHAEL B. KATZ
University of Pennsylvania

Rethinking the American Race Problem *by Roy L. Brooks. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991. 256 pp. $24.95.*

For social science specialists in American race relations, it would be all too easy summarily to dismiss this thin volume as of little value. But a closer look uncovers its distinctive contribution. The author is a distinguished professor of law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Brooks writes with earnest directness and grave urgency. This effective style, its critical conclusions, and its interesting legal support constitute major strengths of *Rethinking the American Race Problem*

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Brooks is thinking for himself, constructively and structurally. Unlike a few better known black American intellectuals, Brooks has not given up in despair, as Derrick Bell has; nor is he pushing themes certain to gain instant approval from the American right wing, as Glenn Loury and Thomas Sowell have.

The book's primary weakness is its neglect of the abundant social science evidence directly relevant to its thesis. While a useful five-page table of major state and federal court cases is provided, social science evidence often creeps in with mass media references. Indeed, two-thirds of the 265-item bibliography consists of either legal citations or mass media articles. Political science work is virtually ignored; and sociology is represented largely through textbook citations. It is this deficiency that the specialist will first notice. But on the second look, Brooks impresses me as actually having a quite solid grasp of much of the most advanced work in the current race relations research literature. So the problem is not that the book is not informed by social science work, but that it has not strengthened its contentions by more carefully citing it.

Brooks reaches several basic conclusions. First, he contends that ". . . no understanding or resolution of the American race problem in this day and age can be complete without giving serious attention to civil rights laws and policies and to the class divisions in African American society" (p. 171). He holds that the nation's civil rights laws and policies in general have been on target. The problems frequently arise not in the design of these laws and policies, but in their typical implementation. Brooks might be pleasantly surprised to learn how much social science work supports his fundamentally correct assessment.

Over half of the volume details how the continued denial of equal opportunity to black Americans impacts members of different social classes in contrasting ways. Brooks is careful to repudiate two popular and convenient misconceptions: that class problems so predominate as to cause race problems to decline in significance; and that the advances of the 1960s largely ended discrimination against better educated black citizens. In separate chapters on the middle, working, and poverty classes, he describes the various processes by which class and race interact to establish contrasting, but still debilitating, means of restricting opportunity at each class level.

The volume's conclusion on remedy flows directly from these contentions. Brooks calls for a dual attack on the problem: ". . . the American race problem can be resolved only by an intensive program of African American self-help *and* governmental assistance (legal and economic remedies) functioning concurrently" (p. 172). The most original part of the book describes in detail self-help programs that involve organized efforts by the black middle class.

None of these broad conclusions, perhaps, will strike many specialists as novel rethinking. Yet most of the book's principal contentions are out of step with the current popular debates on the subject. The book's contribution is its vigorous advancement of an important perspective that lacks wide acceptance in American society today and surely deserves to be competently reintroduced.

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University of California, Santa Cruz

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The Struggle for Auto Safety *by Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1990. 296 pp. $29.95.*

This book is variously thoughtful, challenging, incomplete, and erroneous. Mashaw, a Yale law professor, and Harfst, an attorney with the Washington law firm, Covington & Burling, thread their analysis of twenty-five years of implementing the 1966 motor vehicle and traffic safety law by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) with one sustained thesis: "the legal system makes adopting regulatory standards quite difficult, but tends to facilitate recalling 'defective' automobiles. . . . the legal-ideological minefield confronted by NHTSA's standard setting was planted so heavily that safe passage to the goals envisaged in 1966 may well have been impossible" (p. 19).

While briefly recognizing, but not weighing, other shaping variables such as who is in the White House, who dominates Congress, the media, and the personalities in charge, the authors repeatedly assign to the "legal culture" of administrative rules and judicial review the preeminent shaping role of outcomes regarding vehicle safety standards. The legal culture, they write, "selects the winners" (p. 174). Their discussion of NHTSA's losses in the courts during the early 1970s is an instructive reminder of the damage done by the judges to the federal quest for safer motor vehicles. But the authors make far too much of the legal culture and far too little of the difference that a more pro-safety White House and congressional leadership during the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush years could have made on who the judges were, the inhibiting influence on the agency and Congress itself of a formidably, obstructive figure such as Representative John Dingell or of White House Office of Management and Budget officials reflecting a continuing presidential pro-auto industry bias of unyielding duration.

Mashaw and Harfst strive to demonstrate their thesis that the administrative-judicial legal culture determines the agency's internal bureaucracy by citing the tenure of consumer advocate Joan Claybrook, the NHTSA administrator from mid-1977 to early 1981. Even her tenure, they claim, emphasized vehicle recalls at the expense of issuing standards.

But Claybrook was only partially her own person. She reported to less vigorous consumer advocates in the persons of Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams and, worse, Neil Goldschmidt and to President Jimmy Carter, who switched from a firm regulator to a frantic deregulator in 1979–1980 as higher fuel prices and recession led to an aggressive auto industry lobbying effort. Apart from such external determinants, so down-played by the authors as to be virtually unmentioned Claybrook asserts that recalls were a tiny portion of her budget and that most agency activity focused on research for and issuance of proposed or actual standards. Indeed, had Claybrook been able to build on this momentum for another term and had she received high-level backing, the authors' determinative legal culture would not have obstructed such productivity seriously, even given lead time and prior consultation with the automobile companies.

It is worth remembering that both a federal circuit court and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Reagan government's recission of the 208 standard (commonly

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called the air bag standard). That recission would never have come about had NHTSA (just prior to Claybrook's arrival) been directed by Brock Adams to give the auto companies an unprecedented four to six years of lead time by vehicle size to meet the passive restraint standard. The 208 standard assumed a second Carter term and instead collided with a first Reagan term. A sufficient lead time of three years would not have encountered, in my judgement, a rejection by the legal culture because of the overwhelming evidence in the public record of the need and feasibility of passive restraints in accordance with the 1966 law's provisions.

To the authors' point that the legal culture tends to facilitate recalls, as it tends to obstruct standards, what does this culture do for inaction? The courts have ruled that when NHTSA issues a non-defect finding, that decision is not judicially reviewable. That ruling would seem to facilitate no defect findings. And anyone watching General Motors' (GM) extended use of the legal culture to challenge a recall decision by NHTSA in the 1980s can wonder what the authors mean by facilitation. The recall record of NHTSA has been almost as abysmal as its standards-issuance record.

The authors tend to make valid points and then greatly overreach. It is true, as they say, that the early standards in 1967 often reflected existing industry practice. But some of these, such as the collapsible steering column, were installed during congressional hearings in an attempt to argue against the need for regulation. In an egregious error, the authors claim that "Standard 208 required lap and shoulder belts that were by then standard on most domestic vehicles" (p. 78). This standard was issued in January 1967, effective January 1968. No domestic manufacturers and few foreign ones (Volvo being the outstanding exception) selling to the U.S. market had standard three-point belts. Standard 208 was a technology forcing rule; just ask General Motors, which strenuously opposed it.

Another misconception by the authors is that capture of the agency by the regulated industry is largely a myth. The casualty insurance industry, they say, countervails the auto companies and so do consumer groups, components manufacturers, and physicians' and trial lawyers' associations. For authors, one of whom is a worldly Washington lawyer, such a view cannot be excused. The disproportion of resources and the daily drumbeat of multiple pressures on the agency by the automobile lobby towers over the other competing parties. The capture theory is still very valid in Washington's regulatory arenas.

In their concluding chapter, the authors raise important issues for discussion. Can the liability system be relied upon for advancing motor vehicle safety design? They think not, though their judgment could have been tempered by greater reliance on empirical data regarding postliability design changes. Can Congress legislate standards, as they did with the fuel tank safety rule in 1977? They think not, judging by the legislature's performance in the fuel efficiency and emissions control areas. By relying heavily on R. Crandall's opinion deprecating the CAFE fuel-saving standards, instead of, for example, on the more careful studies conducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, they severely bias their conclusion against

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congressional enactments of performance standards which, they accurately note, would not be bound by the subsequent legal culture of delay and attrition.

The book suffers from a dearth of empirical research and interviewing outside the agency. It is astonishing, for example, that there is no reference to Attorney Lloyd Cutler, who steered the automobile industry vis-à-vis NHTSA, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Justice Department for so many years. Missed interviews with knowledgeable insurance officials and retired auto company officials would have saved the authors from an erroneous evaluation as to why GM turned against an earlier GM leadership policy for air bag deployment.

I found their six lessons to would-be regulators quite thought-provoking, though sometimes quite off the mark. Their recommendation that NHTSA's statute be amended to provide for judicial review of standards "only in the context of a proceeding to enforce a regulatory standard" (p. 245) sounds good, if the standard is reasonably strong. But what if the standard is such a rubber stamp of industry practice that there are no enforcement proceedings. How then can consumers challenge a phantom standard in the courts?

Though they inform readers that a great deal of research and reflection went into the book, the authors finished with a whimper instead of some imaginative proposals. They neglected the lever of government procurement becoming a major factor in advancing motor vehicle safety. It was General Services Administration's 1985 order for 5,300 air bag-equipped automobiles, delivered by the Ford Motor Co., that accelerated the adoption of air bags by the industry. Much more can be done through procurement in conjunction with federal, state, and local government automobile purchases, utilizing, as GSA did, the expertise and tests of NHTSA.

But what the authors neglected the most was a more textured understanding of the political and media forces necessary to achieve the goals of the 1966 motor vehicle safety law. They developed the hypothesis of the determinative legal culture and monistically trapped their minds in its maw. Nonetheless, the book is well worth reading, but with caveats aboard.

RALPH NADER

The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective *by Ronald M. Peters, Jr. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. 354 pp. $39.50.*

This book seeks both to provide a history of the American speakership and to extend and refine the state of theory with respect to the House and its leadership. The author clearly satisfies the first of these goals. Peters is at his best in his long analysis of the Carl Albert speakership, but the treatments of Sam Rayburn, Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, and Jim Wright are also of high quality. The portraits

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of nineteenth-century speakers are competently done, but overall not as richly textured and informative as the analysis of twentieth-century speakers.

Such differences are not so much the fault of the author as of continuing deficiencies in nineteenth-century historiography. However, Peters can be faulted for a tendency to indulge several of the underlying presumptions that guide his work. His unqualified insistence on seeing the Democratic Party as the representative of the common man leads to a myopic view of the role and appeal of the Republican Party at various points in history. In addition, his pristine application of Burkean principles without much regard for their ambiguities and limitations leads at times to rigid appraisals of particular speakers and events. The analysis of Joseph G. Cannon provides a prime example.

Whatever its problems, however, this book stands as a valuable addition to the historical literature on the speakership. This is true not merely because previous histories are sparse and outdated, but also because the author brings great strengths to historical analysis. His work is distinguished by a sophisticated understanding of politics, a detailed knowledge of twentieth-century actors and issues, the ability to place narrative history in the context of broader forces, and a talent for clear and expressive writing. Nonetheless, these virtues do not mean that the author can satisfy his second goal along with his first. He cannot and does not.

Peters believes that narrative history should be enclosed in theory and that the result of doing so will be beneficial to both. He thus seeks to apply the contextual approach to history but in a revised version of his own design. On the one hand, while he accepts the contextualist premise that different types of Houses exist in different contexts, he argues that contexts need to be drawn in terms of far broader cultural and political factors. On the other hand, he insists that contextual theory's neglect of personality traits and skills must be corrected, and he reintroduces them as a key ingredient of explanation.

Both these strategies enhance his product as narrative history. However, neither does much to refine and enhance theoretical understanding. The identification and treatment of broad contextual forces increase the intellectual reach of the discussion, but remain far too global and ambiguous for theory building. Thus, while plausible and even insightful explanations of trends and events are possible, precise understanding of the character of contextual and institutional patterns, relationships within and between them, and the processes of dynamic interaction over time is not much advanced. It is, therefore, no accident that the conceptual scheme the author advances to distinguish different types of Houses and transitions over time is so rent with ambiguities and contradictions that it retains only a highly general and fragile form of validity.

Similarly, whereas the introduction of personal factors contributes to the explanation of particular Speakers and outcomes, it does not contribute to any generally defined theory of leadership in the House or elsewhere. Overall, Peters tends to reduce contextual theory to caricature, but perhaps his critical error on the issue of personality is to fail to understand the defining intuition of the contextual

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approach. Personality is so complex a factor that it should be dealt with only tangentially by focusing on the parameters under which it comes into play. Insistence on the need to introduce personality centrally into explanation to satisfy the needs of narrative history does not solve this problem; it only complicates it by confusing the task of explaining events in all their richness with the task of building theory.

In sum, this book succeeds far more as history than as theory. Peters has substantially underestimated the difficulties of pursuing the tasks of narrative history and theory building in tandem. But he has provided us with a sophisticated and insightful history of the speakership, and that in itself is no mean achievement.

JOSEPH COOPER
Rice University

The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crisis and Western Politics Since 1944 *by Ethan B. Kapstein. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 198 pp. $35.00*

In 1945 the United States emerged with hegemony over the noncommunist world. Not the least important element contributing to this was its surplus production of both coal and oil. This book analytically studies the interplay between U.S. policy and the various postwar energy crises, stopping just short of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; it deftly steers its way through the alphabet soup of initials produced by each crisis. (Incidentally, a glossary might have helped the reader.)

First came the coal crisis of 1944–1947, caused by wartime destruction and disruption. The potentially horrendous consequences were avoided by the restoration of facilities and allocation of some 100 million tons by the European Coal Organization. This worked because imminent disaster had concentrated European minds; at the same time, the United States, which had oil and coal surpluses, exercised judicious leadership. Next came the Marshall Plan. Here too the United States played a major and highly beneficial role, acting through the Committee of European Economic Corporation. Coal production increased and so did refining capacity, enabling Europe to draw on cheap Middle Eastern oil. In this process the sterling-dollar problem arose but was solved by the American and British governments with help from the oil companies.

The same set of actors with CIA assistance dealt with the third crisis, the 1951 dispute between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The crisis had been aggravated by the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased demand for aviation fuel, largely supplied by the Abadan Refinery. A further contributory factor, not mentioned by the author, was the expansion in output of crude from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other producers. The Suez crisis of 1956 disrupted supplies more severely, revealed the divergence in interests between the United States and Britain and France, and was ended only when, following Soviet mili-

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tary threats, the United States used financial pressure against its allies. This greatly strained the alliance and made the Europeans determined to seek their own oil security. The next ten years saw a large increase in world production and a downward pressure on prices that led to the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war caused the renewed blockage of the Suez Canal and the interruption of the oil pipelines. The shortage was eased by the U.S. government and companies, which both increased exports to Europe and rerouted tankers.

The next few years saw three parallel trends. First, U.S. oil consumption rose and production declined so that in 1973 36 percent of its consumption was imported. Second, the Europeans and Japanese made numerous deals with Middle Eastern and African oil countries. Third, in successive negotiations, the oil producers greatly raised their take per barrel and acquired increasing equity in the companies. Hence, when in 1973 OPEC raised prices and the Arabs cut production and embargoed certain countries, the United States was no longer in a position to help and the alliance fell apart. The same scene was repeated in 1979, when the Iranian revolution broke out. The creation by the U.S. in 1974 of the International Energy Agency to coordinate western policy had negligible effects. By 1990, the United States had lost its economic clout, was once more a large importer of oil, and had to rely on military means—largely paid for by its allies—in the Iraqi crisis.

In conclusion the author points out that in 1944–1955 allied interests were parallel and crisis management was smooth. In 1956 interests were divergent, but the United States was in a position to coerce its allies and also to supply oil; the same was to a lesser extent true in 1967. After that, U.S. leverage rapidly decreased. This exciting story is well told though the author's "parsimony"—to use one of his favorite words—forces him to leave out many interesting details; but he gives the essentials.

CHARLES ISSAWI
Princeton University

The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s *by Henry R. Nau. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 448 pp. $24.95.*

Can the United States continue to "lead the world economy," promoting greater openness and continued growth *despite* the fact that it has experienced a measure of decline in its relative economic standing? Notwithstanding its eye-catching title, that is the question to which this important and powerfully argued book is devoted. Nau begins by carving out a distinct approach to the study of international political economy. In contrast to adherents of structuralism, he argues that the collapse of an open world trading system need not be an inevitable consequence of the relative decline in American power. As compared to advocates of liberal institutionalism,

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however, he also questions whether the key to continued openness is a system of deliberate international economic policy coordination, with responsibility for managing the world economy shared among a group of roughly equal partners. Instead Nau makes the case for what might be called "liberal idealism" or, as he labels it, "voluntarism." He asserts that America can continue to lead, not merely by the exertion of its material strength, but through the power of its beliefs and the example of its policies. Given the fact that its "purposes are more widely shared in the world today . . . America does not need as much power as it did 20 or 40 years ago. It can maintain its leadership by being more of a global pope than a global power . . ." (p. 11).

In the central portion of his book, Nau presents a detailed analytical history of the past forty years of American economic policy. He seeks to show that when the United States has adhered to what he calls the Bretton Woods triad of noninflationary macroeconomic policies, noninterventionist microeconomic policies, and a steady commitment to lower trade barriers (essentially the years 1947 to 1967 and, to a somewhat lesser degree, from 1979 to the present) both the United States and its trading partners have experienced sustained, healthy growth. It is only when Americans have doubted the wisdom of these policies and departed from them, Nau believes, that they have helped to lead the world economy into difficulties.

Nau's policy prescriptions flow smoothly from his analysis. The United States must rededicate itself to its fundamental purpose of promoting "human freedom and individual dignity" and to the "efficient" economic policies that both reflect these values and give them the greatest possible latitude (p. 370). It is only by doing so that it can hope to persuade others to follow suit.

Nau's vision is pleasing, even inspiring. But is it realistic? The main objection to his analysis is that in correctly pointing to the centrality of principles, he has understated the importance of power. To take an example from the domestic realm: the fact that the United States has had such difficulty in lowering its budget deficit has much less to do with ideas than it does with interests. Reaching consensus on the goal of a smaller deficit has proved far easier than getting agreement on how exactly the costs of reducing it should be apportioned. The diffusion of "good" ideas overseas faces similar obstacles. Other countries have their own interest groups, some of which will continue to oppose the fuller adoption of free market policies. Persuading foreign governments to lower their trade barriers, for instance, may require more than just the power of example.

But the difficulties may run deeper. While democracy and capitalism are surely on the upswing, the American model of democratic capitalism is not the only one around, nor in recent years has it necessarily been the most enticing (even to some Americans). Policies that promise improved national performance may be appealing, even if they deviate from the laissez-faire principles that Nau recommends and despite the fact that, as he warns, their widespread adoption could threaten the continued stability and openness of the world economy.

AARON L. FRIEDBERG
Princeton University

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Worldwide Science and Technology Advice to the Highest Levels of Government *edited by William T. Golden. New York, Pergamon Press, 1991. 430 pp. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $28.50.*

The redoubtable William T. Golden goes global. Since 1950, when he designed the world's first science advisory organization for President Harry S. Truman, this model citizen and science watcher has assiduously monitored the evolution of the process in this country. Here he has assembled views of the process around the world.

These papers were presented at a conference at the Weizmann Institute in 1989. Most of the forty-seven contributions offer country-by-country descriptions of the way science advice is solicited, following an overview section featuring sage platitudes and hortatory calls for cooperation—globally, in Europe, in the developing countries generally, and in Africa. It is refreshing to find reports on so many countries not treated elsewhere, such as Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Chile, and Indonesia, even though one case, that of East Germany, is now academic. (Could it be that the Saudi representative actually visited Israel, one wonders, or was his paper faxed care of Rehovot and marked "to whom it may concern"?)

Shalheveth Freier, chair of Israel's Presidential Council for Science Policy, summarizes the general sentiment when he notes agreement on the need "for a chief adviser on science and technology (CAST), reporting to the head of the government and supported by an advisory committee" (p. 21). This is scarcely surprising in view of the fact that virtually all the presenters are or have been employed either as such an adviser or in a staff or advisory position.

Only as the country-by-country profiles are examined does it become obvious that the *parti pris* line is more problematic than inexperienced observers might suppose. The problem for a single-focused system of scientific advice is that science and its applications are now critical to so many functions of government as to defy localization. That is why recent presidents and most members of Congress have resisted calls to upgrade the White House Science and Technology Policy Office (STPO) into a cabinet-level Department of Science and Technology.

Smaller countries and those more committed to central planning than the United States (which is to say almost every other country examined here) make more of an effort to develop a single comprehensive set of science politics and to concert the advisory function, but even they have problems reducing this ubiquitous instrument to a single budgetary line supervised at one point on a bureaucratic flow chart. Since 1958, France has relied on an interministerial committee staffed by a secretariat reporting to the prime minister. But Pierre Piganiol, who served as the first director of the secretariat, complains here that France has made an error in sticking to this "light" organization rather than setting up a ministerial level department with the same clout as other ministries (p. 181). He is not sufficiently detached from his role to explain that such a single ministry would either have to incorporate virtually all the others or represent no improvement. Japan's organization chart is neat enough as presented but somehow makes no place for the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), which many observers hold largely respon-

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sible for the important developments in industrial technology that Japan has to its credit.

The less than satisfying quality of these two country studies points to the essential weakness of this volume: it consists almost entirely of descriptions by practitioners rather than of analysis by social scientists and other students of the "science of science." I. M. Markarov's self-satisfied account of the Soviet supervision of science and technology is a particularly glaring example of the inadequacies of this descriptive approach. It completely ignores that state's dismal record of suppressing scientific dissenters like Andrei Sakharov and hardly prepares one for Chernobyl or the utter collapse of the Soviet economy—both of which represent dreadful failures of supervision and planning.

For assembling so remarkably comprehensive a collection of case studies, however, Bill Golden deserves yet another accolade from all who study science and public policy—and who carp about its shortcomings while he keeps filling in the blanks.

SANFORD LAKOFF
University of California, San Diego

The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy *edited by Christopher C. Joyner. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1990. 255 pp. $45.00.*

Let there be no mistake. This book is not about the latest war in the Gulf, but rather on a previous conflict of Saddam Hussein's making—the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran. Yet, since the invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990 was the continuation of the Iran-Iraq War by the same means, this book sheds important light both on the origins of the present crisis in the Gulf and on the prospects for the future stability of the region.

Bringing together a group of leading American specialists on international relations and Middle Eastern affairs, this volume examines the origins of the Iran-Iraq War, discusses Arab and Israeli interests in the conflict, and analyzes great power intervention in the war. In an excellent chapter on the Iraqi perceptions of the war, Phebe Marr delineates the delicate balance of weaknesses and strengths that drove Saddam Hussein to make his gravest miscalculation until then and to invade Iran. She argues that "[r]egardless of the means chosen or the wisdom of the strategy applied, the first—and, in the Iraqi view, the chief—objective of the war was defensive: protection of the regime and the Iraqi state from the spread of the Iranian revolution" (p. 60). This fear was compounded both by the fragility of the Iraqi state—an almost impossible mixture of religious and sectarian groups—and by the thin popular base of the ruling Ba'th Party, which had made the political elite in Iraq ever wary over its survival. Reinforced by the desire to redress the 1975 Algiers Agreement (which had severely constrained Iraq's access to the Gulf) and by a growing sense of military prowess as

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a result of the domestic unpheaval in Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, these defensive considerations made the temptation to seize the window of opportunity and to revise the status quo in the Gulf almost irresistable.

Indeed, it was this awkward combination of anxiety and greed that was to lead Saddam Hussein to his second invasion of a neighboring country within a decade. His desperate need for financial resources to overcome the economic dislocations of the war against Iran and his exasperation with Kuwait's refusal to provide this much-needed support combined with the formidable strength of his armed forces to lure him into the belief that the occupation of the small Gulf principality would be a virtual walkover that would face the regional actors, as well as the international community at large, with a *fait accompli*.

A major factor in Saddam's miscalculation was his misreading of the possible American reaction to the invasion of Kuwait. As transpired later, this mistake was largely rooted in Saddam's famous conversation shortly before the invasion with the U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie, in which in his opinion, he was given a green light to invade Kuwait. Had he read Thomas McNaugher's chapter on the American policy toward the Iran-Iraq War, he might have shown greater caution. During the early stages of the war, as long as its interests were not seriously endangered, the United States remained conspicuously aloof. However, when confronted by the fearful specter of an Iranian victory, the United States stepped more aggressively into the picture, passing vital intelligence data to Iraq, and going so far as to provide military protection to Kuwait's oil tankers.

Most regrettably, however, Saddam's capacity for self-delusion was incredible. He would neither draw the correct historical lessons from his personal experience with the United States during the Iran-Iraq War nor see the writing on the wall in its aftermath. Those who are interested in getting a better understanding of the factors underlying the apparently incomprehensible behavior of the Iraqi leader and the constraints within which he had operated are well advised to consult this timely volume.

EFRAIM KARSH
King's College, London

The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990 *by Marilyn Young. New York, HarperCollins, 1991. 386 pp. $25.00.*

Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam 1945 to 1990 *by James S. Olson and Randy Roberts. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 321 pp. $19.95.*

The near simultaneous publication of these two books reveals the not surprising fact that interest in the Vietnam war continues, despite Grenada, Panama, and now the Persian Gulf war, and despite the official pronouncement that the nation has kicked the Vietnam syndrome. Both books are designed for use in the class-

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room and will provide healthy competition for earlier entrants in that field. Both are synoptic, offering excellent summaries of the already vast scholarship on the war; yet both are also interpretative and avoid the textbook sin of boring readers to death.

Marilyn Young writes with great verve, in a pungent style, and time and again comes up with exactly the right phrase to make her points, whether it is someone else speaking or one of her own making. On efforts to teach South Vietnamese leaders the techniques of American politics, such as the fireside chat and other things that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge attempted to explain to the generals, Young notes that the ultimate proposal came from Carl Rowan, head of the United States Information Agency, who urged, apparently in all seriousness, that an effort be made to "find a Vietnamese who can write a GNV [Government of Vietnam] version of 'God Bless America'" (p. 114).

Or again, on the 1964 presidential campaign in America, "The Democratic incumbent ran as a moderate, a peace candidate. But not too peaceful, or Johnson might have faced those charges that have made all Democratic peace candidates since Truman wake sweating in the middle of the night: that in their sleep they had somehow lost a country" (p. 115).

The treatment of the rising anti-war movement at home and the divisions among the "enemy" are both skillfully handled. Young has no illusions about the determination and dogmatism of the North Vietnamese to reclaim the land in victory, but also to redeem Saigon from the corrupters, so as to build their own harsh version of the "City Upon a Hill." Young devotes a final chapter to the aftermath of the war since 1975, really a continuation, as her title suggests, of the war by political and economic means. This is a passionate book, concluded with an epilogue discussing the fate of veterans of the war, their experiences upon returning home, their memoirs and somewhat halting efforts to express emotions through poetry.

Because these are such similar works, it should probably be said that Young's publishers have produced a very attractive book, with many excellent graphics and illustrations. Olson and Roberts have not fared so well in this regard with their publisher. If Young's book has great strength in bringing forward cultural and social dimensions of the war, Olson and Roberts, while not ignoring these areas, offer traditional military and political history in a highly readable style.

While the debate goes on (and undoubtedly will go on forever) about whether Vietnam was "Mr. Johnson's War" or "Mr. Johnson's Advisers' War," for example, these two authors give readers a very well drawn account of that president's cautious approach, first to escalation in 1965 and then to General William Westmoreland's repeated urgings that he be allowed to strike north across the seventeenth parallel or westward into Laos. Lyndon Johnson's caution, as indicated by his persistent if misconstrued efforts to wage the other war in Vietnam—the struggle for hearts and minds—reflected perhaps a greater understanding of the political forces that drove the enemy than any of his principal advisers, absorbed as many of them were in the techniques of abstract measurement of progress at home and

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abroad. Johnson's background in the hill country of Texas gave him an understanding of the mentality of the disenfranchised that could not be quantified successfully in computer centers of the Pentagon. For whatever reasons, and historians have ably documented many aspects of his decision-making process, LBJ could not go all the way with his own insights.

And military critics of the American approach to the war, such as Marine Corps General Victor Krulak, had no chance against the "big boys" of the army and air force when it came to influencing Johnson. The big engagements of the war, Olson and Roberts quote Krulak as saying, "could move to another planet today, and we would still have not won the war because the Vietnamese people are the prize" (p. 144). When the "Wise Men" came to Washington to explore the political prospects for support of the war in the United States in the aftermath of the Tet offensive (30 January 1968), Johnson was stunned by their near-unanimous reversal from only a few months before. Walt Rostow thought he "smelled a rat . . . a put up job. . . ." The "Wise Men" were not really listening to administration briefers; they had fled in panic from the board rooms in New York and now huddled in Washington, wanting Johnson to save them from their fears. "I thought to myself that what began in the spring of 1940 when Henry Stimson came to Washington ended tonight. The American Establishment is dead" (Olson and Roberts, p. 193).

Several years earlier, in 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had predicted that if the United States did not prevail in Vietnam, the backlash would destroy nearly all that had been accomplished for the world since the defeat of the Axis. As these books demonstrate so ably, the Vietnam war will continue to be studied as the climacteric of the cold war.

LLOYD C. GARDNER
Rutgers University

Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance *by Donald MacKenzie. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1990. 464 pp. $29.95.*

Donald MacKenzie's brilliant and difficult book is the best existing study of how and why the United States and the Soviet Union have developed ballistic missiles that are capable of destroying hardened counterforce targets on the other side. The volume's central theme is the fallacy of technological determinism—the widespread belief that there was a natural and inevitable technological trend toward improved accuracy. MacKenzie's richly detailed study accurately targets and then convincingly destroys this popular theory.

There are two central modes of attack against technological determinism. First, MacKenzie gets deep inside the black box of missile guidance decision making to demonstrate that enhanced accuracy was the deliberate result of specific organizational interests and political choices, and not runaway technology. Many historical episodes show that "technology was politics pursued by other, harder,

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means" (p. 294). Some sweet technology developments favored by the weapons scientists—such as gradiometers and electrostatic gyroscopes for U.S. submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—were *not* pursued by the military because less advanced systems were considered adequate for the assigned mission. Effective laboratory officials (such as Charles Draper) shaped political perceptions of what was technologically possible; cunning organizations (such as the Navy Special Programs office) learned how to grant tactical approval for specific technological innovations when it was needed to gain bureaucratic support for other goals, and learned to reverse their position later when such bureaucratic support was no longer needed by the organization. Even the technical "facts" about accuracy, MacKenzie argues, are socially constructed by interested parties. Throughout the debate on the mobile MX missile, for example, the air force maintained that Soviet missiles were capable of destroying all U.S. missile silos. When the political decision was made to put the MX into old Minutemen holes, however, auxiliary assumptions about the geology of Wyoming were reassessed and the missile silos there were found to be invulnerable after all.

MacKenzie's second attack on technological determinism is more comparative in nature. If technology progresses along some sort of natural trajectory, then one should find similar technological outcomes in different countries. MacKenzie briefly notes, however, that the French and Chinese have not developed pinpoint accuracy in their missile force, and his superb chapter on Soviet missile guidance examines contrasts between U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. The Soviet navy, for example, has not developed advanced unistar stellar guidance systems (as used in the U.S. D-5 missile). This may limit the counterforce capability of Soviet SLBMs, but MacKenzie argues that "perhaps that has not been seen as the appropriate role for this portion of the Soviet strategic force" (p. 333). Another likely case of strategic missions overcoming technological trends is seen in the Soviet deployment in the late 1960s of the *less* accurate and *lower* yield SS-11 and SS-13 ICBMs, *after* deploying the counterforce-capable SS-9. This suggests, as MacKenzie notes, that the SS-9 may have been deliberately designed to threaten U.S. hardened counterforce targets (such as Minutemen launch command centers), while the follow-on missiles were more cheaply built for attacks on soft countervalue targets.

Inventing Accuracy provides important and fascinating insights into bureaucratic politics: how the air force can influence political decision makers by shaping intelligence estimates; how the navy can maintain its autonomy by out-maneuvering its bureaucratic rivals; how weapons scientists can alter and not just anticipate the objectives of political authorities by making some technologies appear possible and others appear impossible. Yet MacKenzie's focus on the intricacies of organizational maneuvers often obfuscates the central role played by senior political leaders in the counterforce story and misleads him to argue as forcefully against political determinism in the conclusions as he does against technical determinism. What is most striking about this history from a broader perspective is the degree to which civilian U.S. officials were able to push missiles onto a

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bomber-infatuated air force and a carrier-infatuated navy in the 1950s, push counterforce strategies onto an initially skeptical air force in the early 1960s, and finally push the navy, which favored less accurate missiles, to develop more accurate counterforce SLBMs in the 1980s.

Individuals may contest (as indeed MacKenzie does) the logic of the strategic arguments—damage limitation, support for extended deterrence in NATO, and second-strike counterforce doctrines—which have motivated civilian authorities to support counterforce programs. Without these strategic motives, however, it is highly unlikely that the missile revolution analyzed by MacKenzie would have occurred. MacKenzie's less detailed chapter on Soviet missiles concludes that "the most plausible explanation" for Soviet accuracy "is simply that the Soviet military and political elite have desired the counterforce capability that accuracy brings" (p. 335). The same statement could and should have been made about the United States.

SCOTT D. SAGAN
Stanford University

The Rise and Decline of the Nation State *edited by Michael Mann. Cambridge, MA, Basil Blackwell, 1990. 233 pp. $44.95.*

A decade of rapid change in international economic and political alignments has given discussions of rise, decline, and fall a life they lost during the long stalemate of the cold war. Paul Kennedy's best-selling *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* captured American anxieties about the end of empire, but in Europe and elsewhere concerns about Japanese expansion, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and the prospects for the European Community all revive the analysis of hegemony, its costs, and its visible vincibility. In September 1988, an outstanding group of scholars met to discuss academic versions of these questions under the leadership of Fred Halliday, John Hobson, and Michael Mann. The revised papers—all but those of Patrick O'Brien and Mancur Olson apparently published here for the first time—now appear in print with a brief, pithy introduction by Michael Mann.

The nine papers pivot on reflections about Britain's decline from preeminent political and economic position in the nineteenth century. Three deal directly with the subject: Patrick O'Brien on the costs of the British Empire, Sidney Pollard on slowing economic growth before 1914, Andrew Gamble on theoretical difficulties in the relevant literature. Mancur Olson uses the title "Is Britain the Wave of the Future?" to summarize his arguments on the dead weight of distributional coalitions, but also to comment on the (in his view, rare) conditions in which economic ideas make a difference to growth. Papers by John Hall and David Calleo ask whether the United States is now recapitulating British decline. Gilbert Rozman (China and Japan), Meghnad Desai (Germany and India), and Wolfgang Mommsen

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(modern conceptions of nations and nationality) bring other experiences than the Anglo-Saxon to bear on the analysis of rise and fall.

The papers are serious, reflective, and densely documented; each will serve as a useful introduction to its subject. We can only regret that Michael Mann, in his characteristically incisive comments on each paper and his brief discussion of the growing separation between economic and political power in the world, did not attempt to synthesize the contributions or to speak more generally about how and why the world order is changing. Mann raises a conceptual question, for example, that almost all of his authors could profitably have addressed: in a world where almost every state enjoys some area of autonomy, where states and economies fall into tangled connections and multiple hierarchies, where power generally declines with distance from its center, what does it mean to call a state or an economy hegemonic? Wouldn't it be better to use something like network analysts' multiple conceptions of prominence: centrality, prestige, and so on? Implicitly Mann's authors disagree sharply on the issue, but explicitly neither he nor they attempt to resolve the question.

Calling this book *Rise and Decline of the Nation State* is misleading in two important regards: first, because (with the partial exception of those by Meghnad Desai and Wolfgang Mommsen) the papers do not address the increasingly urgent problem of correspondence between nation and state in the contemporary world; second, because only Mommsen's asks whether, as the title implies, the large, bureaucratized, centralized states that have dominated the western world directly and the rest of the world indirectly for several centuries have now collectively passed their prime. Yet they do bring concentrated intelligence to bear on how the relative power of any particular state or economy has shifted within the Europe-centered system of the last two hundred years.

CHARLES TILLY
New School for Social Research

Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State *by Barrett L. McCormick. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990. 235 pp. $34.95.*

The key concept employed by Barrett McCormick in this illuminating study of contemporary Chinese politics is Leninism, a familiar enough category in the study of comparative communism. Building on the Weberian-inspired work of scholars like Guenther Roth and Kenneth Jowitt, the author adds a fresh dimension to the study of Leninism by noting its essentially patrimonial nature. Lenin and his successors at party central in the Soviet Union, China, and elsewhere certainly did not and do not intend that cadres treat their positions as a kind of personal possession and partible inheritance. But as McCormick convincingly demonstrates in the case of socialist China, organizational hierarchies of the

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Leninist type invariably produce officials who defend and advance their positions and interests through the subtle and not so subtle use of personal connections.

In doing so, they draw into clientelistic relationships colleagues, friends, kin, and even some ordinary citizens who can pay the price in favors, cash, or loyalty. Autonomy on the part of the state, the hallmark of Leninism in its militant phase, is whittled away through a myriad of petty transactions. The paradoxical effect is to deprive the Leninist state of social support. Any single individual, save those dissidents who resist on principle, can be coopted with the promise of a measure of personal influence or access (leading to, for example, a job, an apartment, a consumer good, or the publication of short story). However, individuals as members of groups like students, workers, farmers, intellectuals, or women are consigned to desiccated abstractions that vary the theme of the "people" and to bureaus that only purport to represent them. As a result, despite its high profile and monopoly hold on power, the state finds controlling and mobilizing society or itself increasingly difficult. Instead of closing the gap between state and society, as many accounts of Leninism as "totalitarianism" would have it, this concealed patrimonial system creates and widens it.

Short of radical democratization and the creation of institutions capable of holding officialdom accountable, it is hard to imagine how a mature Leninist system can substantially remedy the defects of corruption, inefficiency, and popular alienation that it causes to grow so luxuriantly. The author acknowledges that some political reforms in recent years have addressed the problem of institutional accountability. But he is skeptical about the prospects for change in the basic relationship (or lack of relationship) between state and society. He argues that "the institutionalization of a patronage system makes state institutions more impervious to change, whether directed by leaders or demanded by society" (p. 23).

Nonetheless, the relatively immobile, fixed nature of the state encourages leaders to experiment with devices such as freer local elections as antidotes to stasis and inefficiency, even though there is no real place for them within a Leninist system. McCormick helps us understand how a more independent economic, social, and cultural life might emerge outside and just beyond the grasp of the regime without necessarily triggering real reform. The reform-minded (but incorrigible) Leninist state is doomed to permit in the interest of reform the emergence of the very groups and movements it fears most. This is a recipe for periodic political and social turmoil. At some point, as happened in China in 1989, the state's incapacity to absorb writers, entrepreneurs, students, or consumers of an independent or indignant cast of mind will lead to a crisis. Since there is no reform option in these circumstances save real concessions to concrete constituencies (and that kind of gesture would quickly undermine the whole system), we should not be surprised if violence is the regime's response.

Despite its brevity and a focus on theory, this is by no means a purely theoretical work. McCormick has included several case studies based on archival work and field research in China. These accounts of party infighting, local elections, pro-

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tests, political campaigns, and legal reform make the problem of being a leader, cadre, or citizen in a Leninist/patrimonial system come alive. The book concludes with the sobering observation that since neither a reconstituted nor democratically transformed Leninism is likely to appear, collapse of the entire system is the most plausible scenario. While the 1989 Democracy Movement and Tiananmen massacre figures only marginally in McCormick's discussion, it is a measure of the quality of the work and its predictive and explanatory power that these events can be seen as expected products of the political system he has so ably depicted and dissected.

DAVID STRAND
Dickinson College

U.S. National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies *by Richard J. Stoll. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1990. 248 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $21.95.*

The recent transformation in world politics, particularly the Soviet strategic retreat from Central and Eastern Europe, will have major implications for U.S. policy and strategy and demands serious reexamination of Soviet–U.S. relations. Deterrence of nuclear war remains, of course, a primary U.S. political objective, but the new political situation in the USSR and Eastern Europe removes the urgency from this objective and marks the successful conclusion to containment of Soviet expansion. The Soviet threat was probably exaggerated in the past, but we no longer have the necessity to overestimate it in the near future. The success of deterrence and containment, moreover, means that we should take another look at the sources of Soviet–U.S. friction and assess the prospects for Soviet–U.S. national security policy in the near term.

Stoll uses unconventional methodologies such as case studies, statistical analyses, and computer simulations to find patterns and regularities in U.S. national security policy. But unfortunately he reaches exceptionally conventional conclusions (for example, military force is a "useful but potentially dangerous tool for the implementation of . . . policy" (p. 245), it will be "difficult to keep a limited nuclear war from escalating" (p. 247), the U.S. and the USSR "display some reluctance . . . to escalate to war" (p. 245). The statistical analyses and computer simulations rely heavily on the work of Joshua Epstein of The Brookings Institution, whose work will have to be scrutinized in view of its lack of predictive value during the Persian Gulf war of 1991. The case study on the Cuban missile crisis is of limited utility because it relies solely on the blockade and does not deal with the Kennedy administration's willingness to link U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Turkey to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Stoll makes very dubious assertions, such as any U.S. withdrawal from NATO would move Western Europe "much closer to the Soviet Union" and even "en-

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courage the Soviet Union to invade Western Europe" (p. 184). It would appear that one of the lessons of the postwar period has been consistent U.S. underestimation of West European independence in security policy and an overestimation of the Soviet military threat. In any event, the dissolution of the military structure of the Warsaw Pact and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty overtakes and often invalidates much of Stoll's discussion of the military balance in Europe.

Stoll's discussion of arms control and strategic stability is weakened by an extremely limited definition of stability, which leads him to conclude that arms control regimes of the 1970s had a "poor record of improving strategic stability" (p. 247). Unfortunately, he does not discuss the Accident Measures Agreement of 1971, the Naval Incidents Agreement of 1972, the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement of 1973, etc., which contributed to the foundation for improved security and stability over the past twenty years. On the other hand, Stoll believes that arms control negotiations led to a decrease in Soviet-U.S. conflict, but fails to mention the U.S. Declaration of Defense Condition III (the highest stage of readiness for essentially peacetime conditions) during the October War in 1973 and in the wake of the above agreements. His book suffers from a dearth of footnotes, and it appears that no Soviet sources were used, which contributes to the very unsophisticated discussion of strategic issues.

On the basis of his research, Stoll predicts an increase in the cold war, which is astonishing in view of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in conflict resolution since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the series of arms control measures since the Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty in 1987. Indeed, the U.S. willingness to eliminate all its Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe seems to argue with the view that Washington "has never abandoned a class of strategic nuclear weapons system" (p. 116). Finally, Stoll has ignored the Shevardnadze era in Soviet foreign policy from 1985 to 1990, which emphasized the importance of stability and predictability in Soviet-U.S. relations and in tandem with U.S. national security policy produced one of the more productive periods in arms control diplomacy.

MELVIN A. GOODMAN
National War College

The New Right and the Constitution: Turning Back the Legal Clock by Bernard Schwartz. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1990. 310 pp. $32.50

The most striking thing about a book with this title is how shockingly little the author seems to know about either the so-called new right or the Constitution. But then, that does not really matter, given the author's clear purpose. This book is an old-fashioned, unapologetic, devil-take-the-hindmost diatribe. That truth is a casualty of passion is obviously no big deal—except to those readers who might actually care about the Constitution and contemporary jurisprudence.

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The focus of this attack (one cannot in good conscience call it a study) is ostensibly to guard the Constitution from the "radical" schools of conservative jurisprudence. But in fact, the author is not concerned with protecting the Constitution but only contemporary constitutional law; and the infidels at the courthouse door are not in truth conservatives but rather libertarians. These fundamental confusions render this book nearly worthless as a contribution to legal studies.

It is not completely worthless insofar as the author does understand that one of the most potent threats to the Constitution does indeed come from the libertarians who would gladly resuscitate laissez-faire economic liberties of the sort created by the Supreme Court in *Lochner v. New York*. But what this book fails to see is how intimately connected is the libertarian camp to the liberals the author so celebrates. They are two sides of the coin of extraconstitutional judicial activism; the text or the intention of the Constitution matters little to either group.

The deepest flaw of this book is that the author goes out of his way to dismiss and disparage the idea that there is an ascertainable intention or meaning to the Constitution that judges should take seriously as they seek to interpret the text. With intention shoved out of the way, the meaning of the Constitution is left to depend on nothing more substantive than the personal predilections of those who fill the bench. Thus the author is left with no principled argument against those who might now seek to twist the Constitution into the shape they please; it is all a matter of power and the conservatives now have it, in the author's view.

Ironically, it is by his all-out assault on the libertarian element that the author exposes the theoretical insufficiency and political illegitimacy of his own position. Having reduced the Constitution to mere constitutional law, there is nothing to fall back on; those who embrace such a view are doomed to take what comes. There is no ground for resistance beyond predilection; principled argument is replaced by ideological whining.

One of the lessons of recent years that the liberals learned is that in their constitutional world personnel is everything; the debacle of the Robert Bork confirmation was but a part of a larger campaign to keep the courts out of the hands of those with whom the author politically disagrees. The tactic, as the Bork affair showed, is to frighten the general public out of its constitutional wits by painting as bleak a picture as possible. This book is a wonderful example of jurisprudence as yelling "boo." Without blushing, the author offers an ominous warning: should the Reagan and Bush appointees get the upper hand, "Jim Crow, child labor, the third degree, and a destructive individualism may once again characterize American society" (p. ix). This is a book that is nothing short of shameful.

GARY L. MCDOWELL
Harvard Law School

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In Our Defense: The Bill of Rights in Action *by Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy. New York, William Morrow, 1991. 430 pp. $22.95.*

In 1991, as we celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution of the United States, Alderman and Kennedy have made a major contribution to our understanding of the significance of the first ten amendments to that document. The authors, both currently attorneys living in New York City, met in a civil rights class at Columbia University School of Law. The book is an analysis of these basic rights through a consideration of a series of cases drawn from U.S. legal history. The cases present a fascinating array of situations in which constitutional guarantees have had an enormous impact on the lives of the litigants. The book truly brings the Bill of Rights to life in a dramatic way.

Especially interesting and effective are the sections dealing with First Amendment cases, the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure, the Eighth Amendment and the principle of cruel and unusual punishments, and the emergence of the privacy concept in the interpretation of the Ninth Amendment's doctrine of retained rights.

In an introductory note the authors state that their purpose was to write a book that would tell some of the compelling stories "that have shaped the freedoms we Americans so take for granted that we cannot even name them" (p. 13). They have succeeded admirably in achieving this objective. They traveled widely throughout the United States to meet and talk with the people involved in these cases. The book is, as the authors say, "a subjective slice of an enormous subject" (p. 14).

An essential theme in the book is, of course, the process by which the Bill of Rights has been *selectively* incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus made applicable to the states. The process of incorporation has been essentially a phenomenon of the twentieth century and even more especially of the last twenty-five years. Thus, many of the cases reflect the judicial values that have become important in relatively recent times.

Inexorably, the cases focus on a number of concepts very basic to American constitutional law: clear and present danger; prior restraint; unreasonable search and seizure; "taking the fifth"; eminent domain; *effective* representation by counsel; cruel and unusual punishments; and the distinction between procedural and substantive due process.

That some of the persons involved in certain of these cases are not very pleasant human beings hardly comes as a surprise. But the Bill of Rights was intended as a shield for the rights of the despicable as well as the admirable among us. The vitality of the first ten amendments is perhaps best tested when a constitutional guarantee is invoked by an individual whom most of us would regard as loathsome.

Like the rest of the Constitution, the meaning of the Bill of Rights has gone through an evolutionary process of "gradual inclusion and exclusion" as the courts have interpreted its meaning. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes so eloquently said many years ago: "The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience."

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Over the last two hundred years the Bill of Rights has aroused great controversy and passion. This book provides a compelling look at a selective group of actual cases involving ordinary people wherein those rights have been judicially determined. The meaning of some of the rights may indeed have been given a definitive interpretation. But surely many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights will continue to undergo a process of gradual change as the personnel of the United States Supreme Court changes and as our notions of justice evolve into the twenty-first century.

RAYMOND H. GUSTESON
Ohio University

The President in the Legislative Arena *by Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990. 259 pp. Cloth, $47.00; paper, $16.95.*

It has become common to lament the inadequacies of policy making within the American system of divided government, where the Congress and president are often perceived as having conflicting agendas. Bond and Fleisher's book makes an important contribution to this discussion by providing a systematic, thorough, and thoughtful exposition of the determinants of presidential success in the legislative arena over the past thirty years. Rather than limiting their study to factors under presidential control, the authors consider both presidency-centered and congress-centered explanations of legislative success. Through a study of congressional roll calls, they determine that congressional variables such as party composition and member's ideology have greater explanatory power than do those emphasizing presidential popularity and skill.

At every stage of their analysis Bond and Fleisher exercise great care in devising quantifiable measures to test these alternative explanations. This is particularly evident in their test of presidential skills. In the past, those who have believed that leadership skill was a primary factor in presidential success derived their position from a study of a small number of cases where this appeared to help a president prevail. Those believing that a president's leadership skills were of negligible importance had no way of directly measuring it, but based their position on quantitative analysis of a large numer of cases whose outcome appeared to be determined by more easily quantifiable variables. Bond and Fleisher devised an ingenious indirect way of measuring presidential skill. They divided the presidents according to whether they had a professional reputation for high, medium, or low levels of skill. Then the authors constructed a base line to use as a common standard for measuring each president. They did this by regressing the president's annual percentage of success on votes as a function of all the major variables known to affect presidential success. By examining the residuals, the authors were able to determine whether a president won more or less often than expected. While one might quite reasonably argue that the unexplained variance could be caused by many

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factors other than presidential skill, this is still a very commendable attempt at measuring something normally considered to be nonquantifiable.

In a sense the authors' concern with methodological precision is related to the book's primary shortcoming. Their very care about not going beyond what they could clearly support with their data means that the book is not as intellectually ambitious as one might hope. For example, in their discussion of the effect of political context on presidential-congressional relations the authors quite rightly point out that "the content and nature of the policy under consideration" could be important (p. 50). However, instead of considering various typologies developed by policy analysts over the years, the authors confine themselves to distinguishing between domestic and foreign policy initiatives. While an important distinction, the domestic versus foreign policy classification leaves many questions about the effect of policy content unexplored. In a similar vein, by only focusing on the postwar period the authors miss some of the underlying changes in presidential-congressional relations brought about by secular developments within society. Their assertion that the impact of party and ideology are relatively stable might not be so true if a longer period of time were studied. It would have been interesting to see the authors at least speculate about what impact realigning elections would have upon their view of the relationship. But in a sense these are relatively small quibbles with what is without a doubt a path-breaking piece of research, which all subsequent scholars will need to consider.

JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL
Claremont Graduate School

Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf *by Raymond Cohen. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1990. 193 pp. $27.50.*

Raymond Cohen has written a sensitive analysis of Egyptian-Israeli relations that is in my view based on a premise that is at least partially flawed. In brief, Cohen argues that Israel and Egypt are models of fundamentally different cultures—guilt vs. shame, "low-context" vs. "high context"—and the two peoples are designed to misunderstand each other in very basic ways. Thus, diplomacy and peacemaking often prove to be exercises in flawed communication. Only a skillful intermediary can help reach understandings; direct negotiations produce stalemate.

Anyone who has visited Egypt and Israel will recognize some truth in what Cohen argues. And anyone familiar with recent history will find endless examples of misunderstandings. And yet, the two countries did negotiate, albeit with third party help, a series of agreements from 1974 to 1979, and they have remained at peace since then. Some individuals in each society have managed to transcend the

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limits of their cultural conditioning and have dealt quite effectively with their counterparts. For example, military men in both countries had little trouble negotiating directly on the security annex to the peace treaty. This book gives no guide for understanding how cultural constraints can be transcended, which is, after all, what professional diplomats are constantly having to do. So, after reading the long stream of examples of the "dialogue of the deaf," I found myself saying: "Yes, but . . ." I would say the same to anyone asking if I would recommend that they read the book.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis *by James G. Blight. Savage, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 1990. 224 pp. $33.50.*

James Blight's analysis is not just another rehash of recently revealed information about the Cuban missile crisis. He critiques the dominant theories of crisis decision making and suggests an alternative explanation not only for the outcome of the crisis but for the way members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) reacted as the showdown reached its peak. According to Blight, those relying on rational actor psychology, epitomized by the work of Thomas Schelling, cannot explain the onset or outcome of the crisis. Given the strategic advantage enjoyed by the United States in October 1962, according to these theorists, Nikita Khrushchev should not have acted so provocatively, and the EXCOMM should have been less reluctant to remove the missiles by force. Soviet strategic inferiority left Khrushchev with no alternative but to back down. Theories relying on irrational actor psychology, best represented by Richard Ned Lebow's work, cannot explain how EXCOMM members avoided the deleterious impact of stress during their deliberations. Irrationality theorists are forced to rely on the notion of luck to explain the peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Theorists from both schools, according to Blight, base too much of their argument on hindsight. Alternatively, he suggests that scholars take participants' reports seriously regarding how they actually experienced the crisis. By "forward living" the crisis (viewing events without the aid of hindsight), a phenomenon overlooked by the dominant theories becomes apparent. When members of the EXCOMM realized on 27 October that war between the superpowers was becoming *probable*, their objective abruptly changed. Members of the EXCOMM became less interested in removing missiles from Cuba and more interested in reaching a Soviet-American compromise to avoid the inadvertent nuclear war that loomed on the horizon. Moreover, the fear that events were about to spin out of control improved the quality of the EXCOMM's deliberations. Staring

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into the nuclear abyss concentrated the minds of policy makers, according to Blight, thus leading to initiatives that cannot be explained by theories based on rational or irrational psychology.

Blight's provocative alternative to the dominant theories of crisis decision making is not, however, without shortcomings. His analysis cannot explain why fear was not experienced by all members of the EXCOMM. Paul Nitze, Douglas Dillon, and Maxwell Taylor, for example, claimed during and after the crisis that they believed that the risk of nuclear war was extremely low and that the United States should have removed the missiles by force. Given the Kremlin's haste to end the crisis when the Strategic Air Command was placed on alert, it would appear unjustified to dismiss the position of these hawks out of hand. Yet, by not forward living the crisis from the hawks' perspective, Blight fails to address the main anomaly confronting his theory.

Some of Blight's evidence is less than convincing. Participants' fear of inadvertent nuclear war is more apparent in interviews conducted twenty-five years after the crisis than in the EXCOMM transcripts. Additionally, Blight acknowledges that participants would be likely to confirm his theory because it offers a complementary description of their performance. In a sense, these empirical problems demonstrate the difficulty inherent in Blight's theoretical enterprise. In practice, it appears impossible to eliminate hindsight in reconstructing the past.

Despite these shortcomings, Blight plausibly argues that Soviet and American policy makers shared a unique experience when they sensed that they were creating the distinct probability of nuclear war. That they saw this danger and averted it might not be a realistic source of optimism about the future. Nevertheless, Blight's analysis represents an interesting contribution to the literature on crisis decision making.

JAMES J. WIRTZ
Naval Postgraduate School

The Withering Away of the Totalitarian State . . . and Other Surprises *by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. Lanham, MD, AEI Press, 1990. 316 pp. $19.95.*

When Jeane Kirkpatrick joined the Reagan cabinet to represent her country at the United Nations, she brought with her two zany ideas that became centerpieces of U.S. foreign policy. First, authoritarian regimes can change and, therefore, the United States should befriend and even ally itself with anticommunist generals who murder and torture their opponents; second, "totalitarian" revolutions like those in Nicaragua and Grenada are uncorrectable and, as she stated in *Commentary* in 1979, might force the United States to face "the unprecedented need to defend itself against a ring of Soviet bases on and around our southern and eastern borders." "Central America," she declared in *Commentary* in 1980, "is the most

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important place in the world." Neither thesis contained original thought or research. The former, lifted from Hannah Arendt and perverted, assumed that Orwellian literary descriptions corresponded to reality; the second verged on paranoia.

The Withering Away, Kirkpatrick's collected 1986–1990 syndicated newspaper columns, carries her unique blend of shrill, anticommunist moralism along with the mundane acceptance of military power and national self-interest. To understand her apparently different standards the reader must deduce that democracy means little more than old fashioned property rights. Thus: "It is unseemly for the United States to try to impose on the people of El Salvador a land-redistribution program that could not conceivably be adopted in the United States" (p. 248).

Kirkpatrick's enemies are revolutionaries who violate liberties associated with ownership of wealth. Her current bête noire, Fidel Castro, who seized a sizable amount of U.S.-owned land and business, she thinks will soon fall because of changes in the Soviet Union. "As long as the Soviet Union was governed by men interested chiefly in world revolution and military power, Castro prospered – even if Cubans suffered" (pp. 262–63). Suffering under revolution is of a different order than misery caused by authoritarian capitalism. Those who "rot in Cuban jails" merit attention. But Third World victims of poverty and oppression in "authoritarian" or democratic nations are facts of life in the natural order. Kirkpatrick appears disinterested in Third World debt, poverty, and the burdensome cost of military establishments. She hails "democracies," like that of El Salvador and even pontificates: "The U.S. government has no right to intervene in the elections of another country" (pp. 247–8). Like a nineteenth-century liberal, Kirkpatrick equates freedom with free markets and elections.

Modern history is judged by those guidelines, a struggle between good guys who treasure "freedom" and the black hats, who manipulate evil, statist ideologies. Kirkpatrick smugly insists "that the American and Western response to Soviet expansion was just that – a response to a perceived Soviet threat to the independence or integrity of Western European nations" (p. 289). The end of the cold war proved the revisionists wrong, because the people of Eastern Europe showed they didn't like the Soviet-imposed regimes.

No government spokesperson could provide a more official line. Kirkpatrick's prose mixes triumphalism with Cassandra-toned homilies. Whether the themes are *perestroika*, the changes in Europe, or defense of Jonas Savimbi, her political definitions remain as intractable and simplistic as her old description of totalitarianism. Despite reams of new documents casting doubt on official explanations of cold war origins and the dropping of atomic bombs, Kirkpatrick reiterates: the years from the end of World War II to 1990 were "characterized by a Soviet threat, grounded in Marxism and backed by Soviet military force; by a divided Europe, symbolized by the Berlin Wall and the many miles of closed, fortified borders separating the Communist East from the Democratic West; and by the U.S. presence as a superpower in an alliance designed to protect Western Europe from the Soviet threat" (p. 290). Kirkpatrick's predictive powers are neatly summed

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up in a 6 February 1989 column: "And the slow slide to a Marxist Central America continues" (p. 243).

SAUL LANDAU
Institute for Policy Studies

Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy *by Louis A. Pérez, Jr. Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1990. 336 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $15.00.*

Cuba: The International Dimension *edited by Georges Fauriol and Eva Loser. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1990. 380 pp. $34.95.*

Much of the writing on Cuba during the last decades has lacked scholarly detachment and has been distorted by the need to either revile or support the Cuban revolution. Although scholarship about other Latin American countries frequently exhibits this same polemical tendency, the problem has been especially acute regarding Cuba. The passions roused by Fidel Castro have virtually assured that much of the scholarship about the island is shaped by ideological and political agendas.

The book by Louis Pérez represents a significant deviation from this general pattern. Indeed, his historical account of U.S.–Cuban relations is a scholarly tour de force. Analysis and description are beautifully woven together into a rich, balanced, and nuanced presentation of the economic, social, and political forces that have given shape to the relationship. Especially impressive is the discussion of the economic relationship between the two countries during the nineteenth century, including the reasons for Spain's decline, the concentration and vicissitudes of Cuba's trade with the United States, and the role of the slave question in annexationist sentiment before and during the American Civil War.

Pérez's book also contains several excellent chapters about U.S.–Cuban relations during the first half of the twentieth century. Most penetrating, perhaps, is his discussion of U.S. influence on Cuban education during these years. Moreover, these chapters, with great clarity and cogency, examine everything from changes in the economic relationship to Afro-Cuban music's impact on American jazz.

The last part of the book discusses U.S.–Cuban relations during the revolution and its aftermath. This section is the weakest portion of the book. The account is a little thin in places, particularly in its examination of the relationship during the 1970s and 1980s. Events like the Mariel boatlift, for example, receive rather spare treatment. Despite this caveat, this is an excellent book written in an elegant and parsimonious style.

The volume edited by Georges Fauriol and Eva Loser, on the other hand, is much more uneven. While some of the contributions are very strong, others lack

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theoretical depth. Many of the articles are journalistic. This is especially true of the pieces by Juan Benemelis, William Ratliff, and Ernest Evans. More significantly, although quite strong descriptively, most of the contributions to the volume fail to advance new arguments or information about the island. In addition, they do not shed any light on any of the broader theoretical questions in international relations.

On the other hand, the book does contains several particularly good articles. Included in this group are the pieces by Juan del Aguila on perceptions of Cuba, Gillian Gunn on Cuba's role in Angola, Paula Pettavino on unconventional forms of diplomacy, and the pieces by Jorge F. Perez Lopez and Jorge Sanguinetti on the Cuban economy. All of these articles are analytically interesting and highly informative. Finally, Michael Mazarr's article on the Cuban internal security apparatus provides a wealth of data about the Cuban military.

Overall, however, the Fauriol and Loser book suffers from two of the problems characteristic of many policy-oriented works. First, it is largely atheoretical and descriptive. Second, it is full of predictions and recommendations. Almost by definition, it is consequently more prone to date than a more theoretical book. This problem is made worse because Cuba's situation is so fluid as a result of the profound changes in the Soviet bloc since 1989. Indeed, portions of the book are already dated because of these changes. In this regard, the Fauriol and Loser volume stands in marked contrast to the book by Louis Pérez, whose analytical and descriptive richness make it a lasting addition to the literature on the historical evolution of U.S.–Cuban relations.

JUAN LINDAU
The Colorado College

Socialism in Britain Since 1884 *by John Callaghan. Cambridge, MA, Basil Blackwell, 1990. 279 pp. $37.95.*

To write a history of British socialism over the past century is a bold undertaking. Callaghan has drawn from established secondary works to sketch out the development from the early Fabians, Marxists, and Independent Labour Party to the present day. He covers much ground succinctly, the text is commendably free of jargon and fair-minded, and he does not regurgitate once more the thesis of betrayal by corrupt leadership. It is a straightforward narrative from the 1880s down to brief chapters on the revisionism of the 1950s, the pragmatism of the Wilson governments, and the rise and fall of the left in the past two decades. The main shortcoming is that although the author makes numerous shrewd observations, he appears not only to have no thesis but no standpoint on the subject he writes about.

This reviewer is left with three problems. For all the discussion of the different ideas and groups—Marxism, Fabianism, Guild Socialism, Labourism, etc.—

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Callaghan never makes clear what he means by socialism. He is correct to write more than a history of the Labour party, because socialism precedes the founding of the party and exists outside of it. Indeed, as David Coates and Ralph Miliband have vigorously argued, the sheer conservatism and strength of the Labour Party has made it the greatest barrier to socialism. Yet this hardly excuses Callaghan's concentration on the ideas of the tiny British Communist Party. A result is that the egregious ideologue and Stalinist toady, Palme Dutt, has nearly as many references as Clement Attlee.

A second difficulty is that Callaghan fails to take the opportunity to answer crucial questions about socialism in Britain. To what extent has it been shaped, even tamed by British political institutions and political culture? The Labour Party has admired the British constitution, particularly when it was in office or had the prospect of office. Any historian of British socialism must be impressed by the isolation of the British left from continental influences, apart from the abject subordination of the Communist Party to Moscow. Why has the record of the left been so dismal, bearing in mind its many advantages, including the relative absence of the distracting cleavages of religion and race?

A third difficulty is that Callaghan neglects the complex relationship between the coalition of reform and progress and of socialism. Since 1914, with the break-up of the progressive Lib-Lab alliance, the Conservative Party has run away with the prizes in British politics. Socialists have so often scorned reform and tried to replace one hegemony with another.

DENNIS KAVANAGH
University of Nottingham

Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947–1963 *by Dennis Merrill. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 282 pp. $39.95.*

At a time when the Bush administration is seeking to establish a "new world order," it is especially useful to examine previous American efforts to transform international politics. Dennis Merrill explores American efforts to remake the world in the two decades following World War II by focusing on the evolution of relations between the United States and India. His is a diplomatic history based on recently declassified United States government documents, State Department records, and the personal papers of key actors. Merrill's conscientious research produces a feast of historical detail concerning the attitudes of American policy makers towards the subcontinent. He integrates his facts with an even-handed treatment that does not radically revise our previous understanding of events, but improves it by adding more substance to its outline.

Merrill argues that the United States missed an opportunity to start Indo-

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American relations off on the right foot during the period from 1947–1950. The Truman administration's preoccupation with fighting communism, the Marshall Plan, and its lack of understanding for India's policies for nonalignment and a mixed economy led it to spurn Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's entreaties for economic assistance. As a consequence, the United States lost the chance to gain an ally that might have proved useful in establishing greater stability in Asia. The United States made economic assistance available only after the Chinese revolution, the war in Korea, and the insurgency in Indochina increased the strategic significance of South Asia. The level of assistance became substantial only when the Soviets made it a new arena for cold war competition. The Kennedy administration made India its number one aid priority during its first years, but quickly lost its enthusiasm when its naive expectations for transforming the Indian economy and influencing India's obstinately independent foreign policy were disillusioned.

What lessons do we learn from this experience? Merrill follows the lead of other scholars in concluding that U.S. policy pursued global interests that rendered it insensitive to regional differences. He shows how American interventions created conditions—such as the build up of the Pakistani military—that exacerbated regional tensions and limited subsequent policy options. Merrill criticizes the arrogance of power implicit in the assumptions of U.S. foreign assistance. Yet he incongruously argues that the United States should have promoted land reform and neglected agricultural development at a time when the Indian government showed little interest in these areas. In fact, U.S. assistance has bequeathed a substantial legacy to Indian agriculture.

Merrill's historical narrative teaches more compelling lessons than his conclusions. The tensions that have plagued Indo-American relations persisted because the two countries defined their strategic interests differently. While the United States was interested in creating dependable allies in the fight against communism, India was sympathetic to anticolonial struggles and eager to maintain its independence from the superpowers. American foreign assistance might modify Indian positions at the margins, but it was never likely to transform Indian policy in ways contradictory to its perceived interests. In India during the 1950s and 1960s, as in the world today, U.S. foreign assistance is most successful in achieving objectives of mutual interest. Sensitivity to local concerns improves the selection of these objectives. If the new world order brings an end to the insensitivity to regional concerns by banishing cold war preoccupations, then it is a welcome development. If it means that the United States will attempt to reshape the world according to a new dogma, then it will end in failure.

JOHN ECHEVERRI-GENT
University of Virginia

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The Child and the State in India: Child Labor and Education Policy in Comparative Perspective *by Myron Weiner. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991. 213 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $14.95.*

Carefully researched, clearly written, and well-published books on important social issues in India are rare these days. Myron Weiner's study of child labor is especially noteworthy because it is all of these. Weiner has selected an important topic that connects with such themes as the role of the child in the family and society, household productive and reproductive strategies, and state policies about education, labor, and family planning. These issues reverberate outward from India to the rest of the world, developing and developed.

The problem of child labor in India is illuminated for Weiner by the fact that "India is a significant exception to the global trend toward the removal of children from the labor force and the establishment of compulsory, universal primary-school education" (p. 4). According to the 1981 census, less than half of India's school-age children attend school. In the age group 6–14 years, there are about 80 million children who do not attend school in India. Estimates of the number of children under 15 years old in the labor force range from a low official count of 17 million to a high count of 44 million obtained by a respected nongovernment research organization. The related problems of school nonattendance by children and child labor are vast.

Weiner follows two directions: in-depth analysis of child labor in India itself, and historical and cross-country comparisons. This two-pronged strategy offers the very best of social science.

Weiner first probes the issue of child labor through six case "sketches." He then presents "dialogues"—material he gathered through interviews about child labor with officials, an activist, a Catholic priest, an economist, and then excerpts from interviews about child education with government officials, educators, researchers, and an education planner. In the next chapter Weiner describes the policy context of India's "new" (1986 and 1987) child labor and education laws, which do not unilaterally prohibit child labor nor support universal child education. Instead they seek to improve working conditions for children and provide noncompulsory part-time schooling for working children.

Weiner next moves to the comparative perspective—historical and cross-country. In examining the recent history (over the past three to four centuries) of state policies regarding compulsory education and child labor in Germany, Austria, England, the United States, and Japan, he emphasizes variation, insisting that no single economic or political determinant for achievement can be discerned. Weiner also looks at countries that may allow closer comparisons with India than highly industrialized countries (China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Sri Lanka). He also considers Kerala, a state in South India. This chapter most clearly reveals two problems in the argument. Weiner claims that "India is indeed unique, not because of its size or political system, but because of its unique culture, the ethos or guiding beliefs that shape the way people think about the way in which their society is

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and should be organized" (p. 155). But elsewhere, Weiner notes that Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have child labor/literacy records similar to India's, which makes me question whether India is "unique" in its state attitudes toward children of the poor. Second, "India" is not internally consistent in its attitudes as the highly contrasting states of Bihar and Kerala demonstrate. "India" and "Indian attitudes" are extremely conflated in this book.

In the end, Weiner's prognosis for India is downbeat: "With illiteracy and child labor declining worldwide at a faster rate than in India, India's global share of illiterates and child laborers will continue to increase" (p. 207). I am sorry that Weiner devoted only three pages to Kerala. Attention to internal variation in child education and labor within India, its antecedents and contemporary dynamics, would unlock the conflated "India," allowing, perhaps, a more positive prognosis. Analysis that falls back on the old sawhorse of entrenched "beliefs" gets us nowhere. Carefully pinpointing the key elements of a model of relative success, lying within the boundaries of "India," just might.

BARBARA D. MILLER
University of Pittsburgh

A Street Is Not A Home: Solving America's Homeless Dilemma *by Robert C. Coates. Buffalo, NY, Prometheus Books, 1990. 356 pp. Paper, $14.95.*

Robert Coates's interest in the homeless stems from his experience as a San Diego municipal court judge, where his duties included "sentencing hundreds of these puzzling, stark, astonishing human beings" (p. 20). Troubled by their plight, Coates called a meeting of social service leaders in 1983, which led eventually to a citywide convocation on homelessness. The event's success convinced Coates to write this book outlining " 'the best solutions' to the problems of the homeless" (p. 21). Less a scholarly inquiry and more a "call to action," *A Street Is Not A Home* is aimed at citizens, community leaders, and policy makers. Coates's message is twofold. First, homelessness is a moral issue; and, second, it is a solvable problem. Specifically, homelessness can be solved with human effort, resources, and well designed programs.

The book is divided into four sections on planning, homeless subpopulations, major solutions, and empowerment. Also included are three appendices, one of which outlines the legal rights of homeless people. Throughout Coates relies on the first-hand experiences of ministers, mayors, community leaders, volunteers, and innovative program directors to make his case that homelessness is solvable. These in turn are buttressed with detailed descriptions of successful programs that have been developed around the country (for example, Los Angeles Skid Row Mental Health Service). Finally, research studies, books, government reports, court decisions, and statistics are used to dispel myths about the homeless and reinforce the fact that it is a serious national problem.

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If homelessness is to be solved, several actions must be taken at the community and state levels. First, officials should be more aware that the homeless population is actually comprised of diverse subpopulations, including women, veterans, alcoholics, teen-agers, and the elderly. Each group requires specially tailored programs. Second, communities must develop job training programs for the able-bodied homeless so that they may return to mainstream society. Third, local governments, in the federal government's absence, should begin building low-income housing. Coates notes that the current shortage of low-income housing is a "people-made" crisis (p. 128) that can be resolved with political will, and by "piecing together funding from several sources" (p. 147).

Fourth, model homeless shelters should be established that treat individuals with care and sensitivity. Here, Coates points to two such shelter systems in San Diego. Both are managed by church-based groups, but one system is centralized and the other is decentralized. Coates believes that both approaches have positive features, although "one solution will not work for all" communities (p. 127). Fifth, state and local governments must make a concerted effort to help the deinstitutionalized mentally ill. Coates is especially critical of the policies that returned the mentally ill to cities without providing the necessary outpatient and support services. All five actions will require a substantial commitment of state and local resources, as well as partnerships with the private and nonprofit sectors.

Overall, Coates is a convincing and impassioned advocate for the homeless. He is most persuasive when examining proven programs and strategies. He is less persuasive when inspirational quotations and exhortations are substituted for analysis and argument. Ultimately, the book's strength lies in its message that the problem of homelessness will be solved only when enough people, both inside and outside government, choose to see the homeless as their neighbors in distress, rather than as strangers in the street.

DeLysa Burnier
Ohio University

Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America *by Frank Donner. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990. 503 pp. $34.95.*

The videotaped brutal beating in March 1991 of a black motorist by police in Los Angeles is a graphic reminder to the American public of the horrors of police misconduct. As reprehensible as physical brutality is, it is not the only nor the most damaging manifestation of the abuse of authority by police. When the police use their powers to repress protest, dissent, and related activities through interventionist strategies – be they passive or aggressive, open or clandestine, for the purposes of monitoring behavior or gathering intelligence – the police mission becomes ideologically based, with political repression serving the status quo.

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Frank Donner's history of the development of urban police surveillance activities in America offers a chilling account of repressive police behavior and its damaging impact on protected freedoms. Donner's detailed account of the transition of specialized police units, the red squads, in nine American cities begins with the Haymarket bombings in 1886. According to the author, these units served as the protectors of the economic and political interests of business and other urban elites for over a century. While private interests looked to the Chicago police department for protection from immigrant workers and pro-union forces in the nineteenth century, the units became the antiphon to perceived threats to the status quo spawned by the disturbances and demonstrations of the 1960s.

As the focus of police mission evolved from the suppression of violence to the curbing of peaceful dissent and radical hunting, so did the countersubversive strategies. What began with open observation, pretext arrests, raids, and intimidation ended with infiltration by informers, undercover agents, and other forms of clandestine surveillance. The collection and dissemination of files and dossiers was intended to demoralize and intimidate the exercise of protected freedoms. In following the proscriptive model for political repression, the police, through the expansion and sophistication of the red squads, contributed to the national obsession with conspiracies and other fear-based assumptions through an aggressive confrontational style and exploitation of real threats and mass fears. By the end of the 1960s, in some quarters the hunters became more dangerously ideological than the prey.

Protectors of Privilege is a comprehensive and well-documented study of the political environments that spawned repression; police target selection and operations; the relationship of the squads to the power structure; the role of the press; the methods, assumptions, and career aspirations of ambitious police "Big Men"; and the factors that effectively brought an end to the squads. An informed observer would have little quarrel with the facts presented by Donner or the economic, political, and physical harm suffered by many individual and organizational victims of the squads. Yet, while he outlines the dangers of surveillance and intelligence, it is unclear that the public's right to know and its right to public safety are to be balanced. Donner seems to suggest that because the police failed to predict and prevent the eruption of all violent confrontations, race riots, and brutality that none was prevented. Some threats are very real, and we cannot know to what extent such police activity prevented greater harm to the American public and its institutions.

Donner also warns of the prospects and conditions for the revival of urban surveillance activities. But here again, little attention is paid to the strong internal counterbalances evident in urban American policing today. These factors include improved and expanded training and education; enhanced recruitment and representation of minorities and women; greater acceptance within the ranks of ethnic, cultural, gender, and sexual preference differences. However, as the recent case in Los Angeles clearly illustrates, police behavior is indeed an issue that must re-

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main high on the public policy agenda; it is the role of political observers like Frank Donner to keep us mindful of that need.

PAMELA D. DELANEY
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Policing As Though People Matter *by Dorothy Guyot. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1991. 357 pp. $39.95.*

Policing is one subject on which all Americans think themselves experts. Dorothy Guyot offers a scholarly rejoinder to such hubris in her knowing look at the operations and practices of the Troy, NY Police Department and the approaches of its reform chief, George W. O'Connor (1973–1975 and 1977–1987).

Guyot is hard working, caring, conscientious, and deeply involved. Perhaps too deeply. Scholars and scientists should study what needs to be examined rather than settling for those items or organizations willing to succumb to their examinations. While a study as exhaustive as this one of any police agency is to be welcomed, it has to be added that some would be more welcome than others.

America's fate is probably locked into the future of its urban centers, the areas patrolled and observed by its police. Neither Troy nor its commissioner are likely to make as much of a difference as Detroit or its chief or their equivalents. Commentaries on the conditions of life in the ghetto by such close observers as cops or their examiners might well help the rest of us understand the enormous threat that rising levels of crime and violence pose for our very survival.

Guyot's internal examination of policies, organizational dynamics, and the backdrop against which the police perform reflects her integrity, enthusiasm, and dedication. Many of her descriptions are basic to any understanding of the complex police culture in America: the chief's central importance, the need for good management, the faded promise of civil service, the role of unions as obstacles to reform, the powerful acculturation forces within the ranks, the importance of moral courage in a system that prizes only physical courage, the existence of a code of silence, and the peculiar view-of-the-world shared by so many cops. We need only glimpse the L.A.P.D. incident involving Rodney King on 3 March 1991 to recognize the critical need for such understanding.

The writer has a sure grasp of both the literature and the ideas afloat in the field. She describes the folly of the military model and the attraction of the hospital approach fully, but she doesn't quite come to grips with the subtle distinction between serving and pleasing. The client isn't always the best judge of when he or she is being effectively served. For example, it might be more efficient to ignore nineteen burglaries after a quick inspection and to concentrate on the one where the odds of making an arrest are greatest. This may risk alienating 95 percent of the clients, but it may easily result in more burglars arrested. Guyot's analysis of the cops' fabled breadth of discretion is both knowing and persuasive. The temp-

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tation to abuse power receives a thorough search. The police need to stereotype—and its dangers—also receive careful attention.

Policing As Though People Matter will enable the reader to understand the arcane world of policing and clarify many of the mysteries encountered every day on the front pages or the evening news. This is an excellent case study of an agency in reform. If it is sometimes too adoring a look, it will have to be forgiven for the wealth of information and knowing insights that come with it.

It is one of the anomalies of policing that the best writing about it comes not from its practitioners but from the scholars examining the institution. While one may wish for a larger canvas and a more imposing hero, Guyot has nevertheless provided us with a useful, valuable guide to the Atlantis we know as the police world.

ANTHONY BOUZA

From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938–1980 *by Bruce J. Schulman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. 333 pp. $35.00.*

Bruce Schulman, a member of the history faculty at UCLA, has produced a broadly researched, well written, and probing examination of the influences and impact of national programs and policies on the South over four decades. Schulman takes 1938 as his launching date, because FDR then declared the South "the Nation's No. 1 economic problem" based on an official report declaring the region "a belt of sickness, misery, and unnecessary death" (p. 3).

A simplistic way to state Schulman's thesis is: national micro- and macroeconomic policies, as well as social programs have had only selective positive results in the South. In the main, national public policies have had marginal or even negative consequences for many present and former residents of the South. The pervasive theme of the book is the persistence of severe poverty (no longer chiefly rural) with coexistent spectacular growth.

This two Souths argument is hardly new, but in the author's hands it receives extensive and varied treatment. Adding to the robustness of Schulman's analysis is a temporal dimension, one frequently lost, strayed, stolen, or ignored in the examination(s) of public policy impacts. An example of the author's main thesis, in his own words, is that the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administration's "various redistributive and anti-poverty initiatives never abandoned [a policy emphasis on] growth," and that "The Early War on Poverty, the Great Society, and Nixon's welfare reforms only reinforced the South's drift toward a dual economy and a Whiggish political order" (p. 198).

A sense of the sequential, temporal character of the author's exposition and his style can be gleaned from the descriptive nature of his chapter titles. They are: Becoming Economic Problem No. 1; Wild Cards and Innovations; The Wages of Dixie; Bulldozers on the Old Plantation; Persistent Whiggery; Missiles and Magnolias; Shadows on the Sunbelt; Conclusion—Place Over People.

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The book harbors a few assumptions and limitations that should be noted and questioned. These can be briefly listed. First, national policy is presumed to be the independent variable affecting change in the South. National policy may (often?) be the dependent variable, however, resulting from state-local and/or international political forces.

Second, growth or distributive policies are viewed as in inherent conflict with redistributive or welfare policies. In this zero-sum pattern, the former drive out or seriously impair the effectiveness of the latter. Is this pattern or tension occasionally, regularly, or always the case? The author offers limited guidance in resolving the question.

Third, the two types of policies, distributive and redistributive, are not treated theoretically or analytically as an economist (Charles Lindblom) or a political scientist (Theodore Lowi) would handle them. Recent published research by Paul Peterson and others on variations in policy implementation could have added to the significance of how federalism "works" in the national-state-local implementation process.

Finally, there is a strong presumption about the ability or political efficacy of the national government to impose and implement its policy will on southern states. "Washington never forced southern states to reorder priorities from business development to poverty fighting" (p. 197). How "forceful" could Washington be? The institutional, political, and other constraints on the exercise of national powers receive short shrift. The author could have benefited from a thoughtful reading of Morton Grodzins's writings on "A New View" of American governance or even from James Patterson's book on the New Deal and the states.

Despite these cautions and caveats, this is a very good book. It adds to our understanding of political, economic, and social change in the South. Its research depth, policy breadth, descriptive readability, and interpretive thesis commend it to a wide audience of political scientists and economists, not to mention historians.

DEIL S. WRIGHT
University of North Carolina

Perspectives on Political Economy *edited by James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 244 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $16.95.*

A better title for this book would be *Essays in Politics and Economics.* Some of the articles are about politics, some are about economics, and only a few about political economy. As with too many edited volumes, the primary coherence of this book is that most of the articles were first presented to a common audience, in this case a seminar series at Harvard in the fall of 1987.

A few of these articles deserve special attention. My first favorite is the article on "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory" by David Kreps. He defines cor-

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porate culture as the rules by which an organization operates and that in turn become the organization's reputation in dealing with other organizations. A series of increasingly complicated "trust games" are developed to illustrate the type of rules that are easiest to monitor and are most efficient in reducing transactions costs. Kreps's writing is both precise and lively; he must be a marvelous teacher. Two other articles also develop on the transaction cost literature. The article by Douglass North is a useful introduction to this literature and its relevance for both private and public organizations. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts make an important contribution by demonstrating that "if the costs of bargaining over short-term arrangements were zero . . . the actions taken by the parties both in the short run *and in the long run* would *in all contingencies* be identical to those that would have been specified in the 'ideal contract'" (emphasis in original, p. 66). This shifts the emphasis of this approach from the traditional focus on asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of dealing to the costs of short-term bargaining.

My other favorite is the article by Mancur Olson. As is usual, he addresses interesting questions and provides a plausible, but not wholly convincing, common answer. The several questions range from why increases in income often increase social discontent to why some subjects of social science seem much more difficult than others. His common answer is that the production or consumption of some goods and services involves indivisibilities. Intrigued? Read the article.

Two articles address important issues but need further development. Harold Demsetz addresses the effects on political parties of the ideology that motivates their partisans, a partial answer to why parties do not always maximize votes. This approach should be extended to addressing the relative use of money and workers in political campaigns. The Republican party, for example, is less dependent on partisans because it is relatively more successful in raising money; as a consequence, Republican partisans are more likely to be frustrated when their candidate wins. Democratic partisans, just because they are more important to the party, are more likely to be frustrated by a losing candidate. Gordon Tullock, one of the original developers of the "rent-seeking" theory, provides a partial answer why observed rent-seeking expenditures are so much smaller than what the theory suggests: most politically induced rents are created by inefficient means. Moreover, this may be a better outcome than the alternative of larger rent-seeking expenditures and more efficient transfers. Tullock's estimate of the magnitude of potential rent-seeking and rent-defending expenditures, however, is still much too low.

The three articles by political scientists seem designed to convince their colleagues that the authors are not agents of economic imperialism. Peter Ordeshook's survey of political economy is much too complex as an introduction and too cryptic for the initiated. Robert Bates finds all of the theories about economic development to be wanting but concludes that they should somehow be combined. William Riker asserts that rational choice theory is the only basis for the development of political science, but he claims that one of the important advantages of this approach is "that it permits generalizations about intentions" (p. 174). How odd! An *as-*

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sumption about intentions is the first step in rational choice theory, but it is most incorrect to conclude that empirical confirmation of the hypotheses generated by this theory can be regarded as proof of the assumed intentions.

The modern development of political economy or public choice is now about thirty years old. This book, however, suggests that political scientists and economists may still be talking past each other.

WILLIAM A. NISKANEN
The Cato Institute

Learning Together: A History of Coeducation in American Public Schools *by David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot. New Haven, Yale University Press. 1990. 379 pp. $29.95.*

In their introduction to their insightful and thought provoking study, David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot implicitly focus the readers' attention on a paradox. They ask that we consider the importance of the development of American public schools with respect to the ways young men and women were educated. Yet this is not so much a study of the development of shared education as an examination of the ways in which men and women were served with uniquely different educational experiences.

As such, the book is an important addition to the literature on issues of gender difference, concerning those differences that have manifested themselves in public school structure and curriculum. It is equally important for the ways it suggests we think about how school experiences have themselves worked to reinforce or, in fewer cases, change the structure of gender relations.

There are several important components to the book, each of which alone would provide ground for further exploration. Most important of these is the examination of the relationship between growing institutionalization of separate public spheres for men and women at the same time that sexually mixed common schools were becoming commonplace. They also provide an interesting discussion of how gender differences and similarities grow in relation to the increasingly differentiated curriculum during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most crucial here is the overlap between a gender based differentiation, as in the home economics and manual trades curricula, and differentiation that manifested itself as class specific, serving working and middle class children, irrespective of gender or at least in no direct relation to gender.

The early sections of the book outline the shape of efforts at coeducation growing from the academies and dame schools of the colonial and early postcolonial national experience. The authors discuss these developments in both the rural common and urban public schools through the early twentieth century, when coeducation becomes a commonplace. After a section on the coeducational high school, an institution about which they rightfully argue few generalizable arguments can be

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made, they begin what I believe is the most interesting discussion in the book: the fascinating arguments made by early school leaders about the effects, most of them cautionary, on the character development and sexual development of both boys and girls in the process of education.

One of the most intriguing suggestions in the book is the relationship between public assumptions about adolescent sexuality and its impact on student character development. They argue persuasively that the community of opinion leaders differed regarding the salutary benefits of coeducation. We see the influential William Torrey Harris arguing for the benefits of coeducation on student character, against a host of critics who warn of the stunting and depravity that might well grow from the mixing of boy and girl scholars. The inextricability of gender roles and sexual development is intriguing here. Again, we see school people argue that a proper balance of sexual and civic character is the crucial cement of the orderly domestic/industrial/commercial society so much valued by educators during the crucial building of the public school as a modern institution. Tyack and Hansot conclude with a section on the "hidden injuries of coeducation," suggesting the illusory nature and the false assumptions about equal gender-differentiated education.

Their observations about public assumptions regarding social class mixing and dangers of this, given the powerful "irrationality" of adolescent sexuality, are most interesting. Throughout the book we see the suggestion implicit that social and moral character, inasmuch as they become crucial to the progressive school leader, are inextricably woven into the development of healthy sexuality, and vice versa. Social class and sex mixing are important undercurrents in the development of private privilege in public institutions. What Tyack and Hansot suggest here deserves careful attention.

GUY B. SENESE
Northern Illinois University

The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in America *by G. William Domhoff. New York, Aldine De Gruyter, 1990. 315 pp. Cloth, $47.95; paper, $19.95.*

Among the concerns of political science, none has been witness to more tortured debates than power. Bloodied critiques litter the field; the combat has been bitter. Currently the main drift has been away from those who see the main question as "who rules?" Today the victors appear to be scholars who propose grand theories of "what rules?" Is "the what" the logic of capitalism or the political rationality of an autonomous state? So the debate goes.

Almost from its beginning, G. William Domhoff has been in the thick of the fight. The author of many studies in the "who rules tradition," Domhoff now feels the double indignity of being trivialized, or worse, ignored. The structuralists have

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passed his tradition by. Domhoff is angry about this, and his venom shows through more than once. But his study is more than a defensive reply to critics. While his adversaries will doubtless quarrel with the particulars of its case studies, Domhoff's careful review of the more recent literature of power demands attention. This is an intelligent, forceful case for recognizing that Robert A. Dahl and C. Wright Mills were right: who rules does count.

Domhoff defends his position by advancing an essentially organizational view of power. He insists quite reasonably that the corporate elite works amid great political uncertainty. For one thing, the business elite is itself divided into competing "class segments"—big international corporations, smaller national firms, urban development interests, and a particularly reactionary corps of southern conservatives. Second, as it is pressed by disparate corporate demands as well as by democratic pressures from below, the state's policy response is anything but automatic or predictable. Indeed, what state? For as Domhoff correctly notes, political fragmentation in U.S. government only multiplies the uncertainty and confusion of policy. Neither the logic of capitalism nor whatever passes for the rationality of state managers is enough to guarantee business control of policy. If business wants things done, it has to swing into political action and demand it. This it does through persistent lobbying, by carefully influencing appointments to key positions in the state, and most of all through the service of an informal network of policy advisory institutions—foundations, think tanks, and research institutes. These organs furnish state officials with the general business view of things as well as more technical blueprints for desired policy.

Domhoff makes such points through case studies that mainly examine the formation of early welfare state and international economic policies, ground he has covered before. But he also looks briefly at the rise of modern conservatism and offers an intriguing analysis that disputes recent claims about a reemergence of business power. For Domhoff, business never really lost control; what mainly changed in the national power balance was the partisan shift of southern conservatives in reply to black militancy and the embrace of that militancy by northern liberals. It was the South's move toward the Republicans that unified three of the four major corporate class segments into a political power bloc capable of smashing unionized labor and slashing welfare state programs; the Democrats continue to draw support form the land developers.

Apart from heightened respect for the southern wing of business power, the major new element here is that Domhoff now roots his work in Michael Mann's conception of power; as a system of networks—political, military, economic, and ideological. This neo-Weberian model lends itself to a Millsian view of power; but unfortunately Domhoff does not rigorously apply Mann's idea throughout the book. Where, for example, do military and ideological networks fit in the present scheme of things? This is a notable loose end in an otherwise provocative book.

SIDNEY PLOTKIN
Vassar College

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Preventing A Biological Arms Race *edited by Susan Wright. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1990. 446 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $17.50.*

This is an essential book about a critical issue at a key time. The third international review conference for the Biological Weapons Treaty is scheduled for September 1991. The entire text of the treaty is in the book, as well as carefully thought out proposals for improving and strengthening the treaty. Biological weapons are the only case in which an entire class of weapons has been forbidden by international treaty. International consensus exists in part because of universal revulsion at the prospect of applying medical science to the creation of pestilence for humans, their flocks, and crops and in part because biological weapons probably can't be made to work well for any rational objective. This consensus has strong roots in the community of scientists as well as among those who stand to benefit from the benign applications of biological research—the entire human population and possibly Gaia. The impetus to ban entire classes of weapons is spreading constructively into chemical arms. Extensions of the biowar ban to other means of mass destruction are made more fragile if the biowar ban is threatened and will be empowered by lessons learned in making the biowar ban stick. Related chapters discuss international law (Richard Falk), U.S. domestic law (John Isaacs), the previous review conference for the treaty (Nicholas A. Sims), the mishandling of previous allegations of violation in the cases of yellow rain and Sverdlovsk, and how to prevent repeats of those dangerous faux pas (Julian Robinson, Jeanne Guillemin, and Matthew Meselson; Leonard Cole). Publication of this book preceded the war with Iraq and associated accusations of biological warfare.

Many activities that could be part of an offensive biological warfare effort are also part of defense research against either biological warfare or naturally occurring plagues. Offensive biowar research is banned under the treaty. Thus verification is particularly tricky and depends to a significant degree on interpretations of intent. Charles Piller and Keith R. Yamamoto dissect the U.S. BDRP (Biological Defense Research Program) with respect to issues of intent and come to the conclusion that a large part of the BDRP program could easily be interpreted as being part of an offensive biowar effort. My first reaction to this chapter was that it is an exercise in creative paranoia. My opinion abruptly changed when I considered the authors' question: How would the same research activities be judged by the United States if they were being carried out by the military establishment of an unfriendly country? In order to prevent unintended provocations that could lead the world into an arms race in the biomedical field, several of the authors suggest that a large part of biomedical research currently carried out by the military could be done better and with less provocation by civilian agencies.

The book consists of fifteen chapters by an excellent choice of twenty authors and fourteen appendices. The chapters are not edited with a heavy hand, allowing some diversity of authors' perspectives to shine through. The editor's introduction and three chapters, a volume-encompassing list of abbreviations, appendices, extensive footnotes for most of the chapters as well as charts, diagrams and tables

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of information, and a volume-wide index (not perfect at finding all relevant pages, but pretty good) unify the contributions and provide background information, both historical (Barton Bernstein, Susan Wright) and scientific (Richard Novick and Seth Shulman). *Preventing A Biological Arms Race* is an exemplary volume for scholarship, activism, and decision making. Despite all the careful thought that has gone into this book, it is clear that the last word on biological warfare has not been spoken. There are more important ideas to be had, and they had better come out soon. Those who wish to contribute will need to consider the information and opinion that is provided here. Get the facts, stop anthrax.

DAVID S. THALER
Rockefeller University

Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: in a letter intended to have been sent to a gentleman in Warsaw *by Ralf Dahrendorf. New York, Random House, 1990. 144 pp. $17.95.*

This is a brilliant essay on the task of rebuilding postcommunist Eastern Europe, prompted by the "questions about the riddles of Poland and Europe" with which the author was "showered" on a visit in March 1990 (p. 3). Dahrendorf eloquently pleads for life in an "open society" (p. 28ff) with all its "untidiness, . . . conflict and changeability which allows the blossoming of human life chances" (p. 5). He cautions that any search for a social democratic "middle way" or any other magic formula might bring a return to the "closed" society (p. 62): "There is no . . . inescapable path to freedom. . . . [I]t has to be created" (pp. 34–35).

Dahrendorf's open society requires basic agreement on constitutional matters, such as the role of law, free expression, open elections, private property, and an independent central bank. On other, political matters there is a wide range of choices. But "In the valley of tears" of rebuilding a postcommunist economy, Dahrendorf warns, the government must not be "thrown off course by the kind-hearted desire to soothe people's pain, which bodes disaster in the medium term" (p. 89). He acknowledges the dangers for new democracies of quasi-fascist populism, but congratulates Poland on having organizations such as Solidarity and the Catholic Church to help fill the postcommunist void. While he favorably mentions the Solidarity intellectual Adam Michnik and the crash program of Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, there is no mention of Solidarity leader (now president) Lech Walesa.

As he turns to Polish fears of a future Germany ("a balkanized Europe dominated by the one power which is uniting rather than disintegrating," p. 122), Dahrendorf quotes with empathy Günter Grass's statement that "Whoever . . . seeks answers to the German question, must think of Auschwitz as well" (p. 127). He describes Helmut Kohl as a leader "whose sense of power is better developed than the power of his sensitivity" (p. 123). But in conclusion he emphasizes that democ-

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racy has fully taken hold in West Germany and suggests that Kohl's particular policy of unification may prove "so costly for Germany that for a while its claims to hegemony would be weakened rather than strengthened" (p. 141).

Dahrendorf firmly believes in the process of European unification from the Coal and Steel Community and the community of the six and the twelve to the post-1992 single market. Such unification has made "Transnational companies" into "the great productive force which made the old, national relations of production seem hopelessly outdated" (p. 145). Meanwhile, a Western European "Marshall Plan" for the East should extend this process of gradual unification, but leave out the Soviet "grizzly bear" (p. 120), except possibly for the Baltic countries.

Dahrendorf's title recalls Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), which was cast in the form of a letter to an acquaintance abroad. His text teems with perceptive allusions, critical and interpretive, to Burke and other political classics from the *Federalist Papers* and Karl Marx to Max Weber, F.A. von Hayek, and, above all, Karl Popper's *Open Society and Its Enemies*. Such references, however, are not a boast, but rather an erudite exercise in modesty, emphasizing that many of his themes have been dealt with by others in different circumstances or from different perspectives.

Dahrendorf himself seems uniquely qualified for such political-philosophical reflections. Son of a Social Democratic deputy in Weimar Germany and himself as a teenager sent to a concentration camp for anti-Nazi activities, he earned a doctorate in philosophy in Germany and in sociology in Britain. He has served as a West German member of parliament, a commissioner of the European Community, director of the London School of Economics, and since 1987 warden of an Oxford college.

DANKWART A. RUSTOW
City University of New York

Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action *edited by Roy Godson. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1989. 269 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $22.95.*

In the wake of the rapid transformation within the communist world, in the face of new technology, and in the light of recent events in the Persian Gulf, we will need to revisit many aspects of our national security thinking including our intelligence capabilities—strategic and otherwise—and the requirements generated for the 1990s by the world's rapidly changing geopolitical and technical scenery.

This book edited by Roy Godson undoubtedly represents one of the most comprehensive considerations of intelligence requirements by current and former intelligence professionals and national security intellectuals (Consortium for the Study of Intelligence). The Washington, DC meetings on which this book is based took place in April and December 1987. To say that some material is outdated, especially

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concerning the Soviet Union, would be an understatement. Even as the book went to press, much of the Soviet and East Bloc material was irrelevant. The enduring and worthwhile parts of this work relate not to specific national or geographic considerations but rather to fundamental aspects of intelligence craftsmanship.

The consortium collection is organized around four functions: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. Written for a conference and not for a book, the essays prevent the collection from flowing as smoothly as it should. Instead of exploring a single element of intelligence in detail, each author tends to cover broadly every aspect of intelligence, thus watering down the subject, repeating information, and confusing the reader. In addition, although he prepared a good introduction to the book, it would have been helpful if Godson had added a conclusion to wrap up the loose ends—and particularly to direct the reader toward the new requirements and challenges of the 1990s.

"Collection" is used to refer simply to the gathering of information, and the authors explore the various types of intelligence gathering, including human intelligence (HUMINT) and technically gathered intelligence. The treatment, however, is wholly stacked in favor of the human dimension. Such crucially important subjects as electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) are very poorly addressed.

Analysis focuses on two broad questions. The first concerns who decides which information is important—the analysts (and their agency) or the politicians? Second is the traditional analyst's lament concerning why statesmen fail to heed intelligence recommendations. One participant at the consortium meetings correctly observed that President Ronald Reagan had done more to restore the standing of the intelligence community and less to make use of its product than any president in recent times.

Counterintelligence (CI) discussions generate a consensus opinion among the consortium participants that there are two areas to be addressed in CI: first, whether there is the need for a nationwide CI network composed of all the intelligence agencies; second, the process of setting priorities for different CI targets. Several contributors note the growing requirement for counterterrorism capabilities.

The always touchy subject of covert action (CA), defined as the attempt to influence politics and events in another country without revealing one's involvment or at least while maintaining plausible deniability, is regarded by the consortium authors as both a necessary and a growing requirement. This is a view many Americans, including some in the important congressional oversight committees, would disagree with. Much less controversial is the authors' recurring observation concerning the difficulty in finding and keeping good intelligence personnel, and what the proper form of training should be.

Overall, the book is interesting, easy to read, and enjoys the general support of the academic intelligence community. But this may be more for lack of serious competition than for its insights or its scholarly merit. This is not an in-depth study on intelligence; nor is it one the reader can approach with a view to gaining a

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comprehensive and balanced understanding of how the intelligence functions in the United States are organized, managed, financed, and conducted. Many of the most important aspects of intelligence are left virtually untouched, for example, most of the complex military intelligence subject.

Without some such focus, however brief, one of the most important aspects dealt with in this collection—namely covert action—is bound to be poorly treated. A similar observation could be made for technical considerations, some of which profoundly influence collection, analysis, and distribution. Consequently, the book never really addresses what it is that drives intelligence requirements, and the reader is apt to be directed away from some of the most important trends of the 1990s.

DALTON A. WEST
National Intelligence Study Center

Thailand and the United States: Development, Security, and Foreign Aid *by Robert J. Muscat. New York, Columbia University Press, 1990. 367 pp. $40.00.*

Foreign aid has long been a subject of controversy. Attacked from both left and right as either insidious or wasteful, it encourages polemic rather than scholarly evaluation. Such criticism cannot be leveled against Robert Muscat, who has produced a work that is more than a study in development economics. The author has been both a participant in and academic observer of the aid relationship. The object of his inquiry is to examine and assess the nature and impact of America's aid program to Thailand over four decades since it was inaugurated in 1950.

Muscat does not try to mystify the relationship between donor and recipient. He starts from the honest premise that aid is given in order to secure some return, if only in the form of good will. He also makes clear that the prime American interest has been in the realm of security. That established, Muscat sets out the historical context of the relationship between the United States and Thailand from the end of the Pacific War and then deals systematically with the different phases and priorities of aid giving. American aid primarily in project form has been significant but modest, certainly by comparison with some other beneficiaries in Asia. Nonetheless, the author argues convincingly that the United States has on balance made an evident contribution to development and security in Thailand. He does not claim unqualified success but is able to demonstrate that priorities pursued were realistic and practical. The point is well made that economic development is best characterized by an increase in the importance of human resources in relation to other factors that together produce technological advance, rising production, and income. A great measure of American effort has been put into the promotion of human capital through extensive provision for training and in turn institution building in government departments and agencies

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and the universities. One claimed outcome has been the growing measure of Thai self-reliance in a wide range of expertise expressed in institution-building.

The time frame of the American aid program encompasses great contrasts in the condition of the Thai economy, which the author cites from presentations to Congress in 1952 and 1988. He does not claim American responsibility for the remarkable economic success of Thailand. The foundation for that success is attributed to the military dictator Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who took the advice of the distinguished economist Puey Ungphakorn to reduce the interventionist role of the state and allow the private sector its head. Puey was British and not American-trained, but the American contribution came in providing for a range of public sector services to development, including helping to modernize the bureaucracy.

One aspect of this book of particular interest to students of politics is the effect of those economic changes instituted by Sarit and supported in part by American aid. The author maintains that this initiative facilitated the emergence of the private business sector as the engine of development and also set the stage for the later emergence of the business community as a new political force that would make it more difficult for the Thai military to maintain dominance over domestic political power. The matter of the appropriate political format for Thailand, which has been a function of sustained economic development supported by American aid, remains unresolved, however. At issue still is the institutionalization of politics that subordinates the military to civilian control. It is a test of the institution building that the author maintains has been a signal product of America's aid programs.

MICHAEL LEIFER
The London School of Economics and Political Science

Warpaths: The Politics of Partition *by Robert Schaeffer. New York, Hill and Wang, 1990. 306 pages. $22.95.*

The issues Robert Schaeffer examines in his provocative new book, *Warpaths*, could not be more timely. At the dawn of the post-cold war era in which national boundaries are being redrawn by diplomat and warrior alike with dramatic suddenness, Schaeffer argues that the politics of partition in the twentieth century has stemmed more from Great Power manipulation of the international system than from age-old ethnic and sectarian rivalries. Surveying a broad array of partitioned states ranging from Ireland and Germany to Korea and Pakistan, he makes a plausible case that such carve-ups were designed to further the imperial ambitions of Britain and France or, increasingly after 1945, to fulfill the ideological objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union, not to resolve regional or local conflicts. *Warpaths*, however, is flawed by Schaeffer's discursive style, by his tendency to develop his case studies anecdotally rather than systematically,

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and by his failure to examine other relevant cases of partition, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. As a result, the book raises almost as many questions as it answers.

Schaeffer's description of the background to partition is not very earth-shattering. Nineteenth century empire building brought such Great Powers as France into conflict with indigenous peoples in such faraway places as Vietnam, where local leaders like Ho Chi Minh blended their own cultural traditions with western concepts like self-determination to mobilize resistance to French rule in the twentieth century. A similar story unfolded for Britain much closer to home in Ireland. When the costs of maintaining an empire in the face of nationalist challenges proved too steep, the British resorted to the time-honored tactic of divide and rule, hoping thereby to preserve their influence by partitioning Ireland between Catholics and Protestants, India between Moslems and Hindus, and Palestine between Arabs and Jews. For their part, the French, with an assist from the Americans, acquiesced in the partition of Vietnam along ideological lines, a cold war tactic first implemented in Germany and Korea.

As Schaeffer notes, the legacy of partition has been grim. For ethnic minorities inside partitioned states—Catholics in Northern Ireland, Palestinians in Israel—it has been a sad tale of citizenship diminished by petty apartheid and vigilante justice. For West Germany, South Korea, and other partitioned states themselves, it has often been a story of sovereignty denied by superpower manipulation. And for the world at large, Schaeffer argues in perhaps the best chapter in his book, the legacy of partition has meant increasingly bloody regional conflicts and the inexorable spread of nuclear weapons, developments which make all the talk of a new world order in the post-cold war era ring hollow. Schaeffer concludes with a passionate plea that we reject both imperialism *and* self-determination, which combined to spawn the politics of partition, and return instead to the democratic principles articulated by Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr.

Although it is hard to disagree with the general thrust of what Schaeffer has to say, his argument is not entirely convincing in many of its specifics. His Lincolnesque evocation of the perils of minority rule, for example, might have been tempered by some acknowledgment of James Madison's equally powerful critique of majoritarian tyranny in *The Federalist No. 10*. More importantly, the comparisons Schaeffer seeks to make and the lessons he seeks to draw from his case studies would, I think, have been more persuasive had those case studies been developed more systematically. Nowhere in the book does Schaeffer provide the sort of sustained analysis of, say, South Asia that Barrington Moore provided in his magisterial *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* two decades ago. As a result, one puts the book down with some nagging doubts as to whether the troubles bedeviling divided states stem more from the politics of partition than from the long-term conflicts between, say, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. Certainly, the recent recrudescence of brutal ethnic violence in such nonpartitioned states as Yugoslavia and Burundi, neither of which Schaeffer examines in any detail, suggests that tensions between Serbs and Croats or between Hutus and

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Tutsis are at least as important in sparking sectarian bloodshed as Great Power manipulation.

In short, it is not clear that partition per se is at the root of what ails today's divided nations. National liberation movements—the Basques in Spain, the Tamils in Sri Lanka—have sprung up in states that have never been partitioned. On the other hand, some partitioned states—most recently the two Yemens and the two Germanys—have found the road to reunion far smoother than one might have imagined from reading *Warpaths*. Schaeffer may well be correct to argue that for most of the past century partition has served the interests of the Great Powers while making a bad situation worse in places like Ireland and Bangladesh. But if the events of the past two years are any indication of what is to come, the politics of partition may still seem the lesser of many evils for divided societies in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe, and for the Great Powers who hope to keep those divided societies from stumbling down the warpaths of the 1990s.

DOUGLAS LITTLE
Clark University

The Ordeal of Hegemony: The United States and Latin America *by Guy Poitras. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 214 pp. $34.95.*

This book addresses a question that is at the forefront of the contemporary study of U.S.–Latin American relations: How does the decline of U.S. hegemony in the region influence the U.S.–Latin American relationship, as well as the quality of life within Latin America? In answering these questions the author presents a brief historic overview of the security, economic, and ideological components of the relationship. Poitras's conclusion is that in the face of a decline in U.S. hegemony, unless both sides learn to cooperate, regional prosperity and peace will be elusive.

In addressing this issue, Poitras has written a book appropriate to a general introductory college course. Among its plusses is the integration of general international relations arguments about hegemony and cooperation into the discussion of inter-American relations. Too often the subject is treated in a theoretical vacuum. In addition, the author is sensitive to the factors within Latin America that mitigate cooperation among the nations of the region and that may at times even lead them to seek U.S. leadership.

The book suffers from some major shortcomings of both a theoretical and empirical nature. Both of these problems inhibit Poitras's ability to convince the reader of his argument if the reader has not already come to the same conclusions. The concept of hegemony is fundamental to the study, yet it is confusingly defined. On p. 2 he tells us that it is a "*preponderance* of power of one state over other states" (emphasis in the original). The definition of preponderance, in turn,

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seems to be to "control international and even domestic outcomes of a region to suit itself." Further down the page we find that hegemonic also means "dominant," which in turn is distinguished from "preeminent," which means that "no other center of power in the Americas could dare challenge it."

Without further elaboration, this reader has difficulty understanding the difference between "preponderance/dominance" and "preeminent." Yet on p. 3 Poitras informs us that while the United States is no longer preeminent in the Americas, it remains preponderant. Since the thesis of the book is that U.S. hegemony is fading and not recoverable, the author must provide a clearer definition of hegemony as well as justify some typology of degrees of hegemony. In the absence of these clues, the reader is left with no objective basis by which to evaluate the author's claims.

This absence of criteria becomes problematic in the empirical section. Poitras informs the reader of the debate over U.S. hegemonic decline, then presents the "evidence" to show fading hegemony. As with most studies of hegemony, the author fails to justify why some statistical indicators matter more than others or why a given percentage is or is not proof of "dominance." Poitras also offers policy outcomes as measures, but with the same problem. Chapter 8's discussion of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama is supposed to demonstrate failures, limits, and the need for Latin American cooperation in this period of fading hegemony. But there is no discussion of how these three cases differ from Guatemala in 1954, the Trujillo/Castro game the U.S. and Latin America played in the Organization of American States, and the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965; all occurred in a period during which the United States was supposedly at the height of its regional hegemony.

In summary, this is a flawed but interesting introductory text that can be used to stimulate discussion about U.S.–Latin American relations in the 1990s.

DAVID R. MARES
University of California, San Diego

Cautious Revolution: The European Community Arrives *by Clifford Hackett*
New York, Praeger, 1990. 256 pp. Cloth, $42.95; paper, $15.95.

More Americans are becoming aware of the European Community's (EC) importance, but few understand its foundations and functions or the effect European economic union will have on the United States. Responding to this, Clifford Hackett has produced a straightforward overview of the EC's essential workings tailored to an American audience. The book's nine chapters address historical, institutional, and major policy issues, including general trade patterns, agriculture, technology, and monetary reform. Appendices list EC leadership and directorates as of 1990, provide dates for European Council summit meetings through December 1990, and discuss the community's budgetary process.

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The author, a former foreign service officer and congressional aide, sees a "straight and consistent historical line" (p. 35) from the 1950 Schuman Declaration to the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. As its title indicates, the book traces the gradual process toward closer political and economic integration among diverse nation-states. It avoids, however, a purely chronological approach; most sections summarize community goals, then discuss their formulation, efforts at implementation, and the ever present problems within the community.

The two largest chapters look, respectively, at the continuity and evolution of EC institutions, and at intracommunity trade. The former addresses the individual functions and limitations of EC bodies, often in the context of the SEA. The latter presents market issues in relation to political and commerical barriers; it also examines the EC's position as a trading partner with the U.S. and Asian markets. The policy-specific chapters are more concise, tracing steps toward political cooperation, reviewing joint manufacturing and R&D projects, and broadly addressing the complexities surrounding the EC's Common Agricultural Policy and the European Monetary System. Augmented with occasional charts, they also highlight factors with past or potential effects on American interests.

In presenting his facts and analyses, the author draws upon a variety of primary and secondary sources. He does lean heavily in places on Jean Monnet's *Memoirs*, frequently supplementing his own observations with quotes from that visionary of the EC. (Hackett heads the American Council for Jean Monnet Studies.) Many endnotes contain significant material and might have better served the reader by being placed at the foot of the page or integrated into the text itself.

This volume also tries to explore the concept of a "united" Europe from several angles, including social and geographic ones. This approach makes for a broad inclusion of facts, but seems excessive in places. The chapter on "Foundations of the Economic Community" begins with a discussion of prehistoric land formations; the next several pages discuss Biblical-age and medieval developments affecting Europe's demographic and cultural makeup.

A sign of rapidly changing events, the book contains only brief mentions of the possibilities of enhanced trade with the USSR and its former satellites. At times the text moves away from its otherwise analytical tone. "We" and "our" are used occasionally in referring to American interests and attitudes, and the final chapter (on the United States changing relationship with Europe) closes with the author's policy recommendations meant to improve the U.S. government's understanding of the Community and our means of dealing with the slow process of [European] integration" (p. 210).

Despite these caveats, students new to the EC will find Hackett's effort useful. *Cautious Revolution* addresses a range of important institutions and the basic issues they deal with. As a primer on the European Community, the book makes its factual points without ignoring its subjects' complexities.

JOSEPH GIBBS
Boston University

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Narcoterrorism: How Governments Around the World Have Used the Drug Trade to Finance and Further Their Terrorist Activities *by Rachel Ehrenfeld. New York, Basic Books, 1990. 225 pp. $19.95.*

The political and strategic implications of alliances between narcotics traffickers and terrorists is an issue that has not to date been adequately addressed in the scholarly literature. Rachel Ehrenfeld, a criminologist by training and currently affiliated with New York University, raises powerful questions. This book, however, does not redress the need for either the general reader or the specialist. The book fails on two levels. As a source of information, it is misleadingly incomplete in terms of both the cases it covers and the depth to which those cases are explored. No less important, the information quite often is plainly incorrect. Second, logical analysis is conspicuous by its absence: Ehrenfeld neither implements a systematic methodology nor does she seek disconfirming evidence. Rather, the book is a pastiche of cases supportive of Ehrenfeld's thesis. As such, it advances neither the scholarly debate nor the specialist's understanding of the phenomenon.

The cornerstone of Ehrenfeld's argument is that Marxist-Leninist states and terrorist groups play a key role in narcoterrorism and that the United States is the principal target for these forces. Apart from revenue, the motivation behind narcoterrorism, according to the author, is the destablization of American society. The culmination of her argument is that the American government must stop viewing narcotics trafficking as criminal activity but rather as a political assault on the West. The body of the book is contained in chapters on state and group narcoterrorism in Bulgaria, Cuba, Lebanon, Colombia, and Peru. The thrust of the material, apart from demonstrating narcotics trafficking in these countries, is to allege that the prime force behind such activities is explicit political action against the United States.

The chapter on Lebanon exemplifies this book's shortcomings. While the author accurately notes the role of narcotics transit routes in the Lebanese turf conflicts, she omits information that would provide a fuller understanding of the problem. Ehrenfeld discusses Lebanon in isolation; the key roles played by Turkey (a NATO ally) and certain West African countries (Benin, Nigeria, and Togo) as heroin routes is ignored. Then again, looking at non-leftist governments and groups heavily involved in narcotics trafficking would refute her overall thesis; yet it is essential in order to grasp the real seriousness of the threat. No mention is made of Myanmar, formerly Burma, which is the world's single largest producer of opium and where both the Yangon and Bangkok governments tolerate and reap profits from the opium trafficking conducted by the Shan United Army. Nor does she even make note of heavy involvement of all parties in the Afghanistan conflict, including the U.S.-backed *mujahadeen*, in the opium trade.

In light of the extent to which her argument hinges on the Marxist-Leninist/Soviet nature of the narcoterrorist threat, it is surprising that, writing in 1990, she merely takes note of the changes in the Soviet Union and then dismisses them as inconsequential to her argument. This undercuts the strength of her argument and further ignores the dangers that will undoubtedly spiral in a post-cold war

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world: insurgents, newly devoid of ready patrons, will turn elsewhere for funds—and narcotics is as lucrative a sideline as any.

The book is replete with so many factual errors that one risks being misinformed or left with grave doubts about the thoroughness of the research. George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which saw its heyday in the early 1970s and which according to the most recent State Department profile has recently specialized in hand grenades, gasoline bombs, and stabbings, is pronounced by Ehrenfeld to be the most active and violent of all the Palestinian terrorist groups. She further pronounces his *modus operandi* to be the plastic explosive, "Cimtex" (sic), apparently confusing Habash with the leader of the PFLP-General Command, Ahmed Jibril, who *is* skilled in the use of "Semtex" bombs and is widely reported to have carried out the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland with just such a device. This kind of factual error riddles the text: while discussing Peru, Jose Carlos Mariategui, dead since 1929, is referred to in the present tense and cited as the founder of the Peruvian Communist Party in 1978.

The final section of the book and the culmination of Ehrenfeld's argument is a chapter dedicated to the dimensions and implications of the drug problem in the United States. One key to the problem, according to the author, is the role of American culture in reinforcing drug use. Without demonstrating her logic or marshalling evidence, the U.S. drug problem is attributed to an American need for instant gratification and reliance on "crutches (chemical or otherwise) to relieve any pain" (p. 151) against a backdrop of the 1960s culture (herein the popularity of Jimmy Hendrix and Janis Joplin are cited) which glamorized drugs. Ehrenfeld concludes by calling for Washington to recognize that since terrorist groups and states use narcotics trafficking as a political weapon, American drug consumption is a national security concern.

SANYA POPOVIC
Barnard College

Conflict: Resolution and Prevention *by John Burton. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990. 295 pp. $39.95.*

This is the first in a series of four projected volumes entitled *The Conflict Series* devoted to the analysis and practice of conflict resolution in a variety of institutional settings. The volumes are sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and all will be written or co-written and coedited by John Burton. The present volume is long on *obiter dicta,* models, definitions, and abstract notions, but woefully short on empirical evidence.

One major trouble with the volume is that its author attempts to utilize the results of research in various social science disciplines but is not truly in command of the findings and major trends in these disciplines. One example will have to

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suffice. The author argues that conflicts can be resolved only when the "basic needs" of the antagonists have been satisfied. There are eight (neither nine nor ten) individuals needs: "[A] need for response, a need for security, a need for recognition, a need for stimulation, a need for distributive justice, a need for meaning, a need to be seen as rational . . . , and a need to control" (p. 95).

Such lists of alleged needs were quite the fashion in sociology and psychology in the first quarter of this century. The renowned University of Chicago sociologist, W.I. Thomas, for example, presented a list of four major "wishes" or needs in his writings around the 1910s and 1920s. Widespread criticism argued that such limited needs were insufficient conceptualizations when it comes to the human animal and that any list of basic wishes could be entertained by different scholars. Some may favor four of them; others might only be satisfied with forty. Unfortunately, this news has not yet reached Burton. He asserts that such needs are "independent of any particular culture or society: they are universal and genetically inherent in the individual. They are ontological" (p. 96). Burton provides no inkling of the many controversies that have marked such topics in the last century or so, but instead asks the reader to accept his judgments as if they were the revealed truth. Once these needs are satisfied by the participants in a conflict they are ready to choose "from many options those satisfiers that are not a threat to others, and which, desirably lead to valued exchange relationships" (p. 205). What a pity that President Saddam Hussein and Secretary of State James Baker were not aware of this notion.

The major flaw of the book is that it is almost entirely based on the fallacious argument that if people only understand each other better they will come to appreciate and like former adversaries. Alas, knowing what makes an individual or group tick may increase fear and loathing rather than brotherly love. Stalin or Hitler did not improve upon acquaintance, and the Lithuanians came to hate their Russian overlords the more they came to know them.

The great French writer André Gide once said that "good sentiments make for bad literature." Burton is surely on the side of the angels, but he seems to have too soft a heart, which impairs his vision. He is well justified, to be sure, to take a stand for basic change in the institutionally established relations between the powerful and the powerless, but what he proposes by way of remedy is only the age-old pablum of conflict resolution through the need-satisfaction of everybody. What a pity that good sentiments may make for bad social science.

LEWIS A. COSER
Boston College

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Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics *by Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990. 239 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $11.95.*

This book requires a three-handed response. On the one hand, it provides a useful overview and test of several quantitative and qualitative approaches to world politics. On the other, it leaves out several other approaches that might be even more appropriate for the subject at hand, namely superpower cooperation. Still on the other, it is unlikely that the book will directly achieve the authors' normative aim, which is "to help policy makers learn how to avoid near-misses and collisions on the three-way street of world politics" (p. 2); if policy makers make use of this book, it will either be through the indirect influence it exerts on more accessible accounts, or on the thinking of students who read it and ultimately become policy makers themselves.

The book's reception in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, however, is not the primary concern of the academic community. And taken from a scholarly perspective, the book should be widely read. It provides a unique attempt at applying prominent theories of international relations to a novel data base on Sino-U.S.-Soviet relations, and does so in a remarkably lucid fashion. The models are largely drawn from game theory, but psychological approaches in the Robert Jervis genre are utilized as well.

The authors suggestive finding is that triangular relations among the superpowers have not simply been "up and down" depending on the prevailing political winds, but have evolved in a cooperative direction over the past twenty years. They argue that these relations resemble a "two steps forward, one step back" function; the game being played, therefore, is much more complex than tit-for-tat. Indeed, the strategies of the players over time have apparently been influenced by learning and other dynamic factors that still remain tangential to most international relations scholarship.

It is inappropriate to fault a book for not testing *all* available theories of a given phenomenon, but in the case at hand one wonders if the authors' normative interests did not overwhelm their scientific research. After all, the authors wish to explain superpower *cooperation*, in which cooperation presumably means mutually beneficial policy coordination. But what if the increased frequency of "cooperation" is simply a function of growing U.S. power vis-à-vis its other rivals? The parsimonious explanation of improved relations would then have nothing to do with games and learning, but would simply be a function of American hegemony. One gets the impression that the authors are not comfortable with the thought and thus turn their analytical focus elsewhere.

ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN
Brandeis University

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New Soviet Thinking and U.S. Nuclear Policy *by David B. Myers. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990. 295 pp. $44.95.*

Are Soviet nuclear weapons still a threat to U.S. interests? Myers argues quite reasonably that since Soviet nuclear forces will be significant even after the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the U.S. still needs a policy toward them. He promises a reexamination of U.S. security policy in light of new Soviet thinking, but unfortunately he provides neither a detailed analysis of the impact of the new thinking nor a fresh examination of U.S. policy. The issues may be new to Myers—many of the classic works in the field of arms control and nuclear strategy are absent from the bibliography—but he merely raises old debates that have appeared extensively in the scholarly and popular literature.

The author's goal is to guide the reader through the various U.S. options so that he or she can make a more informed choice about the best option for the American government to pursue. Myers makes an analogy to criminal corrections policy in delineating four possible responses to the Soviet threat: deterrence, defense, retribution, and rehabilitation. Myers also describes seven criteria for judging these different options, including coherence, moral defensibility, legal defensibility, technical feasibility, and affordability.

Myers discusses the pros and cons of the policy options without evaluating their relative merits himself, saying that he wants to let the reader come to his or her own conclusions. But while Myers, a professor of philosophy, provides a thorough discussion of the moral and legal aspects of different nuclear strategies, he does not provide the general reader enough information to make a well-reasoned decision based on the other criteria. For instance, although affordability is one of his criteria, he does not offer any dollar figures, so the reader cannot compare the costs of the given policies. Myers also creates numerous contradictions in describing the different options. For example, in discussing the civil defense option, Myers argues that following a nuclear attack, "[r]adioactive fallout tends to decay rapidly. . . . Citizens could safely emerge after several weeks underground" (p. 128). But then in the next chapter, when discussing a policy of retribution (for example, an attack on the Soviet leadership alone), he says that even a limited nuclear war would have long-range effects and "would be a global Chernobyl" (p. 167).

The chief problem with the book is that Myers is rehashing old issues: Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) vs. Flexible Response; the merits of the Strategic Defense Initiative; the problems of proportionality in responding to an attack; and the possibilities of removing the incentives for war. In a new age of U.S.–Soviet relations, the discussions hardly seem fresh. Myers is correct in arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons still poses a threat, but the major U.S. concern now is not a deliberate Soviet attack, but inadvertent or accidental launches due to Soviet loss of control, a subject that receives one paragraph in the book.

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The general idea behind the book is not a bad one (nor a new one): give the public more information so that people can make more informed decisions about what the government should be doing. What the public needs now, however, is a better understanding of how the current economic and political crises in the USSR threaten U.S. security interests, not another debate about MAD vs. Flexible Response.

JAMES M. GOLDGEIER
Cornell University

Correction: The first sentence of the last paragraph of Tinsley E. Yarbrough's review of Harry Wellington's *Interpreting the Constitution* (*PSQ* Summer 1991: 376–378) should have ended: . . . Wellington's work is far less satisfying than the more systematic efforts of Michael Perry, Ronald Dworkin, and other proponents of a values-based jurisprudence.

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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

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

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

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